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 Synopsis 
 
This thesis composes of four empirical studies with an attempt to assess the 
role of institutions as key determinant of cross-country development.  We 
have unbundled the different facets of institutions, including the security of 
property rights, democracy, regulation and stability of monetary policy.  In 
Chapter 2, we investigate the direct impact of institutions on economic growth 
using dynamic panel data estimations.  Employing this estimator aims at 
alleviating the technical problems embedded in the existing literature.  Our 
results suggest that the security of property rights and stability of monetary 
policy have direct impact on economic growth, whereas democracy and 
regulation are not directly growth-enhancing.  In Chapter 3, we further 
explore the role of democracy and regulation in the development process.  We 
empirically test whether economic reform is more likely to take place in 
democratic economies.  The answer seems affirmative.  More specifically, 
our empirical results show that democracy causes reforms in redistributive 
policies, trade liberalisation and credit market deregulation.  In the next 
Chapter, we consider the institutional barriers as compared to natural barrier 
and at-the-board barriers as determinants of bilateral FDI.  The augmented 
gravity model provides empirical evidences to support that geography, regional 
integration and domestic regulatory environment of the destination economies 
all have significant impacts on FDI inflows.  In particular, credit market 
regulation is amongst the most important, which echoes the view that financial 
development is essential to economic development.  In the final empirical 
work, we hypothesise that institutions matter to cross-country economic 
performances as economies with better institutions are technically more 
efficient.  We estimate a global stochastic production frontier, where countries 
lie below the frontier are less efficient.  Our empirical results suggest that 
countries with better security of property rights and fewer regulations allocate 
their production inputs more efficiently.  The effects of democratic regime and 
stability of monetary policy are also positive to improve inefficiency, if a 
threshold level of human capital is reached.  Other possible factors like 
openness and human capital, in turn, seem not to play direct role.  Our 
research provides empirical basis to understand how particular aspects of 
institutions could affect development outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Background 
 
Economic growth is perhaps one of the most important subjects in the field of 
economic development.  Sustained high growth rates are usually regarded as 
the main driver of improving the general welfare and income of a country.  
Neoclassical growth models, like Solow (1956), have put great emphasis on the 
role of physical capital accumulation.  Modern economic growth theories 
have been extended to consider innovations, technology, human capital as well 
as institutions as the fundamental causes of growth.   
 
Reviewing the recent global development, we saw the most rapid growth 
around the world in the past 30 years.  The rate of global integration, via trade 
and foreign direct investment, is unprecedented.  This in turn has facilitated 
technology flow.  Total world trade as a percentage of GDP rose from 26.7% 
in 1970 to 54.2% in 2005.  At the same time nevertheless, the income gaps 
between the rich and the poor economies are also increasing.  The headcount 
number of poverty has just lately reached a new peak of over 1.3 billion1.  
The development experiences are quite diverse across regions. 
 
Figure  1.1-1 shows that there has been a distinct acceleration of real GDP per 
capita growth since the 80s in most of the developing economies.  Continuous 
economic growth should have naturally helped close the income gaps between 
the developed and developing economies.  However, this seemingly is not the 
case, especially for countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure  1.1-2).   
 
 
                                                 
1 Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2009) (Retrieved from: 
http://www.fao.org/hunger/hunger_home/hunger_at_glance/en/) 
-3- 
 
Figure  1.1-1: Average Growth Rates of Real GDP Per Capita during 1961—2008 (%) 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  Growth rates are simple average.  
 
 
Figure  1.1-2: GDP per capita (2005 constant price, PPP-adjusted) by Regions 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  Data for Europe and Central Asia in 
1980 is not available.  
 
 
 
Table  1.2.1-1 shows the income gaps between developing economies and 
high-income OECD economies in selected years.  It is noted that the average 
real GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted) of the high-income OECD countries was 
about 10 times of that of those countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region in 
1980.  However, the corresponding figure surged to 17 times in 2008.   
-4- 
 
 
Table  1.2.1-1: Income Gaps with respect to High-income OECD Countries by Regions 
 
Region/Year 1980 1990 2000 2008 
East Asia & Pacific 24.59 17.56 10.46 5.97 
Europe & Central Asia .. 1.87 3.37 2.05 
Latin America & Caribbean 1.70 2.68 2.84 2.58 
Middle East & North Africa 3.29 4.48 4.77 4.04 
South Asia 22.17 20.47 17.98 12.88 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.24 14.98 19.11 17.06 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  .. denotes that data is not available.   
 
 
All these trigger the recent interest in studying the role of domestic institutions 
as the fundamental cause of such “great divergence”.  The IMF (2005) also 
advises that, to have considerable economic progress, development challenges 
have increasingly become how to improve the quality of the domestic 
institutional framework.  It is because bad institutions will distort the usage of 
production inputs like labour and capital, the adoption and utilisation of ideas 
from leading nations.  Hence, understanding the channels through which 
institutions work on the development outcomes are essential in order to put 
forward any policy suggestions that would achieve the objectives of sustainable 
development.   
 
 
1.2 What are Institutions and Which Types of Institutions are Important 
to Economic Development?  
 
1.2.1 North’s Definition 
 
For the sake of discussion, we must first understand the meaning of institutions.  
In his seminal work, North (1981) defines institutions as “the rules of the game 
in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction.  In consequence they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (also see North (1990)).  In 
other words, the possibility choice set of an individual is defined and limited by 
institutions.  Economic institutions in a very broad sense, such as the structure 
of property rights and the presence and perfection of markets, influence the 
-5- 
structure of economic incentives in a society.  This structure will direct 
individuals how resources are allocated and secure who gets the profits, 
revenues and the residual rights of control.  In a nutshell, societies with 
economic institutions that facilitate factor accumulation, innovation and the 
efficient allocation of resources will prosper (also see Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2005)).  
 
North further elaborates that institutions can be interpreted as informal 
constraints and formal rules.  The informal constraints as “code of conduct, 
norms of behaviour, and conventions … which come from socially transmitted 
information and are a part of the heritage that we call culture” (1990, P.36-37).  
That said, culture inherited in different societies may also significantly explain 
why same formal rules have made diverse outcomes in various circumstances.  
 
For the present thesis, our key interest is on formal rules nevertheless.  
“Formal rules include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and 
contracts.  The hierarchy of such rules, from constitutions, to statute and 
common laws, to specific bylaw, and finally to individual contracts defines 
constraints, from general rules to particular specifications” (North 1990, P. 47)2.  
It suggests, therefore, at least three principle aspects of institutions – (i) 
political rules (hereafter interpreted as political institutions), (ii) economic rules 
(hereafter referred as economic institutions, which shape the property rights 
structures) and (iii) contracts (between individuals and/or parties).   
 
1.2.2 Interrelationships between Political Institutions and Economic 
Institutions 
 
The IMF (2005) extends North’s definition of institution by stressing the 
interrelationship between economic and political institutions.  The term 
political institution refers to institutions that shape the incentives of the 
                                                 
2 More specifically, “political rules broadly define the hierarchical structure of the polity, its 
basic decision structure, and the explicit characteristics of agenda control.  Economic rules 
define property rights as the bundle of rights over the use and the income to be derived from 
property and the ability to alienate an asset or a resource.  Contracts contain the provisions, 
specific to a particular agreement in exchange”. 
-6- 
political executive and determine the distribution of political power, which 
includes the ability to shape economic institutions and the distribution of 
resources.  Economic institutions, by determining the relative affluence of 
various groups of society, also help shape political institutions.  Good 
economic institutions are most likely to flourish in a “rent-free” environment, 
in which small groups are not able to take advantage of a monopoly position in 
a particular industry or activity, or privileged access to natural resources.  
More importantly, good economic institutions are also likely to be 
accompanied by good political institutions.  If political power is broadly 
shared and subject to checks and balances, there is much less risk that those 
with political power will take advantage of their position to extract rents 
themselves.   
 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) provide a survey of recent work on 
institution and economic growth in the Handbook of Economic Growth, which 
summarises the approach adopted and key conclusions the subject obtained in 
the last decade or so.  The literature developed so far, as they outlined, largely 
attempts to build a framework to explain why economic institutions differ 
across countries and how the economic institutions determine political 
institutions.  Models of such kind, studying the political economics of 
institutions, largely draw on historical experiences.  In retrospect, economic 
institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors 
and thus shape economic outcomes.  Groups with de facto political power 
also strive for the distribution of economic institutions to affect the distribution 
of resources.   
 
Despite these earlier works on institutions, there is a general impression that 
the literature usually does not present a coherent and systematic explanation to 
different measures of institutions.  It is due to the fact that despite all 
theoretical propositions and empirical evidences, there is not a strong 
conclusion about exactly “what” institutions matter to economic growth.  One 
pertinent reason certainly is the lack of an operational framework and the 
measure of “institution”.  As Acemoglu (2009) also points out, the notion of 
institutions used in most of the literature is rather broad.  There is so far little 
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work on unbundling the broad cluster of institutions to understand what 
specific types of institutions might be important for economic outcomes.  
  
1.2.3 Rodrik’s Taxonomy of Institutions  
 
To proceed with our empirical tests in a more systematic manner henceforth, 
we propose to adopt a conceptual framework designed by Rodrik (2005) and 
later adopted by Bhattacharyya (2009)3 .  Rodrik (2005) identifies “good 
institutions” as those that deliver the first-order economic principles – i.e. 
protection of property rights, contract enforcement, market-based competition, 
appropriate incentives, sound money, debt sustainability – effectively.  
Without overseeing the inter-relationship between economic and political 
institutions, Rodrik (2005) also shares the view that political entity is also 
needed to be strong enough to establish property rights and enforce contracts 
for its own purpose.  The interplay between political institution and economic 
institution represents a “right balance between disorder and dictatorship” and 
thus should be considered together.   
 
On this basis, he suggests a taxonomy of “market-sustaining institutions”.  
These institutional arrangements are believed to help achieve cross-country 
economic convergence with the level of development in the developed world.  
The components of market-sustaining institutions are shown in Table  1.2.3-1.  
His taxonomy can be understood in 4 dimensions, namely “market-creating”, 
“market-regulating”, “market-stabilising” and “market-legitimising” 
institutions.   
 
                                                 
3 His work, nevertheless, emphasizes the direct partial impact of human capital on growth, 
instead of institutions.   
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Table  1.2.3-1: A Taxonomy of Market-Sustaining Institutions 
✽ Market-creating institutions 
o Property rights  
o Contract enforcement 
 
 
✽ Market-regulating institutions 
o  Regulatory bodies  
o Other mechanisms for correcting 
market failures  
 
 
✽ Market-stabilizing institutions 
o  Monetary and fiscal institutions  
o  Institutions of prudential regulation and 
supervision  
 
✽ Market-legitimizing institutions 
o Democracy  
o Social protection and social insurance  
 
 
Source: Rodrik (2005) 
 
On market-creating institutions, since Mises (1947) and Mises (1951), Hayek 
(1944) and Hayek (1945), Alchian (1950), Friedman (1962) and Kirzner (1973), 
the importance of market process has been vastly emphasized.  These 
pioneering works have highlighted the essence of economic institutions and 
their role of providing both the incentive and information in making the best 
use of available resources to market participants.  Security of property rights 
and contract enforcement affect incentives, productive efforts, and the 
effectiveness of resource used.  Without such security, the incentive structure 
of the economy will be seriously weakened.   
 
Under Rodrik (2005)’s taxonomy, he is also of the view that markets require 
extensive regulations to minimize the abuse of market power, internalize 
externalities, deal with information asymmetries, establish product and safety 
standards etc (i.e. market-regulating institutions).  Countries also need 
monetary, fiscal, and other arrangements to deal with business cycles (i.e. 
market-stabilising institutions).  Finally democratic governance, also reflected 
in Rodrik (2000)’s views, is reckoned as the market-legitimising institutions for 
the realization and security of market outcomes, say through social protection 
and social insurance.  The role of political process (political regime 
specifically) thus may not enter into the development process directly.  It 
nevertheless could be understood as the institutional arrangement that provide 
the incentives for the market participants to realize the development outcomes 
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after economic development is achieved4.   
 
In overall terms, this classification characterises and creates synergy for 
economic and political institutions and policies.  This thus allows us to bring 
both economic and political institutions together to be tested under a unified 
framework.  In the present thesis, our understanding and clustering of 
institutions are by and large based on this taxonomy.    
 
 
1.3 Effects of Institutions and their Dynamics 
 
1.3.1 Institutional Quality and Development Outcomes 
 
Indeed, when we take a snapshot of institutional quality and development 
outcomes, we do find a seemingly positive relationship.  We consider the 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index as a proxy of overall quality of 
economic institution and four aspects of development as shown below – 
namely GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and gross capital formation.  Figure  1.3-1 to Figure  1.3-4 show that better 
quality of economic institution does associate with higher GDP per capita, 
average GDP per capita growth rate and FDI, yet to a less extent gross capital 
formation.   
 
 
                                                 
4 The incentive-inducing property of democracy may help explain why political regime 
usually does not exhibit direct impact on growth in the literature.  Details are to be discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
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Figure  1.3-1: Economic Freedom and PPP-adjusted Real GDP Per Capita (const 2005 
dollar) in 2007 
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Figure  1.3-2: Economic Freedom and Average Real GDP Per Capita Growth Rate during 
1990-2007 
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Figure  1.3-3: Economic Freedom and Net Inflows of FDI as % of GDP during 1990-2007 
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Figure  1.3-4: Economic Freedom and Gross Capital Formation during 1990 - 2007 
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Sources: Economic Freedom of the World Report 2008, Fraser Institute. 
 
 
1.3.2 Institutional Changes and Transitions Over the Past Decades 
 
These figures above suggest a positive correlation between institutional quality 
and development outcomes around the world.  However, such correlation may 
not imply a straightforward causal relationship and possibly invite two further 
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(and perhaps related) questions.  Firstly, there might be some other factors 
affecting both institutions and economic development.  Reverse causality is 
also possible since richer economies may have more resources to build up 
better institutions.  Secondly, these snapshots ignore any institutional change 
over time.  The IMF (2005) indeed has also concurred that rapid institutional 
change was possible in the past 30 years despite the tendency to institutional 
persistence.   
 
The regional plots of economic institutional quality from the World Bank’s 
Governance Indicators – that we use to proxy economic institution – and 
political institutions from the Polity IV data are presented below in Figure 
 1.3-5 and Figure  1.3-6.  It is shown that institutional changes, in terms of both 
economic and political institutions, did take place over the last few decades.  
It is therefore worth pursuing a study to investigate if there are any 
interrelationships with these institutional changes with the global development 
scenarios that we observe earlier.  The way to undertake this investigation in a 
more robust manner is to perform some econometric analyses.   
 
Figure  1.3-5: Economic Institutions (measured by Governance Indicators) by Regions 
(1996 – 2004) 
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Sources: IMF and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005).  Institutional quality is the World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators, ranging from -2.5 to 2.5.  Regional scores are average scores. 
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Figure  1.3-6: Political Institutions by Regions (1970 – 2003) 
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Source: IMF, Marshall and Jaggers (2003).  Scores are regional average of Polity index.  
Scores from 0 to 10 denote democracy, whereas 0 to -10 denote autocracy. 
 
 
1.3.3 Quantitative Measures of Institutions 
 
However, one of the major problems of undertaking empirical work using 
quantitative measure of institutions is the lack of objective data for a 
sufficiently long time span.  For this study, we have considered few data 
sources of measuring institutional quality and governance5.  Not to mention 
the different aspects these variables are measuring, the time span of these data 
also greatly limit the proper choices we can make.  We summarise the key 
features of selected data sources in Table  1.3.3-1 below.   
 
For example, data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), one of 
the most frequently used data sources in the literature, only start from 1984.  
The World Bank’s Governance Indicators developed by Knack and Keefer 
(1995) on the other hand constitute different institutional measures such as 
quality of the bureaucracy, property rights, and the political stability of a 
country to measure cross-country “governance”, and are only available since 
                                                 
5 For a complete review of governance/institutional indicators from different public and 
private sources, UNDP (2007)’s publication can be referred.   
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1998.  Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index spans relatively longer, 
starting from 1970.  The only exception perhaps is the Polity IV dataset for 
measuring political institutions, which covers measurements of several 
decades. 
 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index is so far, to the best of our 
knowledge, the most comprehensive set of indicators measuring economic 
freedom and, to some extent, institutional quality in general with the longest 
time span.  It also covers a reasonable large number of economies.  Data can 
be traced back to as early as 1970, in a 5-year interval for the earlier years and 
annually from 2000 onwards.  As such, we rely heavily on these indices to 
measure economic institutions in the following chapters.   
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Table  1.3.3-1 : Comparison of Selected Institutional Indicators 
 
 
Data 
Time Span 
Frequency 
Aspects Covered 
No. of 
Economies 
Studied 
I.  Political Institution 
(1) 
Polity IV – Political Regime 
and Authority Characteristics 
Start from 1800 
Annual 
(1) Institutionalised democracy; (2) Institutionalised autocracy; (3) Regime durability 161 
(2) 
Freedom House – Annual 
Survey of Freedom 
Start from 1955 
Annual 
(1) Political rights (including electoral processes, political participation and pluralism, 
functioning of government and discretionary questions) and (2) Civil liberties (freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law and personal 
autonomy and individual right) 
192 
II.  Economic Institution 
(3) 
Fraser Institute – Economic 
Freedom Index 
Start from 1970 
Annual since 2000 
(1) Size of government; (2) Legal structure and security of property rights; (3) Access to 
sound money; (4) Freedom to trade internationally and (5) Regulation of credit, labour and 
business. 
141 
(4) 
Heritage Foundation – Index 
of Economic Freedom  
Start from 1994 
Annual 
(1) Trade policy; (2) Fiscal burden of government; (3) Government intervention in the 
economy; (4) Monetary policy; (5) Capital flows and foreign investment; (6) Banking and 
finance; (7) Wages and prices; (8) Property rights; (9) Regulation, and (10) Informal market 
activity. 
161 
(5) 
ICRG – International Country 
Risk  
Start from 1984 
Annual 
(1) Economic risk; (2) Political risk, and (3) Financial Risk 166 
(6) 
World Bank (WB) 
Governance Indicators 
Start from 1996 
Annual since 2002 
(1) Voice and accountability; (2) Political stability and absence of violence; (3) Government 
effectiveness ; (4) Regulatory quality; (5) Rule of law, and (6) Control of corruption 
213 
(7) 
WB Ease of Doing Business 
Report 
Start from 2004 
Annual 
(1) Starting a business; (2) Dealing with construction permits; (3) Employing workers; (4) 
Registering property; (5) Getting credit; (6) Protecting investors; (7)Paying taxes; (8) 
Trading across borders; (9) Enforcing contracts, and (10) Closing a business 
183 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
 
There is a broad agreement in academia that institutions play a fundamental 
role in economic development.  Nevertheless, the question about which 
specific types of institutions actually relate to specific economic outcomes are 
not adequately addressed.  Our primary research interest is to identify the 
channels through which development outcomes are affected by economic and 
political institutions directly. 
 
During the course of doing so, we are aware that institutional changes did 
occur to various degrees across countries (see also IMF (2005)).  Unlike 
previous studies that generally focus on cross-country long-term relationship, 
analysis in a dynamic setting is perhaps more relevant in this case.  We also 
understand that economic and political institutions may take some time to 
change, policies could be in place sooner instead.  Rodrik’s taxonomy allows 
us to estimate the effects of institutions and policies in a unified framework.  
Besides, how domestic institutions relate to the role of policy and government 
interventions, as well as external institutions also raise our genuine curiosity to 
proceed with this piece of work.    
 
Against this background, our key research questions can be summarised as a 
series of related themes as follows:   
 
(a) Exactly what development outcomes are directly affected by institutional 
quality?   
(b) Are these development outcomes affected by economic or political 
institutions, or macroeconomic policies or other economic fundamentals? 
(c) Given that institutional changes do occur, do economic and political 
institutions cause changes in macroeconomic policies?  Similarly, do 
macroeconomic policies cause institutional changes?  
(d) Other than domestic institutions, do external institutions have any role to 
play in the development process? 
 
With regard to development outcomes, we are interested in four specific 
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aspects, namely economic growth, economic reforms, FDI and technical 
efficiency.  With these in mind, hopefully the results can identify the channels 
through which institutions have direct effects on economic development.  It 
may also help shed some light on any policy implications and help address the 
question of how better institutions can be built.  One main characteristic of 
our analysis, which distinguishes ours from the previous ones surrounding this 
subject, is the use of panel data.  Partly reflecting data limitation, existing 
literature is largely cross-sectional in nature.  Using panel data can help taking 
into account of cross-sectional heterogeneity and thus minimise the risk of 
obtaining biased results arising from omitted variables in the specifications.  
Panel data also gives us more information, less collinearity, more variablility 
and more degree of freedom.  In our case, the time dimension is important, 
which allows us to capture the effect of institutional changes.  Using panel 
data can also let us study better the dynamics of adjustment.  All in all, our 
contributions are intended to be entirely empirical.   
 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is composed of four empirical studies, which investigate the effects 
of institutions on cross-country economic development from different 
perspectives.  In Chapter 2, we will revisit the empirical evidence of the 
effects of institutions on GDP per capita growth.  Although the institution 
view literature largely suggests that institutions are the fundamental cause of 
growth, we find that the empirical evidences are rather inconclusive.  It on 
one hand partly reflects that technical limitations – especially endogeneity – 
are not adequately tackled in these studies.  On the other hand, there appears 
no consensus to exactly what institutions cause growth as we mentioned earlier.  
Using Rodrik (2005)’s taxonomy aforementioned, we test the direct partial 
impact of these four clusters of institutions on growth using dynamic panel 
GMM estimation.  The taxonomy provides a functional definition of 
institutions, allowing us to identify exactly what institutions matter to growth.  
At the same time, our methodology is technically improved without the need to 
look for “external” instruments to tackle the endogeneity problem.  More 
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importantly, we could estimate the effects of institutional change (i.e. the 
short-run effects of institutions) on growth, without assuming institutional 
persistence.  
 
Chapter 3 is a brief extension of the previous one, with particular focus on the 
role of political institution – i.e. democratic regime.  We investigate whether 
economic reforms are more likely to take place in democracies since greater 
accountability may lead the government to adopt measures that gain majority 
support.  Economic reforms are referred as comprehensive measures that 
broaden the scope of the market and of the international market.  Using the 
same methodology as in Chapter 2, we study whether democracy causes 
economic reforms in different sectors, namely fiscal measures, trade 
liberalisation, credit market liberalisation, capital account openness and labour 
market deregulation.  Reciprocally, we will also test if economic reforms 
cause the democratisation process. 
 
In Chapter 4, we will explore the determinants of FDI.  Considering three sets 
of factors – natural barriers, “at-the-border” barrier (i.e. regional trade 
agreement) and “behind the border” barrier (i.e. domestic regulatory 
environment), we deploy an augmented gravity model to test if any one of 
these affect intra-OECD and inter-OECD bilateral FDI.  The main aim is to 
study the impacts of external institution vis-à-vis domestic institution on one of 
the key aspects of global market extension – FDI.   
 
In Chapter 5, our main objective is to explain the diverse economic 
performances across countries.  We argue that different cross-country 
performances are the results of differences in technical inefficiency caused by 
the inefficient allocation of production inputs.  We measure cross-country 
technical efficiency by means of estimating a stochastic production frontier.  
It represents a global production frontier, allowing us to estimate the 
best-practice and to segregate the effects of technical change and efficiency 
change for each country.  We essentially intend to test the competing views of 
whether human capital, openness or institutions would explain such technical 
inefficiency.   
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In Chapter 6, we will summarise all of our empirical findings obtained and 
briefly discuss their policy implications.  We will also point out the 
limitations of our work and suggest extensions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 : INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH – REVISITING THE EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE USING DYNAMIC PANEL GMM 
ESTIMATIONS 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
This is the first empirical analysis of this thesis.  To explore the interaction 
between institution and economic development, the most direct analysis would 
be to study the growth impact of institution.  After all, one of the means of 
improving the well-being of the society is through promoting economic growth, 
thereby narrowing the cross-country income differences.     
 
The proposition that domestic institutions matter to economic growth is not 
new in the economic development literature.  Nevertheless, there are 
competing views arguing that the role of institutions is too overplayed.  
Amongst others, critiques claim that geographical endowments, culture, 
religion, historical events are also key determinants.  Other empirical works 
suggest that in fact human capital is an even more fundamental cause of 
economic growth.  Exactly what institutions matter to economic growth is 
also very loosely defined.  Others criticise that the institution view literature 
present evidence in a very long-run timeframe, assuming that institutions are 
persistent and without considering the effect of institutional change on the 
economic outcome today. 
 
Although there is a vast amount of empirical evidence to support the institution 
view, the estimation strategies are being severely scrutinised.  Critics rightly 
point out that the existing empirical literature is predominantly cross-sectional 
in nature, thereby ignoring the dynamic impact of institution on growth.  
Furthermore, they do not control for the country-specific and time 
characteristics.  In addition, both institutions and economic growth 
understandably can be endogenously determined.  Even though instrumental 
variable (IV) estimations are widely used to tackle such problem, the validity 
of instruments has called for many doubts.  Last but not least, data quality and 
definition of institution are also subject to many criticisms.  
 
In light of these limitations and comments, we propose to use a dynamic panel 
data model to revisit the issue.  We attempt to test whether the institution has 
a direct partial impact on growth, after controlling for income level, 
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time-invariant country-specific and time characteristics.  Using GMM 
estimators in a dynamic panel data model allows us to estimate the impact of 
institution on economic growth without seeking “external” instruments, yet 
taken the problem of endogeneity into account.   
 
In response to the question of exactly what institutions matter to growth, we 
adopt a unified framework developed by Rodrik (2005) for our empirical 
investigations.  To recap, institutions refer to those that sustain the market 
operations of the economy under his taxonomy.  He develops the taxonomy 
into four clusters, namely “market-creating” institution – measuring the 
security of property rights and contract enforcement, “market-regulating” 
institution – measuring the regulatory environment of the society, 
“market-stabilising” institution – measuring the fiscal and monetary institution 
to stabilise the market and finally “market-legitimising” institution – measuring 
the political regime which legitimises the market operation.  As noted, this 
way of clustering brings three frequently, yet separately tested, dimensions of 
institutions – economic institution, political institution and policy – into 
synergy.   
 
Against the background of all these inadequacies of the existing empirical 
literature, we attempt to revisit the empirical evidence of institution and growth 
for three main objectives.  First, we jointly test the impact of economic and 
political institutions on growth using dynamic panel data models.  Such 
methodology helps partially solve the problem of finding “external” 
instruments for tackling the weak endogeneity problem.  Second, it allows 
country-fixed effect and within-country change over time to be controlled for.  
That said, we do not assume institutions persist.  Third, we use Rodrik 
(2005)’s taxonomy as the operational framework for our assessment, adopting 
a unified approach to investigate the relative importance and direct partial 
impact of each type of institutions on growth.   
 
All in all, we essentially try to answer do and what institutions cause growth.  
Our estimation results reflect the direct and short-run impacts of institutions on 
economic growth.  The questions of whether they affect other dimensions of 
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economic development will be further investigated in the coming Chapters.  
  
This Chapter is organised as the following.  We will present a brief literature 
survey in Section  2.2.  Our estimation technique and data will be discussed in 
Section  2.3.  The empirical results follow in Section  2.4.  We conclude in 
Section  2.5. 
 
 
2.2 Literature Survey: Institution and Economic Growth  
 
A vast amount of theoretical and empirical work on institutions and growth has 
been developed in the last two decades.  In the following, we briefly review 
the results of these key studies, their critics and empirical shortcomings.  We 
will first compare three strands of views of cross-country economic 
development, namely endowment view, institution view and a combination of 
the two.  We then proceed to the empirical results of testing the institution 
view with specific reference to economic and political institutions.  Based on 
the literature survey, we summarise 6 key technical shortcomings of these 
empirics with an aim to provide justifications for the estimation we perform in 
the present Chapter.   
 
2.2.1 Endowment View on Economic Growth 
 
Traditional growth theories emphasize the role of human capital (e.g. Lucas 
(1988)), technological diffusion (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997)), public 
infrastructure (e.g. Barro (1990)) or incentives to innovate (e.g. Romer (1990)).  
North and Thomas (1973) nonetheless argue that institutions are the sources of 
cross-country differences in growth.  This view was further echoed by 
Acemoglu, et al. (2005) and IMF (2005), claiming that institution is a more 
fundamental cause of growth.  However, this institutional view of growth 
invites a major debate with the endowment view.  The latter essentially argues 
that geographical factors directly shape the output, income distribution or 
technology adoption in the society.  A third strand of the literature, hereafter 
developed, combines the essence of the institution and endowment views on 
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growth.  This strand opines that economic growth is not directly determined 
by natural factor endowment, but it will shape the policy and institutional 
choices of politicians and/or colonizers.  These choices in turn have a positive 
and long-term effect of economic prosperity.  This third strand largely 
dominates the empirical interests in the literature.  We will discuss briefly 
these three competing and complementing views below.   
   
2.2.1.1 Direct Impact of Geography 
 
The endowment view claims that natural resources to population determine the 
productivity and technology in production.  Earlier works like Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997) provide a historical account and qualitatively argue that the 
composition of population, climate, soils and native populations in the United 
States and Canada significantly explained the relative distribution of wealth, 
human capital and the decentralized political power developed as compared to 
the development experiences of Latin America economies.  Latin America 
economies, as they argue, enjoyed a climate and soil conditions that were 
extremely well suited for growing crops.  Their populations then quickly 
generated vastly unequal distributions of wealth, human capital, and political 
power.  The extensive native populations in the regions colonized by the 
Spanish were powerful factors leading to extreme inequality.  In contrast, 
small, family-sized farms were the rule in the northern colonies of the North 
American mainland, where climatic conditions favoured a regime of mixed 
farming focused on grains and livestock that exhibited quite limited economies 
of scale in production and used few slaves.  These regions do not appear to 
have been very attractive to Europeans during the first quarter of a millennium 
after they began to colonize the New World, since only a small fraction of the 
migrants to the New World opted to locate there. However, the circumstances 
fostered relatively homogeneous populations with relatively equal distributions 
of human capital and wealth.  
 
Sachs and Warner (2001) postulate the “curse of natural resources”, i.e. 
countries with great wealth of natural resources tend to grow more slowly than 
resource-poor countries.  Their ordinary least square (OLS) estimations 
-25- 
suggest that the average GDP per capita growth rate during 1970-1990 is 
negatively associated with the natural resource abundance variables.  They 
explain that this curse may be due to the fact that resource-abundant countries 
are high-price economies and, thus, they tend to miss-out the opportunities of 
export-led growth.  Arezki and Ploeg (2007) provide a more recent empirical 
evidence to support Sachs and Warner’s hypothesis.  Understandably, 
institutions, openness and income growth could be endogenously determined.  
Therefore, the authors use cross-country instrumental variable (IV) estimations 
to correct for the endogenous nature of institutions and openness1, they find a 
significant negative direct impact of natural resources on income per capita, as 
well as indirect effect of natural resources on institutions.  In particular, the 
natural resource curse is particularly severe for economic performance in 
countries with a low degree of trade openness.   
 
Other than natural resource endowment, disease burden provides another 
explanation for poor economic performance.  Diamond (1997) and Gallup, 
Sachs, and Mellinger (1998) share similar views that adverse geographical 
conditions hamper agricultural productivity and habitants’ health.  Gallup, et 
al. (1998), one of the earliest empirical works supporting the endowment view, 
investigates the ways in which geography may matter directly for growth.  
Their OLS empirical results show that location and climate of the economy 
have large direct effects on income levels and income growth through the 
effects on transport costs, disease burdens and agricultural productivity.  The 
results survive even after controlling for the quality of public institutions2.  
They also find that poor regions are typically characterise with locations far 
from the coast, implying that they face large transport costs for international 
                                                 
1 They incorporate the rule of law index from Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) to measure 
institution and de facto openness (i.e. total trade as percentage of GDP) in their estimations 
which suffer from endogeneity bias.  Hence, they instrument the regressors with a 
combination of UK legal origin, log of settler mortality, fraction of population speaking 
English, and a bilateral gravity estimate of openness.  Literature relating to the use of these 
instruments will be discussed further in the coming Section.  The use of IV estimation helps 
tackle the problem of endogenetiy.  If ignored, the least square estimators are biased and 
inconsistent estimator.   
2 The quality of public institutions is based on an index created by Knack and Keefer (1995), 
which is an average of five indicators, including (a) the perceived efficiency of the government 
bureaucracy, (b) the extent of government corruption, (c) efficacy of the rule of law, (d) the 
presence or absence of expropriation risk, and (e) the perceived risk of repudiation of contracts 
by the government.  
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trade, as well as populations in tropical regions of high disease burden.  
Comparing different regions, Sachs (2000) similarly find that tropical areas 
have a higher infectious disease burden than temperate zones, leading to 
greater economic prosperity in the latter.  Bloom and Sachs (1998) suggest 
that the prevalence of malaria also partially explain the poor economic 
performances in Sub-Saharan countries.   
 
Inevitably, the endowment view is not free from counter-arguments.  Olson 
(1996) argues that natural resources do not account for diverse cross-country 
economic performances over time since most economic activities today are 
separated from raw materials and arable land.  Technological improvement 
and sectoral change (greater proportion of manufacturing and service industries) 
are no longer resource-dependent.  Acemoglu, et al. (2005) on the other hand, 
by providing a real life natural experiment – North and South Korea, strongly 
over-rule the importance of geography.  In terms of geographical features, 
both regions are extremely similar in almost all perspectives, not to mention 
their cultural heritage.  The striking diverge economic performances of the 
two parts, as they argue, are due to political and economic institutions much 
more than any other possible aspects of economic development.  
 
2.2.1.2 Indirect Impact of Geography via Institutional Choice 
 
Built on the endowment view, another strand of literature argues that 
geographical conditions do not directly affect growth, but endowments 
determine the institutional structure brought by colonizers and policies chosen 
by politicians.  Hall and Jones (1999) is probably the earliest core empirical 
paper to consider the impact of “social infrastructure”3 on cross-country output 
per capita.  The authors explicitly link such understanding with North’s 
criteria of institution – i.e. institutions that bring social returns of private 
                                                 
3 As they recognise, “social infrastructure” essentially refers to an environment that supports 
productive activities, capital accumulation, skill acquisition, invention and technology transfer.  
In practice, social infrastructure is estimated by two indices in their work: (1) the average score 
of (a) law and order; (b) bureaucratic quality; (c) risk of expropriation; (d) government 
repudiation of contracts, and (e) corruption from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
of Political Risk Service, and (2) openness to international trade based on Sachs and Warner 
(1995).   
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actions as private returns.  They find that differences in social infrastructure 
are largely associated with cross-country differences in capital accumulation, 
educational attainment and productivity.  This in turn explains the 
cross-country difference in output per worker.  While they acknowledge that 
social infrastructure and output per worker are endogenously determined, IV 
estimation is used.  The authors propose to instrument social infrastructure by 
geographical and historical factors of “Western influence”.  The underlying 
hypothesis is that the importance of property rights and systems of checks and 
balance in government came from Western Europe.  Western influences via 
earlier settlers’ institutional transplantation thus determine the development of 
social infrastructure.  Western Europeans were also more likely to settle in 
areas further from the equator where climate is similar to Western Europe.  As 
instruments, therefore, the geographical distance from the equator and fraction 
of country’s population speaking one of the five Western European languages 
are likely to be correlated with social infrastructure.    
 
Making reference to the effect of European diseases in the New World after 
1492 and local disease environments on the colonization strategies of 
Europeans around the world from 1500 to 1900, Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2003) on the other hand claim that health conditions and disease 
environments do not have first-order effect on income, but instead on 
institutions.  Disease environments play an important role in shaping 
institutional development, thereby the path of economic development.  The 
authors hypothesise that when two previously isolated populations come into 
contact, disease environments influence the balance of power between these 
populations and the type of institutions of the more powerful imposes the 
institutional structure on the less powerful. 
 
Based on this institutional transplantation argument, Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) propose an innovative “instruments” for the institution and 
growth empirics.  Since IV estimation is so often used to tackle the problem 
of endogeneity between institution and economic growth, these proposed 
“instruments” naturally are so frequently used in nearly all empirical works of 
the subject that come after.  In essence, the authors claim that an unfavorable 
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climate induced a higher rate of European settlers’ mortality, which 
discouraged them to imbed good institutions (i.e. providing protection against 
expropriation risk) in that colony.  Under such circumstance, they were more 
likely to develop a predatory state without introducing good institutions for 
economic growth.  These institutions persisted to the present, thereby 
affecting present economic performance.  In other words, physical geography 
per se hardly explains growth in a direct manner, but it affects the quality of 
institution transplanted.  In their 2SLS estimations, they regress current 
economic performance with current institution, with the latter instrumented by 
settlers’ mortality rate.  They conclude that once the effect of institutions is 
controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have 
lower incomes due to poor institutions.   
 
McArthur and Sachs (2001), however, use a wider sample of countries to refute 
the idea that geography determines institutional choice.  They find that in fact 
both geography and institutions matter for growth.  Their major critic is that it 
is hard to see why the determination of institutions strongly relates to physical 
geography.  Glaeser, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, et al. (2004) also claim that one 
should not overestimate the effect of geography on economic development via 
institution.  According to their empirical studies, a more basic source of 
growth may be simply human capital only, rather than institutional quality.  
They provide an alternative explanation to Acemoglu, et al. (2001)’s results by 
arguing that geographical conditions do not necessarily relate to the quality of 
institutions with which colonizers brought, but rather the conditions determined 
if the Europeans stayed in the colonies as a form of human capital which drove 
growth.  More recently, Albouy (2008) also casts doubt on Acemoglu, et al. 
(2001)’s settlers mortality rate data.  He finds that 36 of the 64 countries in the 
sample are assigned mortality rates from other countries, typically based on 
mistaken or conflicting evidence.  Incomparable mortality rates from 
populations of laborers, bishops, and soldiers are combined in a manner 
favouring the hypothesis.  After controlling for these data issues, he realises 
that the relationship between mortality and expropriation risk lacks robustness, 
and IV estimates become unreliable.   
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More recently, Nunn (2009) suggests a historical view that the largest effects of 
geography on current economic development may work through its influence 
on past events (i.e. history) rather than through its direct effect on economic 
outcomes today.  In his view, institution is the channel through which history 
matters to economic development.  He does not postulate that geography 
determines institutional choice.  Instead, institutions together with culture, 
knowledge and technology determine the movements of the economy between 
multiple equilibria of the state of development.  All these views together 
weaken the causal direct relationship between geography and institutions.   
 
2.2.2 Institution View: Economic vs. Political Institutions 
 
The institution view essentially argues that institution is the fundamental 
source of growth.  Empirical studies have been developed into two separate 
strands, namely the effect of economic and political institutions.  We highlight 
few core empirical studies below.  
 
2.2.2.1 Economic Institutions and Growth 
 
As we have discussed before, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) 
suggest that economic institution were developed by colonial transplantation 
and thus refute the endowment view completely.  Their key observation of 
“reversal of fortune” is that, among countries colonized by European powers 
during the past 500 years, those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now 
relatively poor.  They find that economic prosperity in the past, measured by 
urbanization and population density, does not link to geographic factors.  In 
contrast, they suggest that this reversal actually reflects changes in the 
institutions resulting from European colonialism.  European colonialism led to 
the development of institutions of private property in previously poor areas, 
while introducing extractive institutions or maintaining existing extractive 
institutions in previously prosperous places.  The main reason for this is that 
relatively poor regions were sparsely populated, and this enabled or induced 
Europeans to settle in large numbers and develop institutions encouraging 
investment.  In contrast, a large population and relative prosperity made 
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extractive institutions more profitable for the colonizers.  In their 2SLS 
regressions, they show that mortality rates faced by settlers, as proposed by 
Acemoglu, et al. (2001), are a good instrument for settlements of Europeans in 
the colonies, i.e. conditional on the other controls, the mortality rates of 
European settlers more than 100 years ago have no effect on GDP per capita 
today, other than their effects through institutional development that 
subsequently affects the growth rates today.  
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, et al. (1997) and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, et al. (1998) examine specifically the importance of 
colonial rule in relation to financial development as a result for investor 
protection.  They focus on how legal institutions were transplanted by the 
different colonial powers.  Their analysis emphasises that differences between 
legal systems based on British common law versus French civil law provide 
different degrees of investor protection.  In their 2SLS estimations, their 
results show that civil law economies, relative to those with common law 
countries, have less investor protection.  In the second stage estimations, they 
show that countries with weaker investor protection have smaller debt and 
equity markets.  As Nunn (2009) points out, nevertheless, a large amount of 
literature emerged which show that legal origin is also correlated with a host of 
other country characteristics, including labour market (Botero, Djankov, La 
Porta, et al. (2004)) and even economic growth (Mahoney (2001)).  This 
inevitably calls into question the validity of using legal origins to be 
instruments in the IV estimation.  Such problem is also mentioned by the 
authors themselves in La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).   
 
More recently, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) attempt to unbundle which 
institutions affect economic development.  They define institutions into two 
forms – (i) “property rights institutions”, which protect citizens against 
expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and (ii) “contracting 
institutions”, which enable private contracts between citizens.  In practice, 
they are measured by “protection against risk of expropriation” and 
“constraints on executives” from the Polity IV dataset respectively.  Using 
settler mortality rate as instruments, their cross-sectional IV estimations show 
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that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic 
growth, investment, and financial development.  Contracting institutions 
appear to matter only for the form of financial intermediation, including credit 
and stock market capitalisation.   
   
2.2.2.2 Political Institution and Growth 
 
Empirical results on the positive impacts of economic institution on growth are 
not particularly controversial despite all the diversities of views 
aforementioned.  However, the effect of political institutions on economic 
growth, especially political regime like democracy, is far from conclusive.  
Research interests have been actively revived since Olson (1993).  According 
to his theory, the state can either be a ‘stationary bandit’ or ‘roving bandit’.  
The former possesses uncontested ‘ownership’ of the streams of income 
generated by the private agents in the economy.  The stream of income 
becomes part of the endowment, enabling the state to prosper.  A stationary 
bandit will invest and nurture the economy, which will increase the level of 
investment in the economy.  On the contrary, a roving bandit possesses little 
incentive to conserve since the prosperity of the nation will be enjoyed by the 
next bandit.  In short, the investment level, which determines economic 
growth, will depend on the incentive structure of the state.  
 
Subsequent research followed by relating how authoritarian (or totalitarian) 
regime and democratic regime behave like stationary and roving bandit.  
Nevertheless, there has been no straightforward argument on political regimes 
and policy choices.  
 
Among others, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) claim that if property rights are 
secured, then it promotes investment and suppresses immediate consumption 
sensibly.  However, it is not clear why democracy secures property rights and 
provides this credible commitment.  They propose a theoretical framework to 
suggest that there may exist an “optimal size of the State”, in other words, 
either political regime implies it is more efficient than the others.  An 
altruistic dictator may be better at mobilizing savings, while democracies are 
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better at allocating investment.  Democracy can potentially be positive to 
economic development because of the competition amongst interest groups.   
 
The form of democracy also matters for the adoption of structural policies that 
promote growth.  By means of cross-section and panel data analysis, Persson 
(2005) finds that reforms in parliamentary (as opposed to presidential) and 
proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) and permanent (as opposed to 
temporary) democracy appear to produce the most growth-promoting policies.  
Roll and Talbott (2002) and Persson (2005) investigate the effect of democratic 
transitions on income while Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) study interactions 
between political and economic reforms.  In overall terms, these papers 
suggest positive correlation between democracy and growth.   
 
However, Andreski (1969) argues that democracy contributes to stagnation 
rather than growth because of the lack of investment and capital, and to the 
necessity of choosing between investment for the future and immediate 
consumption.  It may also result that resources are wasted for interest groups 
for lobbying (Becker (1983)).  In short, whether democracy has a direct 
growth impact is yet conclusive.   
 
Glaeser, et al. (2004) revisit the question of whether political institution causes 
economic growth, or whether growth and human capital accumulation lead to 
improvements in political institutions.  They criticise that in fact most of the 
political institution variables are not suitable for quantitative analysis.  OLS 
and IV techniques are biased and mostly flawed.  They discuss three sets of 
commonly used variables measuring political institution.  The first is the 
survey indicators of institutional quality from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG).  The second set is an aggregated index of survey assessments of 
government effectiveness from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).  The 
third is the Polity IV dataset which aims directly at measuring the limits of 
executive power.  Glaeser, et al. (2004) criticise that the three datasets 
actually measure potential outcomes (e.g. bureaucratic quality or government 
effectiveness), but not some permanent characteristics of the political 
environment, i.e. the constraints imposed to the governments.  From their 
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point of view, the first two sets of political institutions variables are constructed 
in a way that dictators freely choosing good policies receive as high 
evaluations as governments constrained to choose them.  The Polity IV 
variables, in their view, are the only acceptable yet imperfect measure.  The 
Polity IV variables are intended to focus on political constraints, but they too 
reflect political outcomes rather than durable constraints.  In any case, their 
OLS results using the Polity IV indicators suggest that human capital is a more 
fundamental source of growth than political institutions are.        
 
On tackling the problem of endogeneity, Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) suggest 
that the search of exogenous instrumental variables is truly difficult to justify.  
In fact, existing instruments for institutional quality are correlated strongly 
with geographical variables and with human capital.  It thus raises 
interpretational questions about what is being identified.  To estimate the 
interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, 
and income levels, they deploy the strategy of identification through 
heteroskedasticity (IH) as developed in Rigobon (2003).  The main merit of 
this approach is no need to find proper instruments.  Instead, they exploit the 
difference in the structural variances in two sub-samples (including (i) colonies 
versus non-colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East-West versus those 
aligned on a North-South axis) to gain identification.  The authors reassess the 
competing views of economic and political institutions and trade openness on 
economic growth.  Their empirical evidence suggests that democracy and the 
rule of law are both good for economic performance, with the latter having a 
much stronger impact on incomes.  Openness (measured by trade share of 
GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive 
effect on rule of law.  Reciprocally, higher income produces greater openness 
and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong.  Rule of law and 
democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing. 
 
 
2.2.3 Empirical Results of Testing the Competing Views 
 
Against these competing hypothesises, Easterly and Levine (2003) 
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systematically test three different views together – endowment view, institution 
view and effect of macroeconomic policy (called policy view for simplicity) – 
using cross-country data.  Their OLS estimates reject the endowment view 
that settler mortality rates, latitude, whether the area is landlocked and 
crops/minerals productions, do not have any direct impact on the real GDP per 
capita in 1995 nor on other policies variables (measured as trade openness, 
inflation, and real exchange rate overvaluation) after controlling for institutions, 
legal origins, religions composition or ethnolinguisitic diversity.  Nevertheless, 
geography does associate with institutions.  Using IV estimations, their 
empirical results show strong positive impacts of endowments on institutional 
development but not just on GDP per capita.  Even more, macroeconomic 
policies do not help explain economic development after accounting for the 
impact of institutions.   
 
Comparing similar competing views, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) 
use cross-sectional data to estimate the respective contributions of institutions, 
geography, and trade to cross-country income levels using IV estimations.  
Their key results suggest that the quality of institutions "trumps" everything 
else.  They show that once institutions are controlled for, geography only has 
an indirect effect by influencing the quality of institutions.  Similarly, trade is 
almost always insignificant.  These results still stand in a series of robustness 
checks after using different measures of geographical variables and instruments.  
Sachs (2003), on the contrary, comments that IV estimates of such kind are 
biased.  He insists that since initial settler mortality rate has a direct and 
persistent effect on income today, the exclusion restriction of instruments – the 
geographical characteristics – is thus not satisfied.  In his follow-up work, he 
proposes that malaria risk, which is strongly affected by ecological conditions, 
directly affects the level of per capita income after controlling for the quality of 
institutions.  The quality of institution, measured as average risk of 
expropriation, however shows no direct effect on income.   
 
Inconclusive empirical evidence also arises from the use of different measures 
of geography and institutions.  Presbitero (2006) argues that the institution 
view is not as strong as it may appear.  His empirical work shows that 
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geographical factors related to the health and sanitary conditions and to the 
accessibility to the sea of a country indeed play a more direct role in economic 
development.  Kangur (2008) suggest that existing empirical results are not 
robust to alternative measures of institutional quality and/or respective 
instruments.  In particular, settler mortality rate proposed by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) is not a dominant instrument for institutional quality, which is 
potentially prone to fail to satisfy the exclusion restriction.  He concludes that, 
in comparison, human capital and geography appear to come out as winners 
amongst all these determinants of economic development.   
 
2.2.4 Critics of Existing Institutions and Growth Literature 
 
Although the claim that institutions matter to growth has come to an academic 
conclusion, empirical evidence remain inconclusive.  This indeed reveals 
several key technical problems.  Even in those works that provide support to 
the institution view, the estimates obtained are arguably biased, primarily 
because of the endogeneity problem in these growth empirics.  The 
instruments used are also subject to many critics and do not robustly show their 
validity.  Also, despite all the positive empirical results, there is no consistent 
measurement of what institutions are referring to.    
 
To discuss the various critics of the existing literature in proper perspective, we 
highlight 6 key shortcomings of the relevant literature below with an aim to 
provide justifications for the estimation strategy employed in this study.  
These problems generally concern the data and methodology.  For easy 
reference, an overview of the existing empirical work of institution and growth 
is provided in Appendix Section  A.1.   
 
2.2.4.1 Data Problem: Availability, Credibility and Comparability 
 
The lack of consensus of exactly what institutional variables should be used in 
empirics is partially caused by the availability of data.  Firstly, the lack of an 
operational and consistent definition of institution hampers the comparability 
of the empirical studies.  The scope of measurement also invites more 
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questions than answers.  In fact, most of the variables used in the empirical 
studies are not specifically developed or derived from theoretical models.  In 
most of the cases, these variables are employed as different types of proxies of 
institutions to suit the models’ particular needs.  Therefore, “institutions” are 
fairly loosely defined.  Harper (2003), for example, argues that an operational 
definition of, say, economic freedom is absent and the weights put on each 
sub-categories are very doubtful.  Glaeser, et al. (2004), likewise, challenge 
the measures in the sense that they are not exactly measuring what 
“institutions” are supposed to mean, i.e. constraints of possibility choice sets.   
 
Secondly, these variables, for example the predominantly used ICRG’s quality 
of institution and Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index, are often 
composed of a combination of qualitative survey results and quantitative data.  
Inevitably, the use of subjective quantitative data is being heavily criticised.  
Indeed, most of the institutional data are subjective.  Also, it is not uncommon 
to find that different qualitative measures cross-referenced from similar sources 
significantly.  For example, Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index draws 
different measures of regulation from ICRG and World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business Indicators to construct a composite regulation index.  This thus 
presents particular difficulty to carry out robustness tests using alternative 
proxies. 
 
Thirdly, the time span of data is often quite limited, in particular to those 
measuring economic institution.  This also explains why most of the existing 
literature is cross-sectional in nature.     
 
2.2.4.2 Reverse Causality: Economic Growth causes Institutional Change 
 
The literature also suggests reverse causality between institutions and 
economic growth.  Amongst others, Chong and Calderon (2000) argue that 
that most of the studies concerning institution and economic growth have not 
paid enough attention to the possibility that economic growth may lead to 
better institution.  Their hypothesis is that the poorer the country, and the 
longer the wait, the higher the influence of institutional quality on economic 
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growth once growth kicks off.   
 
Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) also provide a hypothesis why income can 
cause institutional development.  They explain that systems that protect 
property rights, such as the judiciary, first require the development of a volume 
of commerce large enough before actual mechanisms and regulations can be 
properly instituted.  Eggertsson (1990) also suggests that higher income levels 
may lead to stronger institutions when property rights become more valuable, 
more is spent to protect them.  Furthermore, Mauro (1995) also opines that 
good economic performance increases institutional efficiency.   
 
Farr, Lord, and Wolfenbarger (1998) test the causality relationship formally.  
They use the dataset from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) to 
measure institutions, which covers: (i) contract enforceability, (ii) 
nationalisation potential, (iii) infrastructure quality, and (iv) bureaucratic delays 
and test the causation on income growth rates.  Using Granger causality, their 
empirical results surprisingly show that the BERI index does not contain useful 
information for predicting future economic growth.  Nevertheless, economic 
growth appears to generate higher institutional quality.  The causal 
relationship is statistically significant and contributes about 61% of the linear 
association between these two variables.  Even using individual BERI 
components, the casual direction from economic growth to institutional quality 
remains higher than the one from institutions to growth.  
 
2.2.4.3 Endogeneity and Validity of Instrumental Variables 
 
The problem of endogeneity induces biased results.  Briefly discussed before, 
IV estimation appears to be the most favourable strategy for this subject.  The 
instruments used for IV estimation so far are principally derived from La Porta, 
et al. (1997) and La Porta, et al. (1998)’s legal origin, Acemoglu, et al. (2001)’s 
European settler’s mortality rate and Alesina, Devlieeschauwer, Easterly, et al. 
(2003)’s religion, ethnic and languages fractionalization.  Collectively, these 
instruments intend to introduce time-invarying factors, e.g. geography 
(distance from equator and predicted trade share, oil exporters, disease burden 
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etc) and colonial origins into the analysis of current income.   
 
There are however very few justifiable variables to be used.  As a result, the 
same instrumental variables are often naturally used in different studies for 
different indicators of institutions, regardless the latter is referring to 
expropriation risk, rule of law, or average quality of institution.  Pande and 
Udry (2006) also wonder on the small amount of instruments developed so far 
despite the huge amount of empirical studies on the subject.  
  
2.2.4.4 Institutional Persistence vs. Institutional Change 
 
Most of the empirical works done so far are cross-sectional analyses, aiming at 
estimating the long-run impact of institutions on growth.  They are designed 
in the way to investigate how the average scores of institutions over a long 
period of time can associate with the present GDP per capita.  The use of 
time-invariant instruments implicitly assumes that institutions are quite 
persistent.  Technically speaking, such design of the instruments also does not 
allow the researchers to identify the consequences of institutional change for 
growth.  In other words, these cross-country studies cannot capture the effect 
of dynamic institutional change on growth, in particular, within country 
variation over time.     
 
2.2.4.5 Omitted Variables: Country- and Time-Specific Effects 
 
In terms of econometrics, the time-invariant instruments could not be used in a 
panel-setting, especially in a fixed-effect model, since all these time-invariant 
characteristics will be absorbed into the unobserved fixed-effects.  
Unfortunately, such country-specific and time-specific effects are too 
significant to be ignored in growth empirics.  Acemoglu, et al. (2008), while 
showing that democracy and higher income may well be mutually reinforcing, 
suggest that the strong correlation between the two may be driven by variables 
that related to colonial heritage and early institutions.  This also implies the 
importance of incorporating that country-specific effect in growth empirics.  
Only recently, there are very few studies on the subject using panel data 
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analysis, although it has long been recognised that the dynamic nature of 
institutional change is very important (Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)).   
 
2.2.4.6 Specification Problem: Growth Rates vs. Income Level  
 
Sachs (2003) criticised the institution view that empirical studies of institutions 
and growth suffer from specification problem, in particular to static versus 
dynamic growth models.  Economic theory suggests that per capita income 
should be specified as a dynamic process (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997), 
in which the growth of income during a time interval [0,t] should be a function 
of the income level at the start of the period and some kind of average of the 
values of the regressors during the time interval [0,t].  In short, growth models 
typically specify cross-country growth in country i as 
 
g&  = iiiiT XIy εδγβα ++++ ln  ( 2.2-1) 
 
where g&  is the average growth rate of GDP per capita, , over a period, T 
indicates a particular chosen year, say 1960.  iTyln  intends to capture the 
initial level of development and β  represents the rate of convergence.  I is a 
vector of institutional variables and X is a vector of macroeconomic and social 
variables. 
 
Sachs (2003) is of the view that it is much more likely the quality of 
institutions in a given time period will affect the growth rate of the economy 
during that period (controlling for initial income), as opposed to the 
contemporaneous level of national income as in Hall and Jones (1999).   
 
Against all these limitations in the literature, we propose to use dynamic panel 
GMM estimation technique in the present study.  In this framework, the use of 
panel data could incorporate country- and time-specific effects which help 
alleviate the problem of omitted variables.  We also use GDP per capita 
growth rate instead of income level.  The key advantage of this methodology 
is that we do not need to seek “external” instruments to deal with endogeneity.  
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In the following section, we will discuss the estimator in greater details.   
 
 
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Data 
 
In this section, we will discuss the baseline specification of our model, the 
empirical strategy employed (i.e. dynamic panel GMM estimator) and data 
used.   
 
2.3.1 Baseline Specification 
 
We convert eq.( 2.2-1) into a panel data setting and thus we can study within 
country variation as well as cross-country variations.  The baseline 
specification model is modified as: 
 
ittiititititit vuXIyyy ++++++=− −− δθθθθ 321101 lnlnln  ( 2.3-1) 
 
1lnln −− itit yy  is the growth rate of GDP per capita of economy i for period t.  
itI  is a vector of institutional variables.  itX  is a vector of macroeconomic 
and social variables.  ui is the country-specific effect absorbs time-invariant 
factors, such as culture, legal origin, historical determinants and other 
geographical endowments being the determinants of economic development as 
proposed in earlier literature.  tδ  is a period-specific dummy to capture 
structural changes that are common to all countries.  vit is an idiosyncratic 
error in the model. 
 
Our specification intends to be canonical in nature.  Eq.( 2.3-1) forms our 
baseline specification.  To get rid of the short-term effect of cyclical dynamics, 
the dependent and independent variables are taken as a non-overlapping 5-year 
average.  Data span from 1970 to 2004, with seven periods in total (i.e. t = 
1970-74, 1975-79, …, 2000-04).      
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2.3.2 Estimation Strategy 
 
Traditional growth regressions like the one in eq.( 2.2-1) generally carry the 
problems like endogenous regressors, measurement errors and omitted 
variables (e.g. Acemoglu (2009)).  Given these problems, least square 
estimations are biased since unobserved omitted variables may potentially 
correlate with one of the regressors.   
 
The use of panel data helps alleviate the problem of omitted variables by taking 
into account of country-specific and time-specific effects.  Islam (1995) is 
among the first to adopt the panel data approach for growth regressions, thus 
allowing the unobserved time-invariant country-specific effect to be controlled 
for.   
 
To tackle the problems of endogeneity and measurement error, the frequently 
used approach of 2SLS in the standard institution and growth literature aims at 
alleviating the problem of endogeneity by introducing innovative instruments, 
such as settlers’ mortality rate, legal origins, ethnic or language fragmentation.  
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, researchers recently cast doubt on the 
validity of these instruments in growth empirics.  This reverts to the old 
problem of finding an “appropriate” instrument for growth regressions.  
Moreover, a dynamic growth model as specified as eq.( 2.3-1) is also prone to 
“dynamic panel bias” (Nickell (1981)) since the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the disturbance terms.   
 
Arising from this, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the application of 
first-differenced generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators to 
estimate a dynamic panel data model.  Blundell and Bond (1998) separately 
develop a system GMM estimator by introducing an additional stationarity 
restriction to the “differenced GMM” estimator.  Such approach is further 
used in growth regressions by Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996), Benhabib 
and Spiegel (1997),  Benhabib and Spiegel (2000), Easterly, Loayza, and 
Montiel (1997), Forbes (2000) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) among 
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others. 
 
2.3.1.1 Linear GMM Estimator 
 
In the following, we will briefly discuss the linear GMM estimator and its use 
in a dynamic panel data model.  The discussion below relies heavily on 
Roodman (2009).  The basic set up is defined as: 
 
   ( 2.3-2) 
 
where  is a column vector of coefficients to be estimated in the model.  y 
and  are random variables and x is a column vector of k regressors.  Let 
assume there exists a z column vector of j instruments, where x and z may 
share the same elements with  and 0),( ≠xzcorr .  Let X, Y, Z and E 
represent N observations for x, y, z and .  is the empirical residual given by 
an estimate .  Since all the instruments are theoretically orthogonal to the 
error term (i.e. ), our aim is to obtain an estimate such that  
converges to zero or is minimized.  Also, since given  , the system is 
over-identified.  Let A be a matrix with positive semi-definite quadratic form 
and weights moments, such that 
a 
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N
ˆ''ˆ
1
 
 
( 2.3-3) 
 
The consistent linear GMM estimator  solves the problem of argmin 
.  This suggests that 
 
  YZAZXXZAZX
''1'' )( −  ( 2.3-4) 
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In other words, the consistent GMM estimator hinges heavily on the 
assumption that the instruments are orthogonal to the errors.  In finite sample, 
nevertheless, the instruments are often at least slightly correlated with the 
endogenous components of the instrumented regressors.  This suggests that 
this estimator is biased. 
 
For efficiency, A must weight moments in inverse proportion to their variances 
and covariances.  This indicates a possible efficient GMM (EGMM) moment 
weighting matrix as: 
 
    
 
( 2.3-5) 
 
The EGMM estimator can then be expressed as, 
 
   ( 2.3-6) 
 
To turn the EGMM estimator feasible, we have to make some initial 
assumption relating to  , which can be expressed as 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
( 2.3-7) 
 
Given eq.( 2.3-7),  could then be understood as  as N 
increases, where H is an “ estimate” of . 
 
This suggests in practical terms, we can first perform an initial GMM 
regression with a reasonable and arbitrary H, such as homoskedasticity (i.e. 
 ), to yield  ( also known as a one-step GMM estimator).  We can 
then obtain the residual’s to construct a .  Rerun the GMM estimation by 
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setting  would bring the two-step GMM estimator , 
which is the feasible and efficient GMM estimator.  This two-step estimator, 
the one we will use for our estimation, is efficient and robust to any pattern of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Although the choice of H, even if wrongly assumed, does not render 
inconsistent parameter estimates, the variance estimate for the parameters will 
be inconsistent as  is not a consistent estimate of .  Arellano 
and Bond (1991) point out that such linear GMM estimates can produce 
standard errors that are downward biased when j is large. 
 
Henceforth, Windmeijer (2005) devises a small-sample correction for the 
two-step standard errors.  He finds that two-step EGMM performs somewhat 
better than one-step in estimating coefficients, with lower bias and standard 
errors.  With his correction, the two-step standard errors are quite accurate 
and it seems modestly superior to the cluster-robust one-step ones. 
 
A critical post-GMM estimation test is the test of overidentification.  If the 
model is exactly identified (i.e. ), the estimator will choose  such that 
 even if .  The Sargan/Hansen test can be carried out to 
provide a test statistics for the test of overidentification (i.e. a joint validity test 
of the moment conditions).  Under the null hypothesis, the vector of  is 
randomly distributed around zero.  A Wald test renders the statistic for the 
null to hold is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If  is scalar, then .  The Hansen (1982)’s J-test 
coincides with the Sargan (1958) test.  In contrast, if  is not scalar, the 
-45- 
Sargan’s statistic would be inconsistent.  Since  is unknown to us, we rely 
on Hansen test for over-identification.  If the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, it suggests the overidentification criterion is satisfied and the 
instruments used are valid. 
 
2.3.1.2 Dynamic Panel Data Models 
 
Let us reiterate the data-generating process of a dynamic panel model as 
 
   ( 2.3-8) 
 
where  and .  Alternatively, 
eq.( 2.3-8) can be written as 
 
 ( 2.3-9) 
 
We take first difference of ( 2.3-9) to remove the fixed effects that gives us 
 
   ( 2.3-10) 
 
Nickell (1981) points out that eq.( 2.3-10) is prone to “dynamic panel bias” 
since  is still correlated with the disturbance terms after transformation.  
Such transformation also poses two problems.  First, the  term is 
correlated with .  Any predetermined variables in x that are not strictly 
exogenous become potentially endogenous as they are correlated to .  
However, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggests the use of lagged levels dated 
 of the dependent variable and earlier can be used as instruments for the 
equations in first-differences.   
 
GMM estimators control for endogeneity by using “internal instruments”, that 
is, instruments based on lagged values of the explanatory variables.  These 
models do not allow us to control for full endogeneity but for a weak version of 
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it.  Thus, it is assumed hereby that the explanatory variables are only “weakly 
exogenous”, which means that they can be affected by current and past 
realisations of institutions but must be uncorrelated with future unanticipated 
shocks to institutions (the error term).  This yields a consistent estimator of  
as  with  is fixed.  By assuming that the transient errors are serially 
uncorrelated, i.e.  where , that the initial conditions  
are predetermined, i.e. , and the explanatory variables xit are 
weakly exogenous.  These assumptions imply the moment restrictions to be 
 
 for  and  
0][ , =∆− itsti vxE  for  and  
( 2.3-11) 
 
 
Such estimates will no longer be biased by any omitted time-invariant variables.  
By instrumenting the regressors in the first-differenced equations using levels 
of the second lags or more, it allows parameters to be estimated consistently.  
Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001) show that the instruments used in this 
setting potentially allow consistent estimation even in the presence of 
measurement error – a common critique to the data of GDP and institution.   
 
Nevertheless, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this “differenced GMM” 
estimator may be subject to a large downward finite-sample bias, especially 
when the number of time periods is small.  They showed that when the 
explanatory variables are persistent over time (like institutions in this case), 
lagged levels of the dependent variable are weak instruments in first 
differences.  In these cases, severe problems of identification can lead to bias 
and could result in a poorly performing differenced estimator.  To obtain a 
linear GMM estimator better suited to estimate autoregressive models with 
persistent panel data, they consider the additional stationarity assumption that 
 
 and 0)( 2 =∆ ii xE µ for . ( 2.3-12) 
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This assumption requires a stationarity restriction on the initial conditions .  
This condition holds if the means of the  series, whilst differing across 
individuals, are constant through time periods  for each individual.  
This assumption yields  further linear moment conditions 
 
0)( 1 =∆ −itit yE ε for i = 1,…,N and t = 3,4,…,T ( 2.3-13) 
 
because )()()()( 2111 ititititiititit vyEvyEyEyE −−−− ∆−∆+∆=∆ µε .  These allow 
the use of lagged first-differences of the series as instruments for equations in 
levels, as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995).  This estimator with an 
additional moment condition is commonly known as the “system GMM” 
estimator.  In other words, Blundell and Bond (1998) instruments level with 
differences whereas Arellano and Bond (1991) instruments differences with 
levels.   
 
Secondly, eq.( 2.3-10) magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels.  Taking first 
difference may result in some  to be missing.  As such, Arellano and 
Bover (1995) propose “orthogonal deviations”.  This suggests 
contemporaneous variable being subtracted from the average of all future 
available observations to minimise data loss.  An added advantage of 
orthogonal deviation is that, lagged observations in this transformation would 
be valid instruments5.  As T increases, the number of instruments proliferates. 
The instrument for the transformed  is  naturally6. 
 
To improve efficiency, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) suggest building 
a set of instruments from the second lag of the dependent variable for each time 
period and substitute zeros for missing observations.  Alternatively, the 
instrument set can be collapsed, as in our estimation, into a single column like 
                                                 
5 Orthogonal deviation, however, makes successive errors correlated (i.e.  correlates 
with ∆ ).  Roodman (2009) suggests that, in practice, it is not usual to assume 
homoskedasticity in applying these estimators.  Therefore, this property does not seriously 
matter. 
6 It is only valid if the model does not have second-order autocorrelation. Otherwise, the third 
lags and longer should be used. 
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When estimating the dynamic panel model, Roodman (2009) recommends that 
lags 2 and up of the endogenous variables can be used as instruments in 
practice.  One lag is valid for predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
variables.  In addition, time dummies should be included to remove universal 
time-related shocks from the errors. 
 
2.3.1.3 Post-estimation Test 
 
The Sargan/Hansen test as discussed above for joint validity of the instruments 
can again be used.  Additionally, Arellano and Bond (1991) develop an 
autocorrelation test for the idiosyncratic disturbance term  to test whether 
the lags are valid instruments.  Since  is mathematically related to 
, negative first-order serial correlation is expected.  To check for 
first-order serial correlation in levels, it is needed to look for whether 
second-order correction in difference exists (i.e. correlation between  in 
 and  in ).  A rejection of second order autocorrelation 
indicates no autocorrelation of the disturbance term in level.  In other words, 
to test the validity of our preferred specification, we are looking for an AR(1) 
test that rejects the null hypothesis but an AR(2) test that cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. 
 
2.3.1.4 Advantages of Using Panel GMM Estimators for Growth 
Empirics 
 
Bond, et al. (2001) recommend the use of the “system GMM” estimator for 
growth empirics.  This is due to two main reasons.  First, it is often the case 
that researchers take a period average of output growth to get rid of cyclical 
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dynamics.  Hence, the number of periods used in the standard growth 
literature is usually small.  Second, their empirical results show that if the 
time series are persistent e.g. growth rate of GDP per capita and institution (see 
Coviello and Islam (2006)), the “differenced GMM” estimator can behave 
poorly because lagged levels of the series only provide weak instruments.  
They show that the ”differenced GMM” estimates of the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable tend to lie below the corresponding within-group 
estimates in a fixed effect model, suggesting that the “differenced GMM” 
estimates are seriously biased.  Hence, we deploy “system GMM” estimators 
for our empirical analysis.   
 
To sum up, the GMM estimators for panel analysis allow arbitrarily distributed 
fixed individual and time effects.  This provides an added advantage over 
cross-sectional regressions, which are particularly prevalent in existing 
institution and growth literature, where cross-country fixed effects are assumed 
away.  Under a panel set-up, studying the variations over time could also be 
possible.  Besides, the GMM estimators allow idiosyncratic, disturbance 
terms which are heteroskedastic and autocorrelated.  These disturbance terms, 
however, are assumed to be uncorrelated across individuals.  With regard to 
the regressors, they could be endogenous, predetermined and not strictly 
exogenous.  The estimators are also applicable for a panel set-up with a large 
number of cross-sections (i.e. large N) and a small number of periods (i.e. 
small T)7.  A particular key advantage in our context is that it does not assume 
the availability of “external” instruments.  In other words, all possible 
instruments exist readily in the dataset.  The use of these “internal” 
instruments – based on the lagged values of the dependent variables – implies 
that we allow the explanatory variables to be weakly exogenous.  
 
2.3.2 Data  
 
The dependent variable of eq.( 2.3-1) is the PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita 
growth rate (GDPPC_gr) from the World Development Indicators (WDI).  
                                                 
7 The number of instruments used tends to explode with T in panel GMM estimations.  This 
is one of the reasons why the GMM estimator is only applicable when T is small. 
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Our data sample spans from 1970 to 2004.  The number of cross-sections (i.e. 
economies) in the estimations is around 99 countries in our main specification 
restricted by the country coverage of Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom 
Index as set out in Appendix Section A.4.  In addition, we also control for 
human capital (SCHOOLING) in our baseline specification, as in Glaser et al 
(2004).  As in standard growth empirics, it is proxied by the average year of 
schooling in the total population aged 25 or above, estimated by Barro and Lee 
(2001)8.   
 
Our measures of different institutional variables primarily come from Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Report (Gwartney, Lawson, and 
Norton (2008)) and Polity IV project dataset (Marshall and Jaggers (2009)).  
Detailed data description and descriptive statistics are at Appendix Sections 
 A.2 and  A.3.  As explained in Chapter 1, the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom Index, to the best of our knowledge, is the only available source 
which covers some kinds of measures of economic institution dating back to 
1970.  A long time series is preferred in our case as we intend to undertake 
dynamic analysis.  Furthermore, another advantage is that the various 
sub-components of the Fraser’s Index can be used to proxy the three facets of 
institutions as described above.  In contrast, the commonly used alternative – 
ICRG’s rule of law index – is not used in our case.  The major reason is that it 
covers a relatively shorter period of time, dating back to 1984 only.  
Nevertheless, we will use a composite index measuring the quality of 
government (QOG) from ICRG as robustness check for our results.   
 
Specifically, in response to Rodrik (2000)’s 4-cluster taxonomy of 
market-sustaining institution, we use the Fraser Institute’s legal structure and 
security of property rights index (LEGAL) to proxy the effectiveness of 
property rights security and contract enforcement for “market-creating 
institutions” 9.  For “market-regulating institution”, we use the composite 
                                                 
8 Data can be retrieved from www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. 
9 Other than those empirical literature mentioned in Section  2.2, market-creating institutions 
are often tested in the context of economic liberties and economic freedom using indicators 
from Gwartney, et al. (2008) or Heritage Foundation (2009).  Among others, Scully and 
Slottje (1991), De Vanssay and Spindler (1994), Gwartnet, Lawson, and Block (1996), Isham, 
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index of regulation (REG).  The index covers the regulatory burden of the 
credit market regulation, labour market regulation and business regulation.  
While some components of both LEGAL and REG are primarily obtained from 
opinion survey results, they are designed in such a way to subjectively describe 
the general perception of the overall environment of security of property rights 
and regulatory environment.  On REG in particular, this is an overall 
macro-level index and is not specific to the regulatory environment of 
particular markets, it thus sheds no particular light on whether there exists any 
mechanisms for correcting market failures.  Nevertheless, we consider these 
two proxies are sufficient in a macroeconomic growth model as in our case.  
It goes beyond the purpose of our estimation here to test the impact of 
micro-level regulation on economic growth. 
 
For “market-stabilising institutions”, we consider using the access to sound 
money index (SM) to proxy the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
institutions.  The index covers money (specifically, M2) growth, standard 
deviation of inflation, average inflation rate and freedom to own foreign 
currency bank accounts, which can duly reflect the functioning of monetary 
institutions and management of macroeconomic policies.  All Fraser’s indices 
range from 0 to 10, with higher scores signifying better institutions.   
 
For “market-legitimising institutions”, we use the democracy index from the 
Polity IV project (DEMOC).  It is a composite index, ranging from 0 to 10, 
measuring the competitiveness of political participation, openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive 
(XCONST).  Higher score means the country is more democratic.  In our 
robustness checks, we will also attempt to use the sub-component XCONST as 
                                                                                                                                 
Kaufmann, and Pritchett (1997), Easton and Walker (1997) and Strum and Haan (2001) show 
that economic freedom (in general) is significantly related to country’s growth performance 
(conventionally measured by GDP per capita and/or GDP growth rate).  Torstensson (1994) 
employs the sub-index rather than the overall score of economic freedom.  He finds that, 
among all the 23 areas measured, the degree of state ownership does not seem to affect growth 
rates whereas property rights structure matters more.  Moreover, some studies also attempt to 
interpret that it has an indirect effect.  Ayal and Karras (1998) show that aggregate economic 
freedom enhances growth both via increasing total factor productivity and via enhancing 
capital accumulation.  Adkins, Moomaw, and Savvides (2002) similarly find that institutions 
that promote greater economic freedom in turn promote efficiency. 
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a proxy of contract enforcement as in previous empirical studies like Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005).  In addition, we will also use Freedom House’s indicators 
on political rights and civil liberties (IPOLITY2) to proxy democratic 
governance instead of DEMOC to check sensitivity of our results.  We will 
discuss these alternative measures when we present our robustness tests in 
Section  2.4.2.3.  
 
The pairwise correlation matrix between key variables, as show in Appendix 
Section  A.3, suggests that the institutional variables do not strongly correlate 
with each other.  It thus appears that multicollinearity is not a major problem 
in our case.   
 
 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
 
2.4.1 Institution in a Growth Model: Preliminary Test 
 
Sachs (2003) criticises the empirical studies of institution view that the 
specification is not dynamic in nature.  In response to this, we first take a 
preliminary test of institutions in a dynamic growth model framework.  We 
make reference to three growth models in the literature and re-examine them if 
institutions are associated with economic growth after controlling for all the 
time-invariant country-specific characteristics, say geography, as well as the 
initial level of economic development using dynamic panel data estimations.    
 
The first one is Hall and Jones (1999)’s baseline specification, where output 
per worker solely depends on “social infrastructure”.  We modify their model 
in a panel setting in response to Sachs (2003)’s criticism as follows:  
 
( ) ittiititit vuIGDPPCgrGDPPC +++++= − δααα 2110 ln_  ( 2.4-1) 
 
We replace “social infrastructure” by the quality of government indicator 
(QOG), which is a composite indicator of corruption, law and order and 
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bureaucratic quality consolidated by Teorell, Charron, Samanni, et al. (2009).  
The original data source is from ICRG, the one used in the literature as in Hall 
and Jones (1999).  We use a composite indicator here instead of unbundling 
different institutions is to allow comparability with the literature.  This 
composite index we use here is scaled from 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating higher quality of government.  QOG is the average value during a 
5-year period.   
 
The second model is modified from Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) (MRW) 
to test the effect of human capital in an augmented Solow growth model.  
Following Solow (1956), the production function for country i is postulated as 
a function of physical and human capital as well as technological progress as 
 
αα −= 1)]()([)()( tHtAtKtY iiii  ( 2.4-2) 
 
For simplicity, we drop the subscript i.  We further assume that human capital 
is expressed in terms of education E, say average year of schooling of the 
population )()()( EGtLtH = .  )(EG is assumed to be constant, where 
EeEG φ=)( .  )()( tnLtL =& and )()( tgAtA =& .  Given steady-state assumption, 
the stead-state physical capital per unit of effective labour services 
 
*k ])(/[* LEAGK≡ )1/(1)]/([ αη −++= gns  ( 2.4-3) 
 
where s is the saving rate, g is a common exogenous rate of technical change 
and η is the depreciation rate.   
 
We further assume common technology advances for all countries, i.e.  
 
)exp()( gtAtA =  ( 2.4-4) 
 
Hence, steady-state output per capita can be expressed as  
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We could then re-assess the augmented Solow model in a dynamic panel data 
framework as in Bond, et al. (2001).  Based on eq.( 2.4-5), the revised 
specification is as eq.( 2.4-6) below:   
 
=grGDPPC _ ( ) ( ) ( )ηγγγγ +++++ − gnsGDPPC ititit lnlnln 32110  
   itSCHOOLING4γ+ itti vu +++ δ  
( 2.4-6) 
 
Eq.( 2.4-6) includes the natural log of saving rate (ln(sit)) and the natural log of 
population growth (ln(nit)), plus 0.05, where 0.05 represents the sum of a 
common exogenous rate of technical change (g) and a common depreciation 
rate (η) as in MRW.  Data of saving rate and population growth come from 
WDI.  The regressors also include a measure of human capital, i.e. the 
average years of schooling (SCHOOLING).  The unobserved 
country-specific effects can be interpreted as the differences in the initial level 
of efficiency, whilst the period-specific intercepts capture productivity changes 
that are common to all countries.  As in MRW, the technical progress is 
assumed to be common for all countries.   
 
The third model extends that of eq.( 2.4-6).  The augmented Solow growth 
model of Bond, et al. (2001) does not incorporate institution.  We thus 
incorporate the effect of institution as in Penalosa and Teksoz (2006), in which 
the authors assume that institutions interact with the level of productivity but 
do not enter directly as inputs.   
 
More specifically, the level of productivity is revised as a function of 
institution as  
 
)exp()( IgtAtA δ+=  ( 2.4-7) 
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With this assumption, the specification of our estimation can then written as 
( 2.4-8) below.   
 
=grGDPPC _ ( ) ( ) ( )ηγγγγ +++++ − gnsGDPPC ititit lnlnln 32110  
   itSCHOOLING4γ+ itI5γ+ itti vu +++ δ  
( 2.4-8) 
 
Estimation results of these three models are at Table  2.4.1-1 below.  Vis-à-vis 
previous cross-sectional literature, estimating growth models in a dynamic 
panel data framework presents several interesting results.  As shown in Model 
2.(1), institution seems to have a significant and positive impact on economic 
growth.  After controlling time-invariant determinants in a panel setting, 
institution still significantly explains cross-country economic performances.  
That said, our results provide support to the institution view, despite using 
modified specifications and estimation techniques.   
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Table  2.4.1-1: Preliminary Tests of Dynamic Growth Models  
(Two-Step System GMM Estimation) 
 
Model 2.(1) 2.(2) 2.(3) 
Specification 
Hall and Jones 
(1999) 
Mankiw et al 
(1992) 
Penalosa and Teksoz (2006) 
        
ln(GDPPC)t-1 -0.0020 -0.0071 -0.0165 
 (0.0014) (0.0133) (0.0125) 
ln(s)  0.0193*** 0.0256*** 
  (0.0069) (0.0063) 
ln(n+g+η)   -0.0932* -0.1038* 
  (0.0532) (0.0617) 
SCHOOLING  -0.0004 0.0020 
  (0.0077) (0.0079) 
QOG 0.0596***  0.0386** 
 (0.0096)  (0.0172) 
Const 0.0152 -0.2338 -0.2404 
 (0.0108) (0.1733) (0.1869) 
    
Obs/No. of cty 760/181 644/100 424/90 
AR(1) p-value 0.0774 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) p-value 0.613 0.784 0.402 
    
Hansen Test Stat 6.709 18.30 19.82 
Hansen Test p-value 0.460 0.147 0.228 
 
Dependent variable is GDPPC_gr.  5-year interval panel data is used for estimation.  The 
lagged ln(GDPPC) is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  
Period dummies are included but not reported.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and 
Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Instruments are transformed by 
orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.   
 
 
Secondly, the cross-sectional analysis of MRW shows that human capital plays 
a key role in economic growth.  Their results suggest that, holding all other 
variables constant, a country with approximately 12% school enrolment should 
have income per capita of about 9 times that of a country.  However, our 
Model 2.(2) shows that human capital9 does not appear to be statistically 
significant once we estimate the model in a dynamic panel data framework.  
In this Model, it even comes with a “wrong” sign.   
 
                                                 
9 We also attempt to proxy human capital by secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios instead of 
average years of schooling.  The statistically insignificant results remain. 
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Thirdly, Model 2.(3) shows that the impact of institution on economic growth 
remains statistically significant even after controlling for human capital.  
Human capital, though turns correctly positive to growth in the augmented 
Solow model, stays statistically insignificant.  One should also note that, 
comparing Models 2.(2) and 2.(3), all coefficients become slightly bigger once 
institution is included in the latter model.  This may suggest that the channel 
through which institution affects growth may be via its effect on other factors 
of production.      
 
To justify whether the two-stage system GMM estimator should be used, we  
see that all three models accept the AR(1) test but reject the AR(2) test, except 
that in Model 2.(1), it is only significant at 10% level.  It therefore suggests 
that there is no serial correlation at level.  The Hansen test also does not reject 
the null hypothesis.  It implies that we cannot reject the over-identification 
restriction.  All these results suggest that dynamic panel data models can be 
used.   
 
 
2.4.2 Direct Partial Impact of Institution on Growth 
 
2.4.2.1 Baseline Specification 
 
We then proceed to estimate the direct partial impact of institution based on the 
taxonomy of institutions proposed earlier.  Table  2.4.2-1 below presents the 
empirical results of our baseline specification as described in eq.( 2.3-1).   
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Table  2.4.2-1: Institution and Economic Growth – Baseline Specification  
(Two-Step System GMM Estimation) 
 
Model 2.(4) 2.(5) 2.(6) 2.(7) 2.(8) 
            
DEMOC 0.0011    0.0015 
 (0.0009)    (0.0015) 
REG  0.0046   0.0042 
  (0.0038)   (0.0045) 
SM   0.0020*  0.0031* 
   (0.0010)  (0.0018) 
LEGAL    0.0066*** 0.0052*** 
    (0.0021) (0.0020) 
      
SCHOOLING 0.0102* 0.0091* 0.0147*** 0.0128** 0.0139** 
 (0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0067) 
ln(GDPPC)t-1 -0.0060 -0.0090 -0.0130 -0.0197** -0.0304** 
 (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0118) 
Const -0.0042 0.0030 0.0112 0.0553 0.0843 
 (0.0556) (0.0565) (0.0469) (0.0430) (0.0575) 
            
Obs/No. of cty 556/99 500/95 542/95 483/95 447/91 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
AR(2) p-value [0.364] [0.855] [0.605] [0.540] [0.279] 
      
Hansen Test      
Test Stat 14.62 13.63 4.210 6.174 21.80 
p-value [0.404] [0.191] [0.838] [0.628] [0.241] 
 
Dependent variable is GDPPC_gr.  5-year interval panel data is used for estimation.  The 
lagged ln(GDPPC) is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  
Period dummies are included but not reported.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and 
Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Maximum 4 lags are used for 
instruments.  Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen 
test is used for over-identifying restrictions.   
 
 
The presence of the lagged ln(GDPPC) in the model means that all the 
estimated coefficients of institutions represent their short-run effects.  A 
significantly negative coefficient of ln(GDPPC) signifies convergence.  In the 
baseline specification, we control for human capital as proxied by 
SCHOOLING as the only macroeconomic control variable.  To recap, we use 
DEMOC, REG, SM and LEGAL to measure the four clusters of 
market-sustaining institutions, namely “market-legitimising”, 
“market-regulating”, “market-stabilising” and “market-creating” institutions 
respectively.  We test individual variable in Models 2.(4) – 2.(7) and all 
variables jointly in Model 2.(8).  
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Our empirical results show that the signs of coefficients of DEMOC and REG 
are positive as expected.  It implies that democracy and less regulation seem 
to associate with faster growth.  However, their coefficients are not 
statistically significant.  Similar to the results in the previous literature 
discussed in Section  2.2.2.2, democracy shows no significant linear effect on 
growth in our sample.  With respect to regulation, Rodrik (2005) suggests that 
a more developed economy intends to have more regulation to rectify market 
failures, say externalities.  However, the corruption literature (e.g. Mauro 
(1995) and Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, et al. (2002)) on the other hand 
argue that more regulations in developing economies is more likely lead to 
more corruption, which is socially wasteful.  These two competing hypotheses 
probably explain the lack of linear direct effect of REG in our full sample.   
 
LEGAL and SM, in contrast, show significant, positive and direct impacts on 
growth.  In other words, security of property rights and “market-stabilising” 
institutions both impose direct impacts on economic growth, although SM is 
only statistically significant at 10% level.    
 
In Model 2.(8), we estimate the baseline specification with all regressors being 
estimated jointly.  The results suggest that a one sample standard deviation 
increase in the LEGAL and SM indices will increase growth rate by 1.0 and 
0.69 percentage points10 respectively.  In a dynamic panel data setting, our 
results generally agree with the key conclusion of the previous literature.  In 
other words, “market-creating” and “market-stabilising” institutions have 
direct effect on growth, whereas “market-regulating” and 
“market-legitimising” institutions show no direct partial impact.  While the 
previous literature aims at establishing a long-run direct impact of institutions, 
our estimations further relax the assumption of institutional persistence.  We 
find that short-run institutional change has a direct impact on growth.  More 
specifically, comparing to the results of Bhattacharyya (2009), our results show 
                                                 
10 The quantitative impacts are obtained from 0.0052*1.9251≈1.0% and 0.0031*2.2143≈0.69% 
respectively.   
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that LEGAL relatively plays a more significant role than SM11.   
 
Hansen test statistics show that the models satisfy the over-identification 
restrictions and do not reject the joint validity of the instruments used.  This 
suggests the lags used in the models are valid instruments.  According to the 
Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test in levels in our results, the disturbances 
terms exhibit AR(1) process but not AR(2) in our models.  A rejection of the 
second-order autocorrelation indicates that there is no autocorrelation of the 
disturbance term in level.  In overall terms, the post-estimation tests indicate 
that using GMM estimators for our models are appropriate.   
 
 
2.4.2.2 Choice of Estimators 
 
To further verify whether the Blundell and Bond (1998)’s 2-step system GMM 
estimator is preferred in our case, we also run both the OLS and within group 
fixed-effect (FE) estimators for comparison.  Although there is no formal test 
for justifying the use of the GMM estimator, Coviello and Islam (2006) suggest 
a possible rule of thumb.  They argue that in a dynamic panel model, the OLS 
estimator is biased and inconsistent as the lag dependent variable is positively 
correlated with the country fixed effect and the error terms.  On the other hand, 
the FE estimator, by estimating the within group difference, can eliminate this 
sort of inconsistency by transforming the equation to eliminate the country 
specific effect.  However, for panels where T is small relative to N as in our 
case, the first difference transformation induces a “non-negligible” correlation 
between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error 
term.  The FE estimator, therefore, is also biased.  
 
The nature of the bias of these two estimators could assist in identifying a 
satisfactory estimator.  Nickell (1981) shows that when fixed effects are 
correlated with explanatory variables, then OLS overestimates the effect of the 
                                                 
11 By way of comparison, his results show that the respective parameters have growth effects of 
0.75 and 0.75 percentage points respectively. 
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lagged dependent variable, fixed effect underestimates it and system GMM 
should be in between the two.  Bond, et al. (2001) and Bond (2002) suggest 
that the OLS level estimator of the autoregressive coefficient could be regarded 
as the upper bound for the true estimates, whereas the FE estimator of the 
autoregressive coefficient can be treated as the lower bound of the true 
estimates.  Therefore, we expect that the true estimator would lie between the 
OLS and FE estimates.  The GMM estimator, if appropriate in our case, 
should lie somewhere in between or at least not to be significantly higher/lower 
than the upper/lower bounds. 
 
The relevant test results are presented in Table  2.4.2-2.  Models 2.(9) and 
2.(10) are the OLS and FE estimations respectively.  Models 2.(11) and 2.(12) 
show the results of our system GMM estimations.  The magnitudes of 
coefficients in the 1-step and 2-step GMM models are not quite significantly 
different.  The coefficient on the lag dependent variable is around -0.03 in 
Models 2.(11) and 2.(12), which lies between that of the OLS (-0.006) and FE 
(-0.06) estimates.  We hence conclude that the system GMM estimator could 
be used in our case. 
 
-62- 
 
Table  2.4.2-2: Institution and Economic Growth – Baseline Specification Using  
Different Estimation Techniques 
 
 Model 2.(9) 2.(10) 2.(11) 2.(12) 
Estimator OLS FE 2-Step GMM 1-Step GMM 
      
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.0055*** -0.0629*** -0.0304** -0.0283** 
 (0.0020) (0.0067) (0.0118) (0.0115) 
DEMOC 0.0001 0.0012* 0.0015 0.0011 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0013) 
REG 0.0003 0.0042* 0.0042 0.0061 
 (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0045) (0.0046) 
SM 0.0016** 0.0009 0.0031* 0.0042*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
LEGAL 0.0043*** 0.0035*** 0.0052*** 0.0055*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
SCHOOLING 0.0017* 0.0013 0.0139** 0.0123* 
 (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0067) (0.0065) 
Const 0.0127 0.4528*** 0.0843 0.0566 
 (0.0132) (0.0543) (0.0575) (0.0593) 
      
Obs 447 447 447 447 
No. of cty  91 91 91 
Adj. R
2
 0.130 0.0904   
F-stat 6.142 13.21   
     
AR(1) p-value   [0.0000] [0.0000] 
AR(2) p-value   [0.279] [0.329] 
     
Hansen Test     
Test Statistics   21.80 21.80 
p-value   [0.241] [0.241] 
 
Dependent variable is GDPPC_gr.  5-year interval panel data is used for estimation.  Period 
dummies are included in all models but not reported.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  For Models 2.(9) and 2.(10), robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  For Models 2.(11) and 2.(12), the lagged ln(GDPPC) is treated as 
pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and 
Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Maximum 4 lags are 
used for instruments.  Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  
Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.  
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2.4.2.3 Robustness Tests  
 
2.4.2.3.1 With Additional Covariates 
 
As robustness tests, we further run 8 regressions by adding extra covariates to 
the baseline specification.  Test results are at Table  2.4.2-3.  As in Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1997)’s growth empirics, we consider three additional 
macroeconomic control variables such as population growth rate (pop_gr), 
government consumption as percentage of GDP (gcon_gdp) and the natural log 
of investment share as percentage of GDP (ln(invest_gdp)) respectively in 
Models 2.(13) – 2.(15).  Secondly, we also use a vector of openness measures, 
including FDI inflows as percentage of GDP (fdi_gdp), natural log of total 
trade as percentage of GDP (ln(trade_gdp)) as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) and Dollar and Kraay (2003).  The results are shown in Models 
2.(16) – 2.(17).  Thirdly, we also consider covariates measuring financial 
openness and financial development on growth, following the literature arguing 
that financial development causes growth as in Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990), King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997), Harrison, Sussman, and Zeira 
(1999),Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2001), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine (2003a), Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Beck and Levine (2004).  We 
use three recently developed indicators – (i) financial integration index from 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) (fin_open); (ii) capital account openness index 
from Chinn and Ito (2006) (ca_open), and (iii) total liquid liabilities as 
percentage of GDP from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009) (lliab_gdp).  
Detailed description and sources of these data are set out at Appendix Section 
 A.2.  The estimations are shown in Models 2.(18) – 2.(20).  Finally, in 
Model 2.(21), we jointly test several covariates.   
 
We find that even after having additional covariates in the baseline 
specifications, our results generally survive.  Our empirical results remain 
suggesting that only LEGAL and SM have direct and statistically significant 
partial impact on economic growth amongst the four clusters of institutions.   
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The only exception is Model 2.(17), with ln(trade_gdp) incorporated in the 
baseline model.  In this Model, the security of property rights (LEGAL) still 
imposes a direct impact on growth as in other specifications.  However, the 
“market-stabilising” institution (measured by SM) no longer plays a significant 
role.  Moreover, DEMOC and REG now turn statistically significant at the 
10% significance level.  The results suggest that after controlling for the 
degree of openness, democracy and less regulatory burden tend to induce 
growth directly.  As the market is more outward-orientated, institutions that 
are more growth-promoting are those that gear towards the interests of the 
foreign investors and those can sustain the linkage between the domestic 
market and the external environment.  Very likely, foreign markets respond 
more positively to an economy with better security of property rights and less 
regulations.  A democratic society, on the other hand, is likely to be more 
political stable, thereby becoming more favourable for foreign trade and 
investment.  In contrast, monetary stability, e.g. inflation, may be less relevant.  
However, we note that such effect of openness cannot be found with regard to 
financial openness and capital account openness as shown in Models 2.(18) and 
2.(19), but only to trade openness.   
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Table  2.4.2-3: Institution and Economic Growth – Baseline Specification with Additional Covariates 
(2-Step System GMM Estimations) 
 
Model 2.(13) 2.(14) 2.(15) 2.(16) 2.(17) 2.(18) 2.(19) 2.(20) 2.(21) 
Additional  
Covariates 
pop_gr gcon_gdp ln(invest_gdp) fdi_gdp ln(trade_gdp) fin_open ca_open lliab_gdp 
(13)+(14)+(15)+ 
(16)+(18)+(19) 
                    
DEMOC -0.0014 0.0010 0.0013 0.0015 0.0020* -0.0008 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0009 
 (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
REG 0.0044 0.0018 0.0063 0.0024 0.0080* 0.0068 0.0024 0.0023 0.0038 
 (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0045) 
SM 0.0044** 0.0040*** 0.0030* 0.0034* 0.0019 0.0033** 0.0039** 0.0031* 0.0032** 
 (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
LEGAL 0.0035 0.0041** 0.0050** 0.0048*** 0.0052** 0.0041* 0.0048** 0.0042** 0.0037** 
 (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
SCHOOLING 0.0110* 0.0051 0.0126* 0.0083 0.0032 0.0097 0.0138** 0.0088** 0.0006 
 (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0068) (0.0055) (0.0047) (0.0081) (0.0062) (0.0042) (0.0041) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.0247** -0.0087 -0.0375** -0.0183* -0.0112 -0.0169 -0.0246** -0.0173** -0.0054 
 (0.0114) (0.0091) (0.0160) (0.0100) (0.0094) (0.0156) (0.0115) (0.0078) (0.0098) 
Const 0.0915 -0.0385 0.0618 0.0322 -0.1262 0.0173 0.0533 0.0344 -0.0407 
 (0.0662) (0.0480) (0.0658) (0.0525) (0.0887) (0.0797) (0.0608) (0.0456) (0.0507) 
          
Obs/No. of cty 447/91 446/91 446/91 444/91 437/91 436/87 442/91 409/86 429/87 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
AR(2) p-value [0.225] [0.832] [0.466] [0.465] [0.525] [0.663] [0.293] [0.420] [0.522] 
Hansen Test Stat 23.72 32.83 13.41 23.95 22.74 22.99 22.07 23.39 34.35 
Hansen p-value [0.307] [0.135] [0.767] [0.295] [0.302] [0.289] [0.281] [0.221] [0.356] 
 
Dependent variable is GDPPC_gr.  5-year interval panel data is used for estimation.  The lagged ln(GDPPC) is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are 
endogenous.  Period dummies and additional covariates are included but not reported.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Maximum 4 lags are used for instruments.  
Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.   
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2.4.2.3.2 With Alternative Measure of Institution 
 
To test further the sensitivity of our results, we test the baseline specification 
with alternative measures of institutions in Table  2.4.2-4.  Instead of DEMOC, 
we use the augmented Freedom House’s polity index (IPOLITY2).  Hadenius 
and Teorell (2005) suggests that averaging the Freedom House’s political rights 
and civil liberties indices works better than simply using the individual one 
from the original source in terms of validity and reliability.  Our Model 2.(22) 
in Table  2.4.2-4 shows that this alternative measure of democracy does not 
change our conclusion at all.  Democracy still has no significant direct partial 
impact on economic growth.  
 
We then substitute LEGAL by the composite measure of the quality of 
government index QOG (as defined in Section  2.4.1) to proxy the security of 
property rights and contract enforcement provided by the State in our 
estimation.  Since this variable captures more dimensions of institutions, it is 
no wonder the variable dominates all the significant impact on growth as 
shown in Models 2.(23) and 2.(24).  In these Models, only QOG remains 
statistically significant, possibly reflecting that the direct impact of QOG 
dominates that of other institutional variables.   
 
To separately test “market-creating” institutions – property rights and 
contractual rights – as in previous literature (like in Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005)), we also carry out similar tests in Models 2.(25) and 2.(26) using Polity 
IV’s executive constraint (XCONST) as a measure of security of property 
rights12.  Higher values of XCONST mean that there are more constraints on 
the executives, implying that the risk of expropriation from the State is less 
likely.  Our results shall suggest that “market-creating” institutions have a 
direct positive impact on economic growth.   
 
                                                 
12 DEMOC has not be incorporated simultaneously to avoid multicollinearity since XCONST 
is a component of DEMOC. 
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Table  2.4.2-4: Institution and Economic Growth – With Alternative Measures of 
Institutions 
(2-Step System GMM Estimations) 
 
Model 2.(22) 2.(23) 2.(24) 2.(25) 2.(26) 
      
          
DEMOC  -0.0002    
  (0.0015)    
IPOLITY2 0.0023  0.0005   
 (0.0016)  (0.0023)   
QOG  0.0651*** 0.0642**   
  (0.0212) (0.0245)   
LEGAL 0.0052***    0.0069*** 
 (0.0019)    (0.0022) 
XCONST    0.0010*** 0.0007*** 
    (0.0002) (0.0002) 
SM 0.0032** 0.0014 0.0014   
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)   
REG 0.0040 0.0047 0.0041   
 (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0047)   
      
SCHOOLING 0.0119** 0.0186*** 0.0178*** 0.0143* 0.0129** 
 (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0084) (0.0058) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.0246** -0.0376*** -0.0327*** -0.0185 -0.0225** 
 (0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0095) (0.0158) (0.0094) 
Const 0.0423 0.1261** 0.0903* 0.0718 0.0734* 
 (0.0510) (0.0570) (0.0487) (0.0760) (0.0437) 
          
Obs/No. of cty 463/94 391/84 402/86 559/99 469/92 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0443]  [0.0000]  
AR(2) p-value [0.298] [0.132] [0.235] [0.283] [0.376] 
Hansen Test Stat 22.03 17.78 20.85 5.068 7.179 
Hansen p-value [0.231] [0.471] [0.287] [0.750] [0.708] 
 
Dependent variable is GDPPC_gr.  5-year interval panel data is used for estimation.  The 
lagged ln(GDPPC) is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  
Period dummies are included but not reported.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and 
Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Maximum 4 lags are used for 
instruments.  Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen 
test is used for overidentifying restrictions.   
 
 
2.4.2.3.3 With Different Sub-samples 
 
Finally, we use different sub-samples to test our baseline specification in Table 
 2.4.2-5.  Following the literature on the effect of legal origins on institutions 
and economic outcomes13, we test the baseline model with non-English 
                                                 
13 See La Porta, et al. (2008) for a recent survey on this strand of literature.  In gist, this strand 
of view suggests that legal origin of an economy will directly affect its degree of security of 
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common law origin and non-French civil law origin countries in Models 2.(27) 
and 2.(28).  In Models 2.(29) – 2.(32), we further test different sub-samples 
by income levels.  Our general results are largely similar.  These models, 
again, provide empirical evidence that “market-creating” institution, measured 
by the protection of property rights and contract enforcement (LEGAL), as 
well as “market-stabilising” institutions, measured by the stability of monetary 
and fiscal institution (SM), are directly conducive to economic growth.  
DEMOC, on the contrary, does not have any direct impact on growth.  
 
One interesting finding is on REG – market-regulating institution.  Using the 
full sample, we have seen that REG does not have any significant direct partial 
effect on growth, although the sign of the coefficients indicate that a less 
regulated environment tends to grow faster.  However, we find a positive and 
statistically significant direct impact of REG on growth in the sub-sample of 
non-English common law origins (i.e. Model 2.(27)), non-industrialised 
countries (i.e. Model 2.(31)) and low income and lower middle income 
countries (i.e. Model 2.(32)).  These results suggest that the negative impact 
of excess regulatory environment is more obvious in less developed economies.  
This also provides supporting evidence to the existing literature, like Djankov, 
et al. (2002) and Botero, et al. (2004), that there are generally more regulations 
in less developed economies and they are more likely to be growth-impeding.  
This probably relates to the bureaucratic quality to execute these regulations.  
In particular, more red tape may also lead to more corruption which is 
gorwht-hampering.  However, the case of Sub-Sahara African countries is 
quite peculiar.  We do not find the negative effect of REG in this sub-sample.  
One, nevertheless, should note that the size of the sub-sample pertaining to 
Sub-Sahara African countries is significantly smaller than the other 
sub-samples.     
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
property rights via judicial formalism, bureaucratic quality, the amount of red-tape and 
regulations, and henceforth, its economic performance.  It is found that countries with English 
common law origin, vis-à-vis those with French civil law origin, generally perform better, with 
more developed financial markets as well as less corruption.  
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Table  2.4.2-5: Institution and Economic Growth – Sub-Samples Estimations 
(2-Step System GMM Estimations) 
 
Model 2.(11) 2.(27) 2.(28) 2.(29) 2.(30) 2.(31) 2.(32) 
Sample Full  
Non-English Common 
Law Countries
§
 
Non-French Civil 
Law Countries
§
 
Non Sub-Sahara 
African Countries 
Sub-Sahara African 
Countries 
Non Industrialised 
Countries
^
 
Lower Middle 
Income & Low 
Income 
Countries
¶
 
                
DEMOC 0.0015 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
REG 0.0042 0.0089* -0.0064 0.0026 0.0135 0.0117* 0.0210** 
 (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0039) (0.0107) (0.0062) (0.0092) 
SM 0.0031* 0.0030* 0.0065** 0.0023* 0.0035 0.0030* 0.0035 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0045) (0.0017) (0.0035) 
LEGAL 0.0052*** 0.0073*** 0.0061* 0.0050*** 0.0098** 0.0072** 0.0090** 
 (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0046) (0.0030) (0.0039) 
SCHOOLING 0.0139* 0.0101* 0.0015 0.0092** -0.0064 0.0131 -0.0018 
 (0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0107) (0.0088) (0.0123) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.0304** -0.0269*** -0.0044 -0.0218** -0.0021 -0.0293* 0.0030 
 (0.0118) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0176) (0.0162) (0.0323) 
Const 0.0843 0.0509 -0.0047 0.0744 -0.1039 0.0427 -0.1700 
 (0.0575) (0.0477) (0.0433) (0.0529) (0.0891) (0.0962) (0.1866) 
Obs/No. of cty 447/91 293/60 213/43 354/70 93/21 326/70 208/46 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0004]  [0.0000]  [0.0190]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  
AR(2) p-value [0.279] [0.478] [0.978] [0.136] [0.604] [0.583] [0.526] 
Hansen Test Stat 21.80 17.12 18.02 25.92 9.322 18.00 15.55 
Hansen Test p-value [0.241] [0.194] [0.115] [0.169] [0.952] [0.456] [0.342] 
Dependent variable is GDPPC_gr.  5-year interval panel data is used for estimation.  The lagged ln(GDPPC) is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are 
endogenous.  Period dummies are included but not reported.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Maximum 4 lags are used for instruments.  Instruments are transformed by 
orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.   
 
§
 English common law and French civil law countries are classified based on La Porta, et al. (1997). 
^
 Industrialised economies are classified based on Chinn and Ito (2006). 
¶ Classification of lower middle income and low income countries is based on World Bank classification.   
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, our primary interest is to revisit the empirical evidence of 
institution and growth in a dynamic panel data model and investigate if and 
what institutions matter to growth.  The research motivation is driven by the 
technical limitations of the existing literature.  After providing a brief 
literature survey of the subject, we point out that the existing literature is 
mostly cross-sectional in nature, which ignores the dynamic and short-run 
impact of institutions on growth.  On the technicalities front, these studies 
assume that there is no direct growth effect of any institutional change.  
Estimation results are also subject to endogeneity without using proper and 
valid instruments.  These results are also potentially biased due to omitted 
variables, like country-specific characteristics which may capture the effect of 
natural endowments, culture, historical developments and other time-invariant 
factors alike.  Exactly what institutions matter to economic growth is not well 
defined in previous studies.  Therefore, although the institution view suggests 
a convincing case that institutions are the fundamental sources of growth, 
empirical results are largely inconclusive.    
 
We employ panel GMM estimator to carry out our empirical investigation.  
By so doing, we do not have to seek “external” instruments to tackle the weak 
version of endogeneity problem between institutions and economic growth.  
In addition, the methodology allows us to control for country-specific 
characteristics, time effect and initial income level.  The results obtained help 
demonstrate the direct and short-run partial impact of institution on growth. 
 
So after using our suggested methodology, which appears to be technically 
improved, do institutions matter to growth empirically?  It all depends on 
what institutions we refer to.  The general results are positive when we first 
take a preliminary test of an augmented Solow growth model with institutions 
incorporated in the specification.  In such specification, we show that 
institutions, as measured by a composite index, have a direct impact on growth.  
In contrast to, say human capital, the effect of institution is more statistically 
significant.     
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We further attempt to test institutions into clusters.  Based on Rodrik(2005)’s 
taxonomy described in Chapter 1, we cluster institutions into four dimensions, 
which essentially measures political institutions – democracy in particular, and 
economic institutions and policies – security of property rights, stability of 
monetary and fiscal policies and regulatory environment.  This framework 
brings political institution, economic institution and policies into synergy and 
allows us to test institutions in a unified manner. 
 
Our empirical results generally show that political institution, i.e. democracy in 
our case, does not have any direct effect on growth.  This result holds even if 
we use alternative measures of democracy.  Secondly, market-creating 
institutions, measured by the security of property rights as well as constraints 
on the executives, are directly associated with growth.  This is in line with the 
existing literature.  Thirdly, stability of monetary and fiscal policies, namely 
market-stabilising institutions, is also growth-promoting.  Fourthly, 
market-regulating institutions, which measure the regulatory environment, 
show no direct growth impact either.  It may suggest that whether regulations 
are growth-impeding is in relation to the stage of development of countries.  
In developed countries, regulations may help rectify externalities and restore 
market competitiveness.  In the less developed economies, regulations may be 
growth-hampering due to the executive ability of bureaucrats and the 
likelihood of corruption thereby induced.  Therefore, using a full sample, the 
impact of regulations is ambiguous.  However, using a sub-sample, we find 
that fewer regulations directly carry a significant growth impact in less 
developed economies.  This suggests that after controlling for the stage of 
development, the negative impact of regulations on growth is more pronounced.  
All these empirical results seem to survive after using different specifications 
with additional covariates and using different sub-samples.  
 
In conclusion, the empirical evidence obtained under a coherent taxonomy 
demonstrates that economic institution and policies impose direct and partial 
growth impacts, but political institutions do not.  We also provide additional 
empirical evidence to the institution view that institutions matter to growth, 
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even after controlling for the unobserved time-invariant effects and the possible 
dynamics of institutional change.  We should stress that we have no intention 
to overrule the endowment view or historical view of growth.  In particular, 
our investigations do not take into account of the impact of historical 
incidences, e.g. wars, on the institutional changes.  Our results merely attempt 
to address the concerns on and critiques of the existing institution view 
literature.  Moreover, the observations showing that institutions that do not 
have direct growth impact does not mean that they play no particular role in the 
development process.  Also, their impacts may be non-linear.  With this in 
mind, we will try to explore other channels through which these defined 
clusters may affect economic development in the following Chapters.    
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CHAPTER 3 : ON THE CAUSALITY OF 
DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC REFORMS 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter is an extension of Chapter 2 with an aim to make progress 
towards understanding the effect of political institution on economic 
development via its causation of economic reforms.  We focus on the 
causality between political institutions – democracy, specifically – and 
economic reforms.  We refer the latter to, as in Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), 
comprehensive reforms that broaden the scope of the market and of 
international markets, i.e. they are market-creating.  The causal relationship is 
tested empirically by using indices of democracy and liberalisation reforms on 
various fronts – namely, fiscal sector, banking sector, capital account and trade 
liberalisation and labour market regulation – for the period of 1970-2005 for 
114 economies.   
 
Literature has attempted to establish the relationship between reforms and 
political institution, in which reforms are commonly referred as liberalisation 
measures.  Naturally, the research questions focus on under which political 
institution – using a dichotomous classification of democracy vis-à-vis 
autocracy – is more likely to cause liberalisation and what are the ex ante and 
ex post growth impacts of liberalisation.   
 
Understandably, political institution and policy choices form an interactive 
nexus.  Since the wave of democratisation beginning from 1978 in Latin 
America, we saw the widespread adoption of outward orientation policies in 
the region.  The opening up of the Central and Eastern European economies 
followed after the fall of Soviet-type socialism.  Liberalisation reforms appear 
to take place together with changes in political institution.  It is commonly 
believed that democracy renders the government to be more accountable, more 
sensitive to the public demand.  Economic liberalisation – free exchange of 
goods and services, capital account liberalisation, free flow of capital or lax 
regulatory environment – introduces competition to the domestic market, 
expands the choice sets of the economy and thus improves the general welfare 
of the society.  Liberalisation measures are more likely to gain public support 
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in democracies.  Reciprocally, market liberalisation also potentially leads to 
economic development and carries a positive feedback to the demand for 
democratisation process in the society (as in Schumpter (1950), Lipset (1959) 
and Hayek (1960)).   
 
At first sight, data do show us that political liberalisation and economic 
liberalisation appear to move hand in hand.  Indeed, we find more 
democracies over the last few decades alongside increased globalisation.  
Table 3.1-1 provides a very preliminary snapshot of regime transition around 
the world over the last few decades.  Using POLITY IV’s measure of 
institutionalised democracy (DEMOC) as defined in Chapter 2, an index 
ranging from 0 to 10 with higher score indicating a more democratic society, 
the number of democratic economies rose from 36 economies in 1970 to an 
overwhelmingly 95 economies in 2007.  Democracies represent over 60% of 
the total number of economies being studied in 2007.   
 
Table 3.1-1: Number of economies under different political regimes 
 
 1970 1990 2007 
Democracy 
(DEMOC ≥ 5) 
36 59 95 
    
Autocracy 
(DEMOC < 5) 
88 72 58 
Total 124 131 153 
 
 
In parallel, economic liberalisation marched forward rapidly.  During 
1970-2007, the value of total world exports rose by 37.6 times1.  Foreign 
direct investment contributed some 0.5% of world’s GDP in 1970 to 3.3% in 
20072.  Using the composite economic freedom index (EF) from the Fraser 
Institute, increasingly more democracies are classified as “economic free” over 
the years, as shown in Table 3.1-2 below.  Indeed, Milner and Kubota (2005) 
similarly argue that preceding and concurrent with the move to free trade, there 
has been a global movement toward democracy.  They suggest that the two 
                                                 
1 Data source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2007 (Retrieved from: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2007_e/its07_appendix_e.htm). 
2  Data source: UNCAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database (Retrieved from: 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1923). 
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trends are related.   
 
 
Table 3.1-2: Number of economic free economies under democracy and autocracy 
 
Political regime Degree of Liberalisation 1970 1990 2004 
Economic Free 23 45 90 
Democracy 
Not Economic Free 3 12 1 
Economic Free 17 22 24 
Autocracy 
Not Economic Free 8 22 7 
 
Note: Democracy (Autocracy) is defined as scoring 5 or above (below 5) in Polity IV’s 
index on institutionalised democracy.  The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher score 
indicating the economy is more democratic. 
Degree of liberalisation is based on the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index.  The 
index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher score indicating the economy is more economic 
free.  Economies are “economic free” if they receive scores with 5 or above and vice 
versa.  
 
Apparently, this co-movement serves no robust foundation for arguing the 
causal relationship between political institution and economic reforms.  For 
example, developed economies like Hong Kong, while enjoying the 
well-acclaimed “the world’s most free” economy for decades (e.g. Gwartney, 
et al. (2008) and Heritage Foundation (2009)), has no democracy (Gwartney, et 
al. (2008)).  It may suggest that an autocrat could be equally likely to 
undertake liberalisation reforms if it deems fit.  In fact, from Table 3.1-2 
above, we find that increasingly more autocratic economies also enjoy greater 
economic freedom.  In other words, having reforms or not may not 
necessarily relate to the political regime.   
 
The causality relationship appears to be further weakened by the spectacular 
growth performances in the emerging markets during the last few decades.  
China, as a notable exception, has adopted market liberalisation reform since 
1978.  On the political institution front, nevertheless, there are very few signs 
showing a dramatic democratisation (see Table 3.1-3 below).  Amongst the 
four most growth-promising emerging markets – together with Brazil, Russia, 
India – China is the only so-called “autocratic” society.  However, all four 
economies show a substantial improvement in economic freedom.   
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Table 3.1-3: Scores on Democracy (DEMOC) and Economic Freedom (EF) of Selected 
Emerging Economies 
 
Year 1980 1995 2000 2004 
 DEMOC EF DEMOC EF DEMOC EF DEMOC EF 
Brazil 2 4.35 8 4.42 8 5.88 8 5.88 
China 0 4.00 0 5.20 0 5.82 0 5.66 
India 0 5.15 0 6.42 7 5.90 8 6.03 
Russia .. .. 8 4.42 7 4.95 7 5.60 
 
Note: DEMOC is defined as above – an index ranging from 0 to 10 with higher scores denote 
democracy.  EF index is from Gwartney, et al. (2008), ranging from 0 to 10 with higher 
scores denote more economically free.   
 
While a causal relationship cannot be established, the use of dichotomous 
classification of political regime also covers up the dynamics of changes in 
political institution, as well as the dynamic policy choices determined.  
Regime transition can happen in some economies within a fairly short period of 
time.  For example, using DEMOC index again, Argentina scored zero in 
1970, then 6 in 1975.  The score fell back to zero again in 1980 and then rose 
to some 7-8 from 1985 onwards.  Peru scored zero in the 70s, then 7s in the 
80s and reverted to around 3 in the late 90s.   
 
Marginal changes of political institution, instead of a fundamental regime 
switch, happen even more often.  We attempt to classify economies as 
democracies/autocracies using the dichotomous classification as above.  The 
classification of the economies in our dataset is set out in Appendix Section 
 A.4.  We find that the majority of economies generally stay as democracies 
throughout the sample period, with marginally improving and deteriorating 
DEMOC scores over the sample period without a complete regime switch.  It 
suggests that marginal changes in political institutions, rather than regime 
switch, are more prevalent.   
 
Henceforth, the question we are interested in naturally is whether these 
marginal changes of political institution at certain period of time could affect 
the policy choices made in the coming periods.  In return, we wonder if there 
will be any feedback effect of these policy choices on political institution.  To 
test empirically these questions, we have to design a strategy to capture the 
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dynamic, short-run impact of our variables of interest.  We propose to use the 
dynamic panel GMM estimators as in Chapter 2 to this end.  This would be 
different from the existing literature in which it is primarily interested in the 
effect of permanent regime transition, instead of any marginal changes of 
political institution.  Furthermore, our proposed estimation strategy helps 
address the endogenous problem of political institution and policy choices, 
which are not often and satisfactorily dealt with in the literature.   
 
Our research motivations also extend to investigate what kinds of reforms are 
more likely to be implemented in democracies.  Empirical work of this kind is 
less frequently explored.  The effects of democracy on trade liberalisation and 
financial liberalisation were separately investigated in earlier studies.  Only 
until recently, however, some studies brought the two forms of liberalisations 
together.  To measure liberalisation, quantitative statistics such as total trade 
as percentage of GDP or the number of credit market restrictions as defined by 
IMF are usually used as proxies.  Since 2000, there is a new strand of 
literature devoting efforts in compiling indicators (or indices) to measure 
liberalisation from a multi-dimensional perspective.  Other than trade and 
financial liberalisations, empirical work on reforms in other sectors is even 
fewer.   
 
To sum up, unlike previous studies, our empirical investigation is designed in a 
dynamic setting, allowing us to investigate if the causal relationship between 
political institution and economic reforms can be found in a relatively short 
time-span.  This captures the effect of marginal changes of political institution, 
but not necessarily a regime switch, on economic reform.  In addition, we will 
also test the causal relationship in respect to sector-specific reforms.  Our 
findings show that democracy seems more likely to lead to a more 
redistributive society and reforms in trade and financial liberalisation.  The 
results survive even when using different measures of political institution and 
sub-samples.  On the reverse causality, we find that redistributive policy and 
trade liberalisation likewise seemingly cause the economy to make progress in 
democratisation.  However, financial liberalisation does not show such causal 
effect.   
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In the following, we will present a brief literature survey in Section  3.2, with 
the emphasis on the strategies employed in previous studies.  We will then 
discuss our model and data used in Section  3.3.  Our empirical results follow 
in Section  3.4.  We conclude in Section  3.5. 
 
 
3.2 Literature Survey: Interrelationship between Political Regime and 
Economic Reform 
 
There is no conclusive theoretical argument or empirical evidence showing that 
democracy will cause economic reform.  Economic reforms reflect policy 
changes.  Democratic governments may have greater legitimacy to reforms 
and promote institutional changes – e.g. strengthening an independent legal 
system to ensure political freedom and democracy – thus leading to successful 
market reforms (Giuliano, Mishra, and Spilimbergo (2009), hereafter 
abbreviated as GMS).  Democracy could also create an environment 
conducive to economic reforms by limiting rent-seeking activities and putting a 
system of checks and balances in place (Dethier, Ghanem, and Zoli (1999)).   
 
3.2.1 Theoretical arguments 
 
Interest group model suggests that economic reforms reflect changes in the 
economic choices that political elites made to maximise their own payoffs 
(Acemoglu (2006)).  Along a similar line, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)’s 
model demonstrates that political institutions may change but economic 
policies could be quite persistent.  In other words, political institutions do not 
directly cause policy choices.  Their proposition is that the persistence of 
economic choices is not due to the persistence of political elites, but the 
persistence of incentives of whoever is in power.  Similarly, Alesina, Ardagna, 
and Trebbi (2006) also argue that delayed reforms are generally caused by the 
political conflict over what type of stabilisation to implement, in particular over 
the distribution of costs of the adjustment.  The rationale of their model is that 
stabilisation occurs when one of the competing groups can impose its desired 
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policies on others that have exhausted their ability to resist the undesired 
stabilisation.  In a nutshell, the “interest group” view of reform suggests that 
democracy could only lead to more reforms if reforms create more winners 
than losers.   
 
Specifically with regard to trade liberalisation, the conventional literature 
suggests that economies in crisis, say hyperinflation, are more likely to 
undertake economic reforms.  However, Milner and Kubota (2005) refute 
such proposition.  Their work, with the support of empirical evidence, 
suggests that it is democracy that triggers trade liberalisation.  As trade 
liberalisation is about to benefit most of the workers, thereby likely gaining 
political support in a democracy.  Likewise, Rajan and Zingales (2003) also 
suggests that economic liberalizations could be associated with higher quality 
of democratic institutions if such reform increases the economic power of the 
middle class.  Aidt and Gassebner (2007) similarly argue that autocracies tend 
to trade less than democracies do because of trade taxes imposed.  
Autocracies, with less political accountability, usually result in poorer 
bureaucratic quality as there is no incentive to build up control structures (e.g. 
red tape and other unobserved trade distortions).  This leads to the differences 
in trade flows as compared to that in democracies.  On the contrary, De Haan 
and Sturm (2003) suggests that democracies are less likely to cause trade 
liberalisation as it involves massive layoffs at the beginning.  As they reckon, 
only an autocrat can possibly bear this short-term cost.   
 
Other than trade liberalisation, democracy may also cause reforms in other 
aspects such as the provision of public goods.  Sunde, Cervellati, and 
Fortunato (2006) propose an endogenous model of political institution, 
highlighting that democratic transition, economic development and economic 
policies are endogenously determined.  Democratic transition, as they 
interpret, is essentially about provision of productive public goods and 
redistribution of incomes.  Redistribution and public good provision are 
public choices made by different interest groups under both democracies and 
autocracies.  Their model basically argues that political elites, albeit their 
monopolised political power, will start to invest in public goods for efficient 
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production once the economy reaches beyond certain level of technology and 
economic development.  Gradually they have to consider the trade-off 
between giving up some political power in exchange for a broader tax basis for 
the provision of public goods.  Their model predicts that democracies tend to 
create environments which are more favourable for economic activities than 
the ones implemented under oligarchies.  Furthermore, countries with more 
democratic institutions usually have a larger state, meaning more government 
consumption and more redistribution.  Acemoglu, et al. (2005) provide a 
survey of cross-country evidence on the patterns of democracy.  They 
conclude that democracies are more redistributive than oligarchies, especially 
with an increase in redistribution following democratisation.   
 
 
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence 
 
3.2.2.1 Trade Liberalisation 
 
Empirical evidence of the causal relationship between democracy and 
economic reforms remains largely inconclusive.  In terms of trade 
liberalisation reforms, empirical studies of Fidrmue (2003) and De Haan and 
Sturm (2003) suggest that democracy is likely to cause trade liberalisation.  
Milner and Kubota (2005) suggest that democratisation reduces the ability of 
governments to use trade barriers as a strategy for building political support.  
Political leaders in labour-rich countries may prefer lower trade barriers to 
obtain political support as democracy increases.  Their empirical evidence 
also supports that regime change is associated with trade liberalization.  In 
contrast, economic crises and external pressures, as conventionally believed, 
seem less salient.  
 
Amongst all these empirical studies, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) is a more 
frequently cited empirical article, which explicitly investigates the causality 
between economic and political liberalisation.  They define economic 
liberalisation as openness to international trade, whereas political liberalisation 
is a permanent regime change from autocracy to democracy.  By means of 
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“difference-in-difference” estimation technique and using the country-specific 
dates of liberalisation to cluster the pre- and post-liberalisation samples, their 
OLS and FE panel estimates show significant positive effects of liberalisations 
on economic performance (e.g. growth, investment and trade volume), 
macroeconomic policy (e.g. budget surplus and inflation) and structural 
policies (e.g. corruption).  Nevertheless, they suggest no causal relationship 
for trade liberalisation to democracy.  Their findings, however, provide 
support to the claim that the sequences of economic and political liberalisation 
do matter.  Countries that first liberalise trade and then become democracies 
do better than those who pursue the opposite sequence in almost all 
dimensions.   
 
Their work is by all means comprehensive in terms of measuring the impact of 
trade liberalisation on various economic outcomes.  However, since they only 
consider a permanent regime change as political liberalisation, they inevitably 
have to consider merely those countries with political liberalisation and that did 
not reverse in the sample.  Their estimation technique – 
“difference-in-difference” estimation – also makes it difficult to estimate 
temporary regime change and regime reversal.  As they also recognise, this 
may create a selection bias.  Moreover, the dichotomous classification of 
democracy does not capture the effect of continuous progress of 
democratisation in the country, unless the improvements are significant enough 
to be classified as a complete regime change.   
 
Other empirical work like Rudra (2005) also finds a positive impact of trade 
openness on democracy, subject to the fact that the levels of social spending are 
high enough.  Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) carry their empirical test on 
the initially non-democratic countries and, likewise, demonstrate a positive 
causality.  On the contrary, Li and Reuveny (2003) use lagged trade data and 
report a negative impact of trade liberalisation on democracy.  Rigobon and 
Rodrik (2004) suggest a similar negative effect through the use of 
identification through heteroskedasticity estimation strategy.   
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3.2.2.2 Financial Liberalisation 
 
Quinn (2000) is amongst the first to test the effect of political institution on 
financial liberalisation.  He creates his own capital account openness indicator 
and estimates the causality relationship in a panel VAR setting.  His 
conclusion is that democracies are more likely to remove capital controls.  
Reciprocally, financial liberalisation is associated with a decrease in democracy.  
Dailami (2000) provides a possible explanation for this negative relationship.  
He notes that capital account liberalisation may limit the ability of 
governments to deploy redistributive taxation, regulation and risk-sharing 
policies, thereby weakening support for democratic forms of governance.  His 
empirical evidence also shows that capital account liberalisation negatively 
associates with democracy.  Abiad and Mody (2005), on the other hand, 
shows no influence of financial liberalisation on political institution at all.   
 
3.2.2.3 Joint Tests of Multi-Sector Reforms 
 
Studies, that jointly test the effect of democracy on economic and financial 
liberalisation reforms, have only come up very lately.  Eichengreen and 
Leblang (2006)3 empirically investigate how democracy interacts with 
globalisation over a long historical period of 1870-2000.  They refer 
globalisation to both trade and financial liberalisation, measured respectively 
by the percentage of total trade to GDP and capital controls – defined as 
whether there are explicit legal restrictions on capital transitions as adopted by 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  
They argue that most of the studies previously done either ignore the possible 
two-way causality relationship or endogeneity problems in the model 
specification.  They are of the view that very little effort has been made to 
develop an appropriate instrumental variables strategy for dealing with the 
endogeneity problem.  To this end, inspired by earlier work by 
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2005) and Milner and Kubota (2005), they use 
the gravity model to obtain instruments for trade.  They suggest that the basic 
                                                 
3 In addition, they also provide an excellent review on the empirical studies of the effect of 
trade and financial liberalisation on democracy.   
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gravity model variables are plausible instruments for identifying the exogenous 
component of trade.  Similarly, for capital account policies, instrumental 
variables like country size, inflation, budget deficit, the number of countries 
with capital control or where those countries are experiencing currency crisis 
can also be used.  Thanks to the long time span of their database, they further 
segregate the full sample into several sub-periods, including the gold standard, 
the interwar period, the Bretton Woods and the post-Bretton Woods periods.  
Although the standard Hansen-J test does not always support the validity of the 
instruments used, their results generally point to the conclusion that there is a 
positive two-way relationship between democracy and globalisation.  The 
results still hold after controlling for legal origins, geographical regions and 
level of economic development of the countries.   
 
The joint tests of trade and financial liberalisation extend research interests to 
economic reforms in other dimensions.  Naturally, this requires the 
development of a multi-sectoral reform dataset.  The IMF (2008) has just 
completed a cross-country economic reform database, covering 10 sectors over 
the period of 1960-20044.  Giuliano, et al. (2009) (GMS) is possibly the first 
to test the effect of democracy on economic reform using these indicators.  
After controlling for country, time and sector-specific effects, their fixed effect 
estimations show that democracy does cause economic reform.  However, 
they find no empirical evidence of the reverse causality.   
 
The fundamental question we are interested in is similar to GMS, but our 
investigation is different in a number of ways.  First of all, we will use a 
different set of reform indicators, namely the sub-indicators of the Fraser 
Institute’s economic freedom index from Gwartney, et al. (2008).  On one 
hand, the IMF’s database is not publicly accessible.  On the other hand, the 
two sets of measures do overlap in a number of aspects.  We will compare the 
two datasets in greater details in Section  3.3.1.1 below.  Secondly, although 
GMS also use panel data fixed-effect model in their study, the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable (either democracy or economic reform) as a 
                                                 
4 We will briefly compare this dataset to the indicators we use in our empirical study in Section 
 3.3.1 below. 
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regressor may reflect the fact that they ignore the problem of “dynamic bias” as 
suggested by Nickell (1981).  Yet, they do acknowledge the potential problem 
of endogeneity in their estimations.  They suggest using the reform index of 
the neighbouring economy to be an instrument for their IV estimations.  
Nevertheless, there is no explicit theoretical justification or empirical validity 
test for these instruments used.  Thirdly, despite a vast amount of additional 
covariates incorporated in their robustness check (e.g. education, inflation, real 
devaluation, public expenditure, bureaucratic quality etc), the authors appear to 
fail to control for the income level.  As shown in Eichengreen and Leblang 
(2006)’s survey, there is indeed a large amount of literature in which they argue 
that income levels (i.e. GDP per capita) are directly associated with democracy 
and also the economy’s capability to undertake economic reform.  It is also 
argued that economic growth helps build up the expectation of deepening 
economic reform and promoting democratisation.   
 
We propose to use the sub-indices of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom 
Index (EF) (Gwartney, et al. (2008)) in the present study.  Testing the 
causality between political institution and economic freedom by using EF are 
not scarce in the literature.  However, there are at least two limitations of 
these studies.  They primarily use the aggregate EF indicator without 
considering its sub-indices, except in Lundstrom (2003).  While EF measures 
broadly 5 areas, it is quite likely that each of them may have a different effect 
on the political institution5 and vice versa.  Second, it seems to be quite 
common that using EF relies heavily on the use of Granger causality to 
demonstrate causal relationship, without considering the problem of 
endogeneity amongst variables.  While EF reflects a broad spectrum of policy 
choices, one should note that political institution and policies measured may be 
endogenously determined.  Table  3.2.2-1 below summarises selective relevant 
empirical studies in relation to the causality between economic freedom and 
political institution.  
                                                 
5 This strand of studies often tests the causality between economic freedom and political 
freedom.  The latter refers to the indices of political freedom and civil liberties in a country 
from Freedom House, which is also a common measure of political institution other than the 
Polity IV index.  In our estimations, we will also use Freedom House indices as a robustness 
check.   
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Table  3.2.2-1: Empirical Studies of Measuring the Causality between 
Economic Freedom and Political Institution 
 
Study Sample 
Estimation 
Technique 
Results 
Dawson 
(1998) 
92 countries, 
1975–1990 
Granger 
causality for 
cross-sections 
The level of EF in 1990 is 
significantly related to political and 
civil freedom in 1975. 
 
Farr, et al. 
(1998) 
22 industrial and 
78 developing 
countries, 
1975–1990 
 
Granger 
causality for 
cross-sections 
No Granger-causal relationship 
between EF and political freedom and 
vice versa; EF Granger-causes income 
per capita, which, in turn, 
Granger-causes political freedom. 
 
Wu and 
Davis 
(1999) 
About 100 
countries, 
1975–1992. 
Log-linear 
method 
Political freedom is not associated 
with economic freedom. 
 
De Haan 
and Sturm 
(2003) 
55–68 developing 
countries, 
1975–1995 
OLS, Panel – 
period fixed 
effect 
The change in EF is significantly 
related to level of democracy in 1975, 
taking various control variables into 
account; conclusion also holds if 
robust estimators are used. 
 
Pitlik and 
Wirth (2003) 
Panel model 
1970–1999 with 
5-year intervals 
for 57–122 
countries 
Panel – country 
fixed effect 
Strong crises lead to more 
liberalization (i.e. higher EF); also 
democracy is positively related to 
increase in EF, as are some political 
system indicators that are based on the 
number of veto players. 
 
Dawson 
(2003) 
Granger causality 
tests, 1970–2000 
Granger 
causality for 
cross-sections 
Causation runs primarily from 
political to economic freedom. 
Lundstrom 
(2003) 
58 developing 
countries, 
1975–1995 
Panel – country 
fixed effect 
Political freedom is related to some 
groups of components of EF 
(‘government operations’ and 
‘regulations and restraints on 
international exchange’), but no to 
others. 
 
Source: De Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturm (2006) and author’s augmentation 
 
 
All in all, this Chapter intends to contribute to the literature in three ways.  
First, unlike the main strand, we consider economic reform by sectors, beyond 
the scope of merely trade and financial liberalisation.  Second, we technically 
deal with the problem of endogeneity between reforms and political regime by 
using a GMM estimator that were seldom satisfactorily addressed in the 
previous literature.  Thirdly, unlike existing studies in relation to economic 
freedom, we estimate the causal relationship in a dynamic panel setting, 
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allowing us to capture both the reverse relationship as well as inter-temporal 
and within country changes.  The contribution of this Chapter is entirely 
empirical. 
 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology  
 
3.3.1 Data 
 
3.3.1.1 Economic Reforms 
 
Using index-based measures of economic reforms serves two advantages.  On 
one hand, an index approach allows us to measure multi-dimensional aspects of 
reforms.  On the other hand, it can help benchmark across countries.   
 
To the best of our knowledge, there are at least three databases measuring 
economic reform.  First is the Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005)’s dichotomy 
index of “economic reform”.  Their database is originally built up by Sachs 
and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003).  The composite index 
primarily measures trade openness, covering conditions like (i) average tariffs 
exceed 40%; (ii) non-tariff barriers covering more than 40% of its imports; (iii) 
the economy has a socialist economic system; (iv) the black market premium 
on the exchange rate exceeds 20%; and (v) most of its exports are controlled by 
a state monopoly.  This index, as a dummy variable, classifies an economy as 
“open” or “close” based on the conditions above.    
 
Second is the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business micro-reform database.  
Reforms in the database are at the micro-level, such as the improvements made 
in the number of days to set up or close businesses, cut of administrative costs 
or review of company law and alike.  Based on this database, Amin and 
Djankov (2009) conclude that micro-reform is more likely to associate with 
democracies.  Due to the short time span of the dataset (2004-2008), the 
authors can only undertake cross-sectional OLS estimations.  Dynamic 
analysis is not possible.  The authors also do not take into account of the 
problem of endogeneity, as they reckon, the reverse causality is unlikely given 
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the reform is at micro-level.    
 
Third is the IMF (2008) reform database, empirically tested by GMS to 
investigate the causal relationship between reforms and democracy.  This is 
the only database that covers reforms in different sectors.  The IMF database 
covers eight areas of measurements, including both the financial sector and real 
sector.  Financial sector reform indicators include reforms pertaining to 
domestic financial markets and external capital account, while real sector 
structural reform indicators include measures of product and agriculture 
markets, labour, fiscal, trade and current account reforms.  Each indicator 
contains sub-indices summarising different dimensions in each sector.  GMS 
aggregate all the sub-indices and normalise them between 0 and 1, with higher 
scores representing greater degree of liberalisation.  In their empirical work, 
after controlling for country, year and sector specific effects, democracy causes 
reform.  The results hold true by sectors, except that democracy does not 
cause reforms in product market and fiscal sector.   
 
Unfortunately, the IMF database is not publicly accessible.  We therefore have 
to seek appropriate alternatives with comparable dimensions, sample size and 
time span for our estimation to pursue similar research interests.  We suggest 
that the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index (EF) (Gwartney, et al. 
(2008)) can be a plausible alternative.  In fact, most of sectors covered in the 
IMF’s database are also measured by the EF indices.  
 
We compare the EF indices to those in the IMF database in Table  3.3.1-1 below.  
In terms of coverage and time span, the two databases are quite comparable.  
In terms of dimensions, the IMF database is actually more superior as it 
includes reforms in product markets, agriculture sectors and security market 
liberalisation (subsumed under the index of financial sector).  The product 
market reforms indicator covers the degree of liberalisation in the 
telecommunication and electricity markets, including the extent of competition 
in the provision of these services and the presence of an independent regulatory 
authority and privatisation.  The agricultural market reforms indicator 
captures intervention in the market for the main agricultural export commodity 
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in each country.  The securities markets sub-indicator assesses the quality of 
the market framework, including the existence of an independent regulator and 
the extent of legal restrictions on the development of domestic bond and equity 
markets.  These three aspects, unfortunately, are not covered in EF.   
 
The IMF reform index and EF index measure in four common aspects, namely 
(a) fiscal sector; (b) trade liberalisation; (c) financial liberalisation and (d) 
labour market regulation.  The EF indices are generally composed of broader 
measures in these areas.  With regard to the fiscal sector, for example, the 
IMF reform index takes an average of the revenue sub-index – measuring 
personal income tax, corporate income tax and import tariffs – and the 
expenditure sub-index – measuring solely the efficiency of public expenditures 
in health and education.  In contrast, the EF index covers income and payroll 
tax rates on the revenue side and general government consumption spending as 
percentage of total consumption as well as transfers and subsidies as 
percentage of GDP on the expenditure side. 
 
In respect to trade and current account liberalisation, the IMF database defines 
the former as average tariff rates and the latter as how a government is free 
from restricting the proceeds from international trade in goods and services.  
The EF index is more comprehensive on this front.  The free trade index of 
EF is composed of taxes on international trade – including revenues from trade 
taxes, mean tariff rate and the variation in tariff rates as compared to a uniform 
tariff.  In addition, the EF also captures the regulatory trade barriers, 
including the perception of the business impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
the compliance cost of importing and exporting (obtained from the World 
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Survey), actual as compared to the expected 
trade size and the difference between the official and the black market 
exchange rate.  
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Table  3.3.1-1: Comparison between IMF Economic Reform Index and 
 Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index 
 
 
IMF Economic Reform Index 
Fraser Institute 
 Economic Freedom Index 
   
Sample Coverage 
 47 -142 countries, 1960 – 2006 141 countries, 1970 - 2005 
   
Areas of Measurement 
   
(1)  Fiscal Sector  
 The fiscal sector index is an average of revenue 
and expenditures sub-indices. 
The revenue sub-index is an average of two 
sub-indices i) a weighted average of three rates: 
personal income tax, corporate income tax, and 
import tariffs. ii) an indicator of efficiency of 
revenue collection for personal income, 
corporate and trade taxes. 
The expenditure sub-index is an average of 
measures of efficiency of public expenditures in 
health and education. The efficiency of public 
spending is measured by comparing actual 
spending with the minimum spending 
theoretically sufficient to produce the same 
actual output. 
 
The size of government index covers 
expenditure, taxes and enterprises. There are 
four sub-indices i) general government 
consumption spending as a percentage of 
total consumption; ii) transfers and 
subsidies as a percentage of GDP; iii) 
government enterprises and investment and 
iv) top marginal tax rate. 
(2)  Trade  
 Trade liberalization is defined as average tariff 
rates. 
Freedom to trade internationally index 
covers 5 sub-indices: i) taxes on 
international trade, measured by revenues 
from trade taxes as percentage of trade 
sector, mean tariff rate and standard 
deviation of tariff rates; ii) regulatory trade 
barriers, measured by non-tariff trade 
barriers and compliance cost of importing 
and exporting; iii) size to trade sector 
relative to expected; iv) black-market 
exchange rates, and v) international capital 
market controls, measured by foreign 
ownership/investment restrictions and 
capital controls. 
 
(3)  Current Account  
 Current account liberalization is defined with an 
indicator describing how compliant a 
government is with its obligations under the 
IMF’s Article VIII to free from government 
restriction the proceeds from international trade 
in goods and services. It distinguishes between 
restrictions on residents (receipts for exports) 
and on non-residents (payments for imports). 
 
 
[See the sub-indices “taxes on international 
trade” and “regulatory trade barriers” 
under Trade sector above.] 
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IMF Economic Reform Index 
Fraser Institute 
 Economic Freedom Index 
(4)  Capital Account  
 Qualitative indicators of restrictions on financial 
credits and personal capital transactions of 
residents and financial credits to non-residents, 
as well as the use of multiple exchange rates. 
 
[See the sub-index “international capital 
market controls” under Trade sector 
above.]  
(5)  Labour Market  
 The labour index is the tax wedge, which is 
defined as the difference between the firm’s 
labour costs and worker’s net income. 
Labour market regulations index covers 
both qualitative and quantitative indices on 
i) minimum wage, ii) hiring and tiring 
regulations, iii) centralized collective 
bargaining, iv) mandated cost of hiring, v) 
mandated cost of worker dismissal and vi) 
conscription. 
 
(6)  Financial Sector  
 The index of domestic financial liberalization is 
an average of five sub-indices related to banking 
and one related to the securities market. 
The banking sub-index is an average of the 
following 5 indicators: (i) interest rate controls, 
such as floors or ceilings; (ii) credit controls, 
such as directed credit and subsidized lending; 
(iii) competition restrictions, such as limits on 
branches and entry barriers in the banking 
sector, including licensing requirements or limits 
on foreign banks; (iv) the degree of state 
ownership; and (v) the quality of banking 
supervision and regulation, including power of 
independence of bank supervisors, adoption of 
Basel capital standards, and a framework for 
bank inspections. 
The securities market sub-index generally 
covers policies that develop domestic bond and 
equity markets. 
 
Credit market regulations index has four 
sub-indices: i) ownership of banks; ii) 
foreign bank competition; iii) private sector 
credit, and iv) interest rate controls / 
negative real interest rates. 
 
(7)  Product Markets  
 The electricity indicators capture (i) the degree 
of unbundling of generation, transmission, and 
distribution; (ii) whether a regulator other than 
government has been established; and (iii) 
whether the wholesale market has been 
liberalized; and (iv) privatization. 
 
The telecommunication indicator captures (i) the 
degree of competition in local services; (ii) 
whether a regulator other than government has 
been established; (iii) the degree of liberalization 
of interconnection changes; and (iv) 
privatization. 
 
 
 
 
 
[No comparable index] 
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IMF Economic Reform Index 
Fraser Institute 
 Economic Freedom Index 
(8)  Agriculture Market  
 The index captures intervention in the market 
for the main agricultural export commodity in 
each country.  The index can take four values 
(i) zero (public monopoly or monopsony in 
production, transportation, or marketing, e.g. 
export marketing boards); (ii) one-third 
(administered prices); (iii) two-thirds (public 
ownership of relevant producers or concession 
requirements); and (iv) one (no public 
intervention).   
 
 
[No comparable index] 
 
Source: Giuliano, et al. (2009) and Gwartney, et al. (2008). 
 
 
Financial liberalisation refers to both capital account openness and credit 
market deregulation.  On capital account openness, the IMF database 
measures the restrictions on financial credits and personal capital transactions 
of residents and restrictions on financial credits to non-residents, as well as the 
use of multiple exchange rates.  This indicator is primarily a composite index 
using the IMF’s definition of the 13 different types of international capital 
controls from its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions.  Similarly, the capital controls sub-component of the EF index is 
also constructed based on the same IMF definition.  In addition, the EF 
supplements the capital account openness index by survey questions results on 
“whether foreign ownership of companies in the country is rare” and “whether 
rules governing FDI are damaging and discourage it”.   
 
On financial sector reform, as mentioned before, the IMF reform index covers 
both the banking sector and securities market liberalisation.  The IMF refers 
domestic banking liberalisation to (i) interest rate controls; (ii) credit controls; 
(iii) banking competition restrictions, e.g. limits on branches and entry barriers 
in the banking sector; (iv) degree of state ownership; and (v) the quality of 
banking supervision and regulation.  In comparison, the EF only captures 
interest rate controls – measuring whether interest rates are determined by the 
market, stable monetary policy and positive real deposit and lending rates.  
Vis-à-vis credit market regulation, the EF index measures (a) the percentage of 
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bank deposits held in privately owned banks; (b) denial rate of foreign bank 
license applications and on foreign bank assets; and (c) the percentage of 
domestic credit consumed by the private sector.   
 
Finally, on labour market regulation, the IMF database measures the tax 
wedge – sum of taxes paid by the worker (e.g. personal income taxes, social 
security contributions etc.) and the employer (payroll tax, social security 
contributions paid etc) expressed as a ratio of gross wage.  In contrast, the EF 
mostly relies on qualitative indices, including survey questions on (a) 
minimum wage; (b) hiring and firing regulations; (c) centralised collective 
bargaining; (d) mandated cost of hiring; (e) mandated cost of worker dismissal, 
and; (f) data on the use and duration of military conscription.  Although the 
EF’s labour market regulation is indeed more directly relevant to labour market 
regulation, these indicators are also fairly subjective.   
 
All in all, we find that the different sub-indices of EF, as discussed above, can 
be used for our estimations as reform measures in different sectors.  As 
Gwartney, et al. (2008) explain, the EF index does not intend to measure 
political institution.  It, however, helps measure the consistency of the choices 
made by political institution.  The only disadvantage of the EF index is that it 
is only available for every 5 year before 1990.   
 
3.3.1.2 Democracy  
 
We use a continuous measure of democracy instead of a dichotomous measure.  
We argue that economic reform can potentially lead to marginal progress in 
democratisation and vice versa.  We use the widely adopted Polity IV’s 
measure of institutional democracy (DEMOC) to measure political institution 
as defined in Chapter 2.  Nevertheless, we will also use the dichotomous 
measure of democracy as a robustness check of our results.   
 
3.3.1.3 Controlled Variables 
 
As described earlier, we will control for income level in each specification.  
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Natural log of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (ln(GDPPC)) from WDI is used 
again.  For robustness checks, we will also include additional covariates in the 
baseline specification.  Details of these robustness checks will be discussed 
further in Section  3.4.3.   
 
3.3.2 Model Specification and Estimation Strategy  
 
As we intend to investigate a causality relationship, we incorporate lagged 
variables in our baseline specification and employ the dynamic panel GMM 
estimator.  Such dynamic analysis has not previously used in the existing 
literature for estimating causality between democracy and economic reforms 
and/or economic freedom.  In our baseline specification, unlike the work of 
GMS, we control for income level as proposed by Coviello and Islam (2006)6.  
We believe such control is essential as political institution, economic 
development and economic reform can be endogenously determined (see 
Sunde, et al. (2006)) since income level of the economy determines the 
capacity of policy reforms and it in turn may help build up the expectation of 
democratisation.   
 
Our baseline model is basically specified as 
 
11 −+++=∆ ittiit DEMOCREFORM βδµα  
( ) ititit GDPPCREFORM εββ +++ −− 13121 ln  
( 3.3-1) 
 
where i represents the i-th cross-section, t represents time period.  All 
regressors are in lagged forms to demonstrate the causality relationship.  
REFORM is a sub-index from EF, representing economic reform in each 
particular sector.  We also control for the unobserved time-invariant and 
country-specific effect, time effect by means of period dummies and the 
income level in the previous period.  All regressors are treated as 
pre-determined and endogenous variables.  Due to data availability, we use 
                                                 
6 Their work attempts to test the effect of foreign aid on institutional change.  They argue that 
the level of economic development may well affect the capacity of institutional change in 
recipient economies.   
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data in every 5-year period.  That is, t = 1970, 1975, 1980 …, 2000 and 2005.  
The lagged variable represents the variable in the last period, i.e. 5 years ago. 
 
Eq. ( 3.3-1) can be rewritten as 
 
    ittiit DEMOCREFORM βδµα +++= −11  
     ( ) ( ) 1312 ln1 −− +++ itit GDPPCREFORM ββ itε+  
( 3.3-2) 
 
is our baseline specification for estimation.  We will replace DEMOC as the 
dependent variable in the baseline specification to test the reverse causality of 
whether REFORM causes DEMOC.  The baseline specification will be 
similar to eq.( 3.3-2): 
  
     11 −+++= ittiit REFORMDEMOC βδµα  
               ititit GDPPCDEMOC εββ ++++ −− 1312 )ln()1(  
( 3.3-3) 
 
In terms of REFORM, we measure 4 main sectors as discussed above: (a) 
fiscal sector – using indices of GOVTC, TRANSFER and TAX; (b) trade 
liberalisation – using indices of FREE TRADE; (c) financial liberalisation – 
using K_AC and CREDIT, and (d) labour market – using LABOR.  Data 
descriptions and sources are at Appendix Section  A.2. 
 
 
3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Does Democracy cause Economic Freedom? 
 
We first estimate the effect of democracy on economic freedom index (EF) in a 
dynamic panel data setting7.  Table  3.4.1-1 shows the impact of lagged 
DEMOC on the level of aggregate EF index using different estimation 
techniques.  As explained in Chapter 2, as a rule of thumb, we look for a 
GMM estimator of the lagged dependent variable that lies somewhere between 
the OLS and fixed-effect within group (FE) estimators.  Models 3.(1) and 3.(2) 
                                                 
7 Technical details of panel system GMM estimation are set out in Chapter 2. 
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show the OLS and FE estimations respectively, whereas Model 3.(3) shows the 
system GMM estimator.  We can comfortably argue that system GMM 
estimator is an appropriate one since the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is around 0.52 which lies somewhere between 0.72 of OLS and 0.43 of 
FE estimators.  In addition, we also attempt to obtain the difference GMM 
estimator for comparison in Model 3.(4).  As we can see, Model 3.(4) fails 
this preliminary test.  The coefficient of lagged EF is significantly below that 
of FE estimator, indicating a downward bias.  The AR(1) test of Model 3.(4) 
also rejects the null hypothesis that the error terms are autocorrelated.  All 
these suggest that difference GMM estimator may not be appropriate in our 
case.  
 
The lagged dependent variable (EF) is positive and significant, suggesting 
convergence of economic freedom across countries over time.  Its coefficient 
is also well below 1 and it signifies that EF does not seem to be explosive.  
The presence of the lagged dependent variable also implies the coefficients of 
other regressors reflect their short-run impact on the dependent variables.  
Model 3.(3) shows that a more democratic society appears to cause the 
economy to be more economically free, even after controlling for 
country-specific and period effects as well as the lagged level of economic 
development, as proxied by natural log of lagged GDP per capita (lagged 
ln(GDPPC))3.  Nevertheless, we should note that lagged DEMOC is only 
marginally significant at 10% level in Model 3.(3).   
 
 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, one should note that the coefficients of the lagged GDP per capita are quite 
unstable across the four models.   
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Table  3.4.1-1: Does Democracy Cause Economic Freedom? –  
Different Estimation Techniques 
 
Model 3.(1) 3.(2) 3.(3) 3.(4) 
Estimation OLS FE 
System 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
          
Lagged EF 0.7155*** 0.4314*** 0.5186*** 0.2140 
 (0.0298) (0.0476) (0.1620) (0.4051) 
Lagged DEMOC 0.0291*** 0.0410*** 0.0411* -0.0699 
 (0.0076) (0.0129) (0.0237) (0.1090) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) 0.0865*** -0.1534 0.1546 -0.4171 
 (0.0238) (0.1488) (0.1967) (0.8599) 
Const 0.7907*** 4.7943*** 1.8405***  
 (0.1617) (1.1253) (0.6484)  
          
Obs 502 502 502 378 
No. of cty  114 114 103 
Adj. R
2
 0.781 0.423   
F-stat 257.6 61.08 85.49 32.12 
AR(1) p-value   [0.0495] [0.628] 
AR(2) p-value   [0.289] [0.347] 
Hansen Test Statistics   8.545 4.951 
Hansen Test p-value     [0.576] [0.666] 
 
Dependent variable is EF.  Models 3.(2) – 3.(4) include country fixed 
effect and period dummies, but the results are not reported.  ***, ** and * 
denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  For Models 
3.(1) and 3.(2), robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  For Models 3.(3) 
and 3.(4), lagged EF is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are 
endogenous.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, 
robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Instruments are 
transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for 
overidentifying restrictions.    
 
 
3.4.2 Does Democracy cause Economic Reform in Different Sectors? 
 
Table  3.4.2-1 shows the 2-step system GMM estimations of the impact of 
lagged DEMOC on reforms by sectors.  This baseline specification attempts 
to address whether democracy is more likely to cause reform in different 
sectors.  We find that the system GMM estimators work fairly well for the 
models, except Model 3.(9) on capital account openness index (K_AC).  All 
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models reject the null hypothesis of the AR(1) test but do not reject the AR(2) 
test.  The Hansen tests also do not reject the overidentification restrictions.   
 
Models 3.(5) – 3.(7) investigate the impact of democracy on the fiscal sector, 
specifically the effects of government consumption (GOVTC), transfer and 
subsidy (TRANSFER) and marginal income tax rate (TAX).  The results 
show that a more democratic economy is more likely to have low government 
consumption as a percentage of total consumption, a higher level of transfer of 
subsidy as a percentage of GDP and higher marginal income tax rate.  The 
effects of democracy on GOVTC and TAX are not statistically significant 
nevertheless.  Strictly speaking, we only find that democracy causes the 
society to be more redistributive (hence lower score of TRANSFER).  The 
effect is significant at the 5% significance level.  The insignificant effects of 
democracy on government spending and income are also consistent with the 
results obtained by GMS, where they find that democracy does not 
significantly cause any reform in fiscal revenue and expenditure.  Our dataset 
extends one more dimension of the fiscal sector, i.e. redistribution through the 
use of transfer and subsidy.  We find that this is the only dimension of fiscal 
sector reform which is likely to be caused by democracy.   
 
Model 3.(8) measures whether democracy is likely to cause trade liberalisation 
(FREE TRADE).  Our empirical findings affirm that this is the case and the 
effect is statistically significant.  On financial liberalisation, the two 
indicators – capital account openness (K_AC) and credit market regulation 
(CREDIT) – in Models 3.(9) and 3.(10) respectively are used.  As explained 
earlier, we do find democracy causes capital account openness.  However, we 
should be very cautious when interpreting Model 3.(9) since the estimation 
fails the AR(2) test.  Hence, the error term is suspected to be autocorrelated in 
level.  On the other hand, our empirical evidence does support that democracy 
causes credit market liberalisation at 1% significance level as shown in Model 
3.(10). 
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Table  3.4.2-1: Does Democracy Cause Economic Reform in Different Sectors? –  
2-step System GMM Estimation 
 
Model 3.(5) 3.(6) 3.(7) 3.(8) 3.(9) 3.(10) 3.(11) 
Dep. var GOVTC TRANSFER TAX 
FREE 
TRADE 
K_AC CREDIT LABOR 
        
Lagged DEMOC 0.0359 -0.3394** -0.0111 0.1381** 0.7430*** 0.3895*** -0.0973 
 (0.0511) (0.1520) (0.1304) (0.0535) (0.2021) (0.0788) (0.0710) 
Lagged dep var 0.6738*** 0.5395* 0.6962*** 0.6187*** 0.6439* 0.6249*** 0.7980*** 
 (0.0826) (0.3130) (0.1161) (0.0801) (0.3745) (0.1160) (0.2510) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.3808 0.2937 -0.0070 0.0190 -0.6091 -0.5418** 0.1320 
 (0.2468) (0.3560) (0.3978) (0.1405) (1.0079) (0.2290) (0.1708) 
Const 4.7564** 3.2990 2.1112 1.2341 1.6734 5.5890*** 1.1353 
 (2.2107) (5.1499) (3.5003) (1.2061) (6.3390) (1.6196) (2.1345) 
                
Obs/No. of cty 679/112 504/103 458/96 629/114 501/112 665/112 234/70 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000] [0.0099] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0822] [0.0001] [0.0547] 
AR(2) p-value [0.925] [0.947] [0.879] [0.277] [0.0190] [0.449] [0.279] 
Hansen Test Statistics 15.56 9.954 15.93 9.413 12.78 11.81 17.61 
Hansen Test p-value [0.341] [0.268] [0.253] [0.224] [0.120] [0.544] [0.225] 
 
All models include country fixed effect and period dummies.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Lagged dep var is treated as 
pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.    
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Finally, Model 3.(11) tests whether democracy causes labour market regulation 
relaxation (LABOR).  In our estimation, we find that democracy is more 
likely to cause stricter labour market regulation (i.e. lower score of LABOR), 
although the result is not statistically significant.  It may illustrate that more 
labour market regulations are more likely to be welcome by employees, 
because this favours the majority in a democratic society.  Understandably, 
labour market regulations are easier to gain support and be rolled out in 
democracies.   
 
β1 in the dynamic models represent the short-run impact of DEMOC on 
economic reform.  The long-run effects can be derived by dividing β1 by β2, 
i.e. 1 - coefficient of the lagged dependent variables.  Based on Models 3.(6), 
3.(8) and 3.(10), where the results are statistically significant, the effects of 
DEMOC in both the short-run and long-run in these sectors are calculated in 
the Table  3.4.2-2 below.   
 
Table  3.4.2-2: Causal Impact of Democracy on Economic Reform 
 
 Short-run impact Long-run impact 
TRANSFER -0.34 -0.74 
FREE TRADE 0.14 0.37 
CREDIT 0.39 1.03 
 
 
These results suggest that, using FREE TRADE as an example, 1 point 
increase in DEMOC will lead to 0.14 point and 0.37 point increases in the 
FREE TRADE index in the short-run and long-run respectively.   
 
3.4.3 Robustness Tests 
 
In the following, we carry out several robustness tests using different measures 
of democracy and additional covariates to test the sensitivity of our results.  
First of all, we use IPOLITY2, a composite score of political freedom and civil 
liberties as defined in Chapter 2, as an alternative measure of democracy.  The 
results are presented in Table  3.4.3-1.   
-101- 
Table  3.4.3-1: IPOLITY2 As An Alternative Measure of Democracy  
 
Model 3.(12) 3.(13) 3.(14) 3.(15) 3.(16) 3.(17) 3.(18) 
Dep. Var GOVTC TRANSFER TAX 
FREE 
TRADE 
K_AC CREDIT LABOR 
                
Lagged IPOLITY2 0.0498 -0.4892* -0.0837 0.2882** 1.3444*** 0.5413*** -0.1320 
 (0.0700) (0.2939) (0.1814) (0.1229) (0.4286) (0.1168) (0.0889) 
Lagged dep. var 0.6263*** 0.4531 0.6834*** 0.5635*** 0.3721 0.5959*** 0.9461*** 
 (0.1009) (0.4394) (0.0920) (0.0738) (0.2484) (0.0944) (0.2281) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.6403** 0.1987 0.0524 0.0069 -0.7329 -0.6206** 0.2051* 
 (0.2684) (0.3653) (0.3822) (0.1216) (0.5329) (0.2401) (0.1190) 
Const 6.9837*** 6.0545 2.2441 0.5101 -0.6499 5.0853*** 0.1102 
 (2.5052) (7.4815) (3.1658) (1.0536) (2.7315) (1.6522) (1.9259) 
         
Obs/No. of cty 647/118 502/108 485/102 615/120 448/118 641/118 222/72 
AR(1) p-value [0.0002] [0.0512] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.1340] [0.0000] [0.0396] 
AR(2) p-value [0.977] [0.785] [0.952] [0.118] [0.00141] [0.284] [0.326] 
Hansen Test Statistics 12.49 9.936 15.75 6.613 11.10 9.111 17.82 
Hansen Test p-value [0.407] [0.192] [0.203] [0.251] [0.196] [0.612] [0.121] 
 
All models include country fixed effect and period dummies.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Lagged dep var is treated as 
pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.    
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The conclusion is generally similar.  Again, the dynamic setting in Model 
3.(16) (where K_AC as dependent variable) appears to be problematic.  Other 
than that, Models 3.(13), 3.(15) and 3.(17) show similar significant results as 
before, indicating that a democratic society is likely to be more redistributive, 
more free to international trade and to have a more liberalised credit market.  
Comparing the magnitudes, the coefficients of lagged IPOLITY2 are 
consistently larger than those using lagged DEMOC.  
 
Like in previous literature, using a dichotomous measure of democracy, we 
undertake a similar exercise by constructing a dummy variable DEMOC1.  
DEMOC1 equals to 1 if DEMOC is greater than 5 and equals to 0 if otherwise.  
The estimations are at Table  3.4.3-2.  Results of Models 3.(19) – 3.(25) show 
that our key results survive.  The only difference is that the effect of 
DEMOC1 on labour market regulation (LABOR) becomes statistically 
significant in Model 3.(25).  The negative effect is now statistically 
significant at 1% significance level.  This reinforces the empirical evidence 
that democracy causes more labour market regulation.  However, we should 
note that the AR(1) test fails in the Model, which makes one to cast doubt on 
the validity of the results.   
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 Table  3.4.3-2: Dichotomous DEMOC1 As An Alternative Measure of Democracy 
 
Model 3.(19) 3.(20) 3.(21) 3.(22) 3.(23) 3.(24) 3.(25) 
Dep. Var GOVTC TRANSFER TAX 
FREE  
TRADE 
K_AC CREDIT LABOR 
        
Lagged DEMOC1 0.0300 -1.7366* -0.6070 0.9042** 0.9463 2.8441*** -1.4985*** 
 (0.3826) (0.9386) (0.8335) (0.3955) (1.2755) (0.7152) (0.4117) 
Lagged Dep. Var 0.6617*** 0.5576** 0.6644*** 0.6070*** 0.8545*** 0.6059*** 0.3303 
 (0.0774) (0.2344) (0.0976) (0.0701) (0.2279) (0.1005) (0.2462) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.2864* -0.0031 0.0134 0.0405 -0.4960 -0.2703 -0.0060 
 (0.1722) (0.2681) (0.3454) (0.0873) (0.5012) (0.2140) (0.1439) 
Const 4.2736*** 4.5944 2.5570 1.3595* 3.9346 3.9906** 5.2461** 
 (1.5697) (3.9752) (3.0542) (0.8017) (3.0893) (1.5402) (2.2407) 
         
Obs/No. of cty 756/119 561/110 506/103 692/121 556/119 739/119 248/73 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000] [0.0003] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0032] [0.0001] [0.1970] 
AR(2) p-value [0.944] [0.725] [0.990] [0.912] [0.209] [0.278] [0.298] 
Hansen Test Statistics 16.24 8.355 15.40 13.71 22.22 14.69 12.49 
Hansen Test p-value [0.299] [0.400] [0.283] [0.0566] [0.00452] [0.327] [0.567] 
 
All models include country fixed effect and period dummies.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Lagged dep var is treated as 
pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.    
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We carry out further estimations for the baseline specifications for the non-high 
income countries8 sample and test if the estimation results are sensitive to the 
sample size.  Moreover, we wonder whether democracy works particularly 
poorly in developing countries, in which economic reform is less likely to be 
implemented.  Our estimation results in Table  3.4.3-3 below show that it is 
not the case.  The results still suggest that democracy is more likely to cause a 
redistributive society, trade liberalisation and financial market liberalisation.   
 
More robustness checks are carried out for TRANSFER, FREE TRADE and 
CREDIT by having additional covariates in the baseline model using our full 
sample again.  These results are shown in Table  3.4.3-4 – Table  3.4.3-6.  We 
controlled for human capital stock (i.e. SCHOOLING, measured by average 
years of schooling), government spending as percentage of GDP (gcon_gdp) 
and exchange rate (ER) from the Penn World Table (ver 6.2) of Heston, 
Summers, and Aten (2006), and natural log of population (POP) from the WDI.  
All the control variables are in lagged terms.  In conclusion, our results 
generally survive, suggesting democracy is likely to cause redistributive 
policies via transfer and subsidy, trade liberalisation as well as credit market 
liberalisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 High-income countries are classified in accordance with the World Bank’s classification. 
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Table  3.4.3-3: Baseline Specification for Non-High income Countries 
 
Model 3.(26) 3.(27) 3.(28) 3.(29) 3.(30) 3.(31) 3.(32) 
Dep. Var GOVTC TRANSFER TAX 
FREE  
TRADE 
K_AC CREDIT LABOR 
         
Lagged DEMOC -0.0211 -0.1962* 0.2375 0.0719* 0.2503 0.3816*** 0.0881 
 (0.0818) (0.1010) (0.1575) (0.0422) (0.7819) (0.1288) (0.1129) 
Lagged dep. var 0.6927*** 0.5769*** 0.6425*** 0.6826*** 0.3852 0.7604*** 0.1733 
 (0.1006) (0.1802) (0.0883) (0.0782) (0.6280) (0.1399) (0.2435) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.1927 0.2297 -0.2165 0.1900 1.4827 -0.6972 -0.6970 
 (0.3416) (0.3214) (0.6705) (0.2305) (0.8939) (0.4667) (0.8672) 
Const 3.6302 2.9148 2.3758 0.0391 -8.9231 5.8814* 9.0994 
 (2.5261) (2.7702) (4.8061) (1.7317) (7.5116) (3.0396) (6.1708) 
         
Obs/No. of cty 465/77 314/68 277/61 426/79 344/77 452/77 80/40 
AR(1) p-value [0.0003] [0.0132] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.3800] [0.0001] [0.5400] 
AR(2) p-value [0.886] [0.723] [0.731] [0.329] [0.0203] [0.626] [0.262] 
Hansen Test Statistics 17.70 8.398 4.837 8.577 14.51 9.735 5.800 
Hansen Test p-value [0.221] [0.590] [0.979] [0.477] [0.0695] [0.715] [0.886] 
  
All models include country fixed effect and period dummies.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Lagged dep var is treated as 
pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.    
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Table  3.4.3-4: Robustness Check for TRANSFER 
 
Model 3.(33) 3.(34) 3.(35) 3.(36) 3.(37) 
       
Lagged DEMOC -0.4185** -0.2979** -0.4305*** -0.5004* -0.3316** 
 (0.1942) (0.1301) (0.1618) (0.2614) (0.1457) 
0.2631 0.5538*** 0.2238 0.2446 0.3646* Lagged 
TRANSFER (0.3503) (0.1849) (0.2521) (0.5602) (0.2007) 
-0.0462  0.0063 -0.0114 -0.0193 
Lagged gcon_gdp 
(0.0571)  (0.0393) (0.0544) (0.0260) 
 -0.0189 -0.2286 -0.4268 -0.3581* Lagged 
SCHOOLING  (0.1437) (0.1875) (0.4679) (0.2020) 
Lagged ER     0.0000 
     (0.0000) 
   0.5403 0.4000 Lagged 
ln(GDPPC)    (0.9156) (0.3925) 
Lagged POP     -0.5355 
     (1.1268) 
Const 9.2173** 5.4864** 10.3136*** 7.7384 15.3583 
 (4.5718) (2.4670) (3.4489) (10.7792) (18.6693) 
       
Obs/No. of cty 517/105 463/83 463/83 451/82 451/82 
AR(1) p-value [0.0269] [0.0027] [0.0021] [0.0435] [0.0022] 
AR(2) p-value [0.505] [0.942] [0.939] [0.563] [0.800] 
Hansen Test      
Statistics 1.196 8.204 1.301 1.935 5.052 
p-value [0.754] [0.224] [0.935] [0.963] [0.929] 
 
Dependent variable is TRANSFER.  All models include country fixed effect and period 
dummies.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Lagged TRANSFER is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  
Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  
Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.    
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Table  3.4.3-5: Robustness Check for FREE TRADE 
 
Model 3.(38) 3.(39) 3.(40) 3.(41) 3.(42) 
            
Lagged DEMOC 0.0849* 0.1174** 0.1032** 0.0952** 0.0792* 
 (0.0428) (0.0448) (0.0426) (0.0422) (0.0439) 
0.6596*** 0.6718*** 0.6800*** 0.6774*** 0.6706*** Lagged FREE 
TRADE (0.0756) (0.0716) (0.0761) (0.0713) (0.0694) 
 0.0087 -0.0024 0.0150 0.0133 
Lagged gcon_gdp 
 (0.0099) (0.0161) (0.0195) (0.0227) 
0.0207  -0.0004 -0.0353 -0.1068 Lagged 
SCHOOLING (0.0539)  (0.0552) (0.1598) (0.1369) 
Lagged ER    0.1327 0.2350 
    (0.3211) (0.3196) 
    -0.0000 Lagged 
ln(GDPPC)     (0.0000) 
Lagged POP     -0.0022 
     (0.2142) 
Const 1.2184** 0.9574* 1.1429 0.0550 -0.0944 
 (0.5552) (0.5266) (0.7407) (1.8639) (4.0420) 
            
Obs/No. of cty 568/94 644/115 560/93 546/92 546/92 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
AR(2) p-value [0.393] [0.280] [0.366] [0.436] [0.429] 
Hansen Test      
Statistics 10.89 11.00 12.63 19.29 25.91 
p-value [0.366] [0.358] [0.396] [0.201] [0.169] 
 
Dependent variable is FREE TRADE.  All models include country fixed effect and period 
dummies.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Lagged FREE TRADE is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  
Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  
Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.    
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Table  3.4.3-6: Robustness Check for CREDIT 
 
Model 3.(43) 3.(44) 3.(45) 3.(46) 3.(47) 
            
Lagged DEMOC 0.3554*** 0.3672*** 0.3304*** 0.2168*** 0.2417*** 
 (0.0779) (0.0858) (0.0729) (0.0683) (0.0677) 
Lagged CREDIT 0.5262*** 0.6908*** 0.5302*** 0.6105*** 0.5730*** 
 (0.1128) (0.1408) (0.1048) (0.1221) (0.1008) 
 0.0061 -0.0326 -0.0030 -0.0102 
Lagged gcon_gdp 
 (0.0211) (0.0235) (0.0230) (0.0212) 
0.0448  0.0547 0.2170 0.0849 Lagged 
SCHOOLING (0.0917)  (0.1044) (0.2910) (0.2223) 
Lagged ER    -0.6130 -0.3163 
    (0.4931) (0.4262) 
    -0.0000 Lagged 
ln(GDPPC)     (0.0000) 
Lagged POP     -0.4589 
     (0.2914) 
Const 1.7485* 0.9331 2.4085** 5.9406*** 12.2213** 
 (0.8924) (0.9483) (1.0209) (2.2228) (4.7285) 
            
Obs/No. of cty 600/93 680/113 587/92 567/91 567/91 
AR(1) p-value [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] 
AR(2) p-value [0.344] [0.406] [0.348] [0.351] [0.344] 
Hansen Test      
Statistics 8.140 6.836 7.919 14.22 16.74 
p-value [0.774] [0.868] [0.894] [0.582] [0.670] 
 
Dependent variable is CREDIT.  All models include country fixed effect and period dummies.  
***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  Lagged CREDIT 
is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  Standard errors are in 
parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for 
overidentifying restrictions.    
 
 
 
3.4.4 Reverse Causality: Economic Reform Causes Democratisation? 
 
Finally, we test the reverse causal relationship between economic reform and 
democratisation in Table  3.4.4-1.  Our empirical results show that economic 
reforms generally do not improve democracy directly, except for TRANSFER 
and FREE TRADE.  In other words, a more redistributive society causes the 
economy to be more democratic.  As one can expect, governments that spend 
more on transfer and subsidy are more likely to benefit the majority of the 
society.  In turn, if the society is a democracy, it is more likely to persist.  
Trade liberalisation also has such an effect.  While free trade may benefit the 
majority, it potentially provides feedback to the democratic regime.  Finally, 
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we find that, although a democratic society more likely leads to liberalisation 
of the financial market through credit market liberalisation, the reverse effect is 
not found empirically.  A word of caution about Model 3.(54) is that we find 
lagged LABOR does not work appropriately in this dynamic panel model as 
the null hypothesis of the AR(1) test is rejected.   
 
The reverse causality results using IPOLITY2 in Table  3.4.4-2 are generally 
similar.  We do not find particular empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesis that economic reforms cause democratisation.  Perhaps the most 
interesting result is that while we use IPOLITY2 to measure democracy, we 
find that more government consumption (as percentage of total consumption) is 
more likely to improve democracy in Model 3.(55).  The negative relationship 
between the two indices was also previously obtained when we use DEMOC, 
but it turns out to be statistically significant only when using IPOLITY2.  
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Table  3.4.4-1: Economic Reforms Cause Democracy? 
 
Model 3.(48) 3.(49) 3.(50) 3.(51) 3.(52) 3.(53) 3.(54) 
Indep. Var GOVTC TRANSFER TAX 
FREE 
TRADE 
K_AC CREDIT LABOR 
         
Lagged indep. var -0.2724 -0.6541** 0.1420 0.7855** 0.2916 0.1470 0.0628 
 (0.2070) (0.2811) (0.0991) (0.3195) (0.2592) (0.1299) (0.0657) 
Lagged DEMOC 0.7942*** 0.6873*** 0.6326*** 0.7368*** 0.6038*** 0.7857*** 0.3289*** 
 (0.0692) (0.1430) (0.1573) (0.1074) (0.1748) (0.1673) (0.0990) 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) -0.1365 -0.5576 -0.1397 -0.8701* -0.3614 -0.5640* 0.5960*** 
 (0.4291) (0.5415) (0.3463) (0.4436) (0.6462) (0.3166) (0.1244) 
Const 3.9621 11.8663** 3.1068 3.3697 3.9981 4.9854* 0.2922 
 (4.2698) (5.7229) (2.9862) (3.7496) (4.0157) (2.5639) (1.0077) 
         
Obs/No. of cty 663/112 518/105 457/97 621/114 575/112 649/112 231/69 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000] [0.0036] [0.0031] [0.0000] [0.0101] [0.0011] [0.2710] 
AR(2) p-value [0.274] [0.775] [0.712] [0.350] [0.604] [0.277] [0.392] 
Hansen Test        
Statistics 20.43 9.030 14.93 10.22 7.178 13.08 6.860 
p-value [0.117] [0.340] [0.312] [0.510] [0.518] [0.363] [0.652] 
 
Dependent variable is DEMOC.  All models include country fixed effect and period dummies.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Lagged DEMOC is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, robust for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.   
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Table  3.4.4-2: Economic Reforms Cause Democracy? – Measured by IPOLITY2 
 
Model 3.(55) 3.(56) 3.(57) 3.(58) 3.(59) 3.(60) 3.(61) 
Indep. Var GOVTC TRANSFER TAX 
FREE  
TRADE 
K_AC CREDIT LABOR 
        
Lagged indep. var -0.3838** -0.6020* 0.0297 0.6005** 0.2165 -0.0078 0.0794 
 (0.1798) (0.3503) (0.0676) (0.2507) (0.1870) (0.2554) (0.1257) 
Lagged IPOLITY2 0.8052*** 0.4278** 0.7571*** 0.5019*** 0.5618*** 0.6117*** 0.4996* 
 (0.0660) (0.2152) (0.1866) (0.1157) (0.1264) (0.1869) (0.2947) 
-0.2968 0.1687 -0.0240 -0.4088 -0.3120 -0.1931 0.3378 
Lagged ln(GDPPC) 
(0.2677) (0.3146) (0.2467) (0.2733) (0.2960) (0.2313) (0.2173) 
Const 6.2434** 7.7301 2.1590 2.9407 4.8274** 4.6366*** 1.1975 
 (3.0699) (5.1838) (2.4705) (2.7081) (1.8964) (1.7036) (1.0634) 
         
Obs/No. of cty 648/118 527/111 493/103 625/120 545/118 641/118 223/72 
AR(1) p-value [0.0000] [0.0838] [0.0043] [0.0002] [0.0014] [0.0104] [0.3050] 
AR(2) p-value [0.844] [0.374] [0.941] [0.875] [0.410] [0.649] [0.384] 
Hansen Test        
Statistics 11.64 7.993 10.35 6.982 9.308 10.55 16.12 
p-value [0.392] [0.535] [0.585] [0.639] [0.157] [0.103] [0.0644] 
 
Dependent variable is IPOLITY2.  All models include country fixed effect and period dummies.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  Lagged IPOLITY2 is treated as pre-determined, while other regressors are endogenous.  Standard errors are in parenthesis and Windmeijer-corrected, 
robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Instruments are transformed by orthogonal deviation and collapsed.  Hansen test is used for overidentifying restrictions.   
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, we make progress towards understanding the role of political 
institution, specifically democracy, in the development process.  We intend to 
argue that economic reforms are more likely to be implemented in democracy.  
Also, we attempt to investigate empirically if there is any reverse causality of 
democracy from economic reforms.  Unlike previous studies, which focus on 
the effect of democratic transition or regime change, we are interested in the 
marginal change in political institution. 
 
The causal relationship from democracy to economic reforms is not definite.  
Theories argue that democracy is more likely to cause liberalisation since 
reform measures are likely to benefit the majority of workers and thus gain 
political support in democracies.  The empirical literature shows mixed results 
however.  In particular, these studies only focus on trade or financial 
liberalisation before and after a political regime switch.   
 
To pursue our empirical investigation, we use various sub-indices from the 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index to explore economic reforms in 
four sectors – (i) fiscal sector; (ii) trade liberalisation; (iii) financial 
liberalisation and, (iv) labour market regulation.  We use a dynamic GMM 
panel data estimator, which allows us to estimate the short-run causality 
between economic reforms and political institution, as well as tackling the 
problem of endogeneity between the interested variables.   
 
From our empirical results, we find that democracy does cause redistributive 
policies in the form of transfer and subsidy, trade liberalisation and credit 
market deregulation.  The causal relationship is robust to different measures 
of democracy and the incorporation of additional covariates in the baseline 
specification.  Moreover, the results still survive when we use non-high 
income sub-samples.  Reciprocally, redistributive policies and trade 
liberalisation is also associated with democratisation.  Nevertheless, credit 
market deregulation does not have such a causal effect.   
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Our results provide empirical support to the Sunde, et al. (2006)’s model, i.e. 
democracy is more redistributive.  In return, redistributive policies provide 
feedback to strengthen the democratic institution.  Also, trade and financial 
liberalisations are likely to associate with more choices of goods and services, 
less regulatory barriers and more competition.  These effects, which are 
beneficial to most sectors, are more likely to win political support in a 
democracy.  An autocracy, on the other hand, may be reluctant to liberalise 
since it may threaten the vested interest of the political elites.  Trade 
liberalisation also causes democratisation.  This is possibly due to the fact that 
trade liberalisation may speed up growth and introduce a more competitive 
environment.  Economic development may provide more resources for 
redistribution and for the pursuit of more political rights.  These bilateral 
causal relationships between redistributive policies, trade liberalisation and 
democracy may also suggest that the progressive development from economic 
reforms to democracy and vice versa.  We hope these empirical results may 
shed light on those liberalised economies with democratisation not yet taken 
place, for example China.  Our results arguably suggest that political 
institution may inevitably have to change when reforms continue to march 
forward.  
 
   
 
-114- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 : DETERMINANTS OF FDI – IMPACT 
OF NATURAL BARRIERS, REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION AND “BEHIND-THE-BORDER” 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-115- 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Extension of international market in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
is one of the most salient features of globalisation since the 1980.  For both 
developing and developed economies, FDI is an important source of capital, 
technology and skills transfer.  FDI outflow on the other hand helps the source 
economy to enjoy market expansion, lower factor costs and facilitate 
“tariff-hopping”.  All these suggest that FDI could potentially lead to 
economic growth and economic development.     
 
FDI indeed experienced a distinct upsurge in the last few decades, alongside 
accelerating growth worldwide (see Figure  1.1-1).  Figure  4.1-1 shows that 
total FDI inflows 1  only amounted to some US$54 billion in 1980, 
subsequently increased to US$1,833 billion in 2007.  This represents an 
impressive average growth rate of almost 14% per annum.  Although it fell 
dramatically to US$561 billion in 2003 due to the burst of the IT bubble, it 
picked up significantly again in 2007 and reached a new peak. 
 
 
                                                 
1 According to UNCTAD’s definition, FDI inflows and outflows comprise capital provided 
(either directly or through other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to a FDI 
enterprise, or capital received by a foreign direct investor from a FDI enterprise. FDI includes 
the three following components: equity capital (foreign direct investor's purchase of shares of 
an enterprise in a country other than that of its residence), reinvested earnings (direct investor's 
share (in proportion to direct equity participation) of earnings not distributed as dividends by 
affiliates or earnings not remitted to the direct investor. Such retained profits by affiliates are 
reinvested) and intra-company loans (referring to short- or long-term borrowing and lending of 
funds between direct investors (parent enterprises) and affiliate enterprises).  
FDI stock refers to the following.  For associate and subsidiary enterprises, it is the value of 
the share of their capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent 
enterprise (this is equal to total assets minus total liabilities), plus the net indebtedness of the 
associate or subsidiary to the parent firm. For branches, it is the value of fixed assets and the 
value of current assets and investments, excluding amounts due from the parent, less liabilities 
to third parties. 
Source: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3201&lang=1 
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Figure  4.1-1: World's FDI Inflows from 1980 to 2007 
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Source: UNCTAD 
 
Albeit such distinct surge, we consistently find that the significant share of 
foreign capital only flow between developed economies.  Analysed by regions 
in Figure  4.1-2, FDI inflows to the developed economies alone accounted for 
the largest share of some 55-86% of the world’s total during the period 1980 – 
2007.  The corresponding shares of the developing economies and transitional 
economies did pick up, yet remaining far behind in overall terms. 
 
Figure  4.1-2: FDI Inflows as Percentage of World's Total 
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Source: UNCTAD 
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Not only as the major FDI destinations, developed economies are also the 
major FDI sources.  Table 4.1-1 shows that the top 10 FDI destinations and 
sources in 2007 are mostly OECD economies, except for the case of China and 
Hong Kong.  The latter is due to the fact that a significant share of Hong 
Kong’s FDI actually came from Mainland China, accounting for about 25% 
(2007 figure) of China’s total FDI outflows.  OECD economies as a whole 
accounted for 85% of world’s FDI outflows and 84% of FDI outward stock in 
2007.   
 
Table 4.1-1: Top FDI Destinations and Sources in 2007 
 
  Top FDI Destination (as % of world's total FDI inflow) 2007 
1 United States of America 12.70 
2 United Kingdom of Great Britain  12.22 
3 France  8.62 
4 Canada 5.93 
5 Netherlands 5.42 
6 China (excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) 4.56 
7 China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 3.27 
8 Spain 2.91 
9 Russian Federation 2.86 
10 Germany 2.78 
 Total of top 10 61.26 
 
  Top FDI Source (as % of world's total FDI outflow) 2007 
1 United States of America 15.72 
2 United Kingdom of Great Britain  13.31 
3 France  11.25 
4 Germany 8.39 
5 Spain 5.99 
6 Italy 4.55 
7 Japan 3.68 
8 Canada 2.70 
9 China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2.66 
10 Luxembourg 2.59 
 Total of top 10 70.84 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
In terms of FDI inflow in developing countries (see Figure  4.1-3), Asia and 
Latin America countries accounted for the greatest shares of world’s total FDI 
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inflows of some 17.4% and 6.9% respectively in 2007.  Whilst Africa is the 
poorest region, its respective share has been consistently less than 5% for the 
last few decades.   
 
Figure  4.1-3: FDI Inflows as Percentage of World's Total in Developing Economies 
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Source: UNCTAD 
 
In fact, FDI contributes a very large share of capital formation in developing 
economies.  In particular in those economies in transition, as shown in Table 
4.1-2, FDI inflows could represent over 20% of their gross fixed capital 
formation.   
 
Table 4.1-2: FDI Inflows as Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
World  9.28  7.37  8.19  9.87  13.16  
 Developing economies  10.42  9.59  12.55  11.70  12.98  
 Economies in transition  11.39  15.45  17.39  14.24  20.44  
 Developed economies  8.86  6.44  6.38  9.00  12.96  
 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
 
As FDI is one of the major sources of capital accumulation and can act as a 
vehicle of technological progress through the use and dissemination of 
improved production techniques, attracting FDI therefore naturally forms part 
of the growth strategy of most of the developing economies.  However, we are 
left wonder why capital does not flow from the rich economies to the poor, 
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where production costs are low and marginal productivity of capital is high.   
 
In this light, the literature has been extensively developed to study the 
determinants of FDI.  Studies at the micro-level suggest that the structure of 
the industry, factor cost of production and intra-industry scale effect, amongst 
others, may affect investors’ decisions to invest abroad in the form of 
greenfield FDI or merger or acquisitions.  Another strand of the literature 
investigates the macroeconomic determinants.  It essentially argues that 
specific characteristics of the destination economy play a significant role, such 
as the transportation cost between the destination economy and source 
economy, trade barriers, fiscal incentives, business climate and exchange rates 
etc.  This study belongs to the latter strand, i.e. identifying the determinants of 
FDI at macro level.   
 
Our key research objective of this Chapter is to assess three potential 
macroeconomic determinants of FDI, namely, natural barrier, de jure “at-the 
border” external institution and de facto “behind-the-border” domestic 
institution.  This is motivated by the fact that regional integration and 
behind-the-border regulatory obstacles have lately drawn keen interests of 
policymakers with an aim to improve institutional frameworks, regulatory 
environment and government policies for attracting foreign investment.  We 
intend to evaluate their respective impacts under a unified assessment 
framework. 
 
Following the existing literature on trade and capital flow, we refer natural 
barriers as the geographical characteristics and historical ties between the 
destination and source economies.  We expect that geographical and cultural 
proximities reduce transportation and transaction costs, thereby fostering 
bilateral FDI flows.    
 
On “behind-the-border” domestic institutional environment, recent research has 
focused on the rule of law, development of credit market, political stability and 
business and investment climate etc.  Our specific focus here is to investigate 
how the regulatory environment of the destination economy affects FDI.  It is 
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believed that, holding other factors constant, burdensome regulatory 
environment discourages foreign investors to invest due to the enormous costs 
of compliance and associating corruption (see Wei (2000b)), thereby 
hampering the dynamics of firm entry and degree of local competition.  On 
the contrary, a less regulated environment reduces the sunk costs to invest 
offshore for foreign investors and is thus more likely to attract FDI.     
    
“At-the-border” external institution refers to regional integration, reflected by 
bilateral (or regional) trade agreements (henceforth RTAs).  Although most 
RTAs aim at facilitating trade liberalisation, the positive impacts on FDI are 
also possible.  This is because closer integration is also likely to associate 
with an expansion of the total market size.   
 
We intentionally test de jure “at-the border” external institution (i.e. RTAs) and 
de facto “behind-the-border” domestic institution together.  We consider the 
former as an externally imposed institution, while the latter is de facto 
institution in the sense that the variable we used measures the subjective 
perception of the regulatory environment.  The scores are collected from 
foreign investors in the respective economies.  This score to a certain extent, 
albeit imperfectly, reflects the domestic regulatory environment.  Our 
investigation hence may allow us to understand which type of barriers, natural 
or institutional, determines the relative locational advantages of FDI.  
 
Our work in the following is entirely empirical and uses an augmented gravity 
model for our estimations.  We hypothesise that better domestic regulatory 
environment may lead to more FDI inflows.  Reciprocally, more FDI inflows 
may also lead to a better regulatory environment since the domestic 
government may respond to the needs of foreign investors.  Such endogeniety 
will be taken into account in our study.  Unlike the existing literature, which 
focuses on the impacts of the overall institutional environment and regional 
agreements on aggregate FDI inflows2, we use bilateral FDI data instead of 
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, it is not our intention to assess the impact of each regional trade agreement on 
FDI, nor the effectiveness of each agreement.  Studies have been done to assess the impact of 
individual regional trade agreement on bilateral trade, especially the effect of WTO accession 
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aggregate FDI data.  As we discussed earlier, OECD economies are the key 
FDI destinations and sources.  Our dataset will thus focus on bilateral FDI 
data of OECD economies as sources.  Using bilateral FDI data at the same 
time could also improve the accuracy of our estimations.  It is because aside 
from the variables of our interest, there may also be some characteristics which 
are specific to the destination and source economies.  Hence, to minimise 
omitted variable bias, we can control for the specific country-pair 
heterogeneity when using bilateral data, which cannot be achieved using 
aggregate FDI data.       
 
This paper is probably among the very first few to assess the impact of natural 
barriers, regional integration and regulatory environment altogether on bilateral 
FDI.  The results may help develop policy implications by identifying the 
macroeconomic determinants of FDI.     
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section  4.2 provides a brief 
literature survey.  We describe the data used in Section  4.3.  In Section  4.4, 
we discuss the estimation strategies.  Empirical results are presented in 
Section 4.5.  We conclude and set out the policy implications in Section  4.6.   
 
 
4.2 Literature Survey: Regulations and Regional Integration as 
Determinants of FDI 
 
The first generation of literature on FDI was largely devoted to its 
macroeconomic impacts.  It is argued that FDI promotes economic growth 
and development since FDI provides a new source of capital, thereby allowing 
investment in both human and physical capital on one hand.  On the other 
hand, it also serves as a means to incorporate new knowledge and technology 
from abroad.  Amongst others, Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) use 
data on FDI flows from industrial countries to 69 developing countries from 
1970 to 1989 and suggest that FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of 
technology, contributing relatively more to growth than domestic investment 
                                                                                                                                 
(see Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Eicher and Henn (2009)).   
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does.  Empirical results from Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford (1996) 
on the other hand suggest that FDI may be growth-promoting only in 
export-promoting countries rather than in import-substituting ones.  More 
recently, Li and Liu (2005) use data of 84 countries for the period of 
1970-1999.  Both single equation and 3SLS estimations show that there is a 
robust positive relationship between FDI and economic growth.   
 
The second generation of literature focuses more on the determinants of FDI 
and investigates the underlying factors of the locations of foreign affiliates.  In 
particular, the quality of institutions increasingly plays a pivotal role in 
attracting foreign investment since good governance is usually associated with 
better security of property rights, effective legal system and enforcement of 
regulations, well-built physical and financial infrastructure and generally more 
productive environment.   
 
In his survey, Lim (2001) has succinctly summarised seven key 
macroeconomic aspects of FDI determinants.  Four of them are particularly 
relevant to our work.  They include (1) economic distance/transport costs; (2) 
size of the destination market; (3) business/investment climate and (4) trade 
barriers/openness3.  Their net impact, however, depends on the nature of 
FDI – vertical or horizontal FDI.   
 
4.2.1 Natural Barriers and FDI 
 
Lim (2001) argues that the impact of economic distance (and hence transport 
costs) on FDI is conceptually unclear.  Horizontal FDI (i.e. “market-seeking” 
FDI) will tend to replace exports and thus increase if the cost of market access 
through exports is high or if the distance between the source and destination 
markets is large.  Nevertheless, as vertical FDI (i.e. “production 
cost-minimising” FDI) is generally export-oriented, it may then be discouraged 
by high transport costs.   
                                                 
3 Another three factors include agglomeration effects, factor costs and fiscal incentives, which 
are not the factors of our direct interest in this Chapter.  Recent research studies additionally 
emphasize the effect of exchange rate on FDI flows (see Froot and Stein (1991), Blonigen 
(1997) and Blonigen (2005)). 
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Similarly for market size – measured in terms of economic activity, population 
or area, larger destination market will encourage horizontal FDI as it will 
reduce the cost of supplying that market as a result of economies of scale and 
lower unit fixed cost.  For vertical FDI, on the other hand, it may be 
indifferent to this factor.   
 
In overall terms, there is no conclusive argument about the combined effect of 
economic distance and market size on FDI inflows.  Along this line, our 
estimations will capture the effect of natural barriers on FDI and empirically 
test these two effects.   
 
4.2.2 Regulations and FDI 
 
Lim (2001) further identifies that the lower costs of doing business in a foreign 
country, holding other factors constant, is more attractive to FDI.  These costs 
may include regulatory, bureaucratic, and judicial hurdles, issues of property 
rights, enforceability of contracts, labour regulation, political and 
macroeconomic stability.   
 
The literature relating the institutional quality of the destination economy as 
the determinant of FDI often rely on the use of an aggregate index of 
institutions.  The choice of “institutional” variables is also different in 
different studies.  Wheeler and Mody (1992) is amongst the first to investigate 
the impact of institution on FDI.  They use a composite index of risk factors, 
which include bureaucratic red tape, political instability, corruption and quality 
of the legal system, and show that there is no significant impact of institutions 
on determining the location of US foreign affiliates.  Singh and Jun (1995), in 
contrast, show that a general qualitative index of business operation conditions 
is an important determinant of FDI in countries that receive high flows.  In 
addition, they also find that these countries also show a positive relationship 
between taxes on international transactions and FDI flows – i.e. supporting the 
“tariff jumping” hypothesis. 
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Wei (2000a) focuses on one specific aspect of institution – corruption.  He 
finds that corruption and so as uncertainty of corruption have significant 
negative effects on FDI.  Likewise, Stein and Daude (2002) show that inward 
FDI is significantly influenced by the quality of institutional variables.  
Political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, 
rule of law and graft all matter for FDI.  Political institutions, e.g. political 
representation and accountability indicators, on the other hand do not. 
 
By studying the effects of institutions on capital structure, Aizenman and 
Spiegel (2004) find that the ratio of FDI to gross fixed investment, as well as 
the ratio of FDI to private domestic investment, is negatively and significantly 
correlated with the level of corruption.  This suggests that FDI is more 
sensitive than domestic investment to the level of institutional quality.  By 
using the law and order variable of ICRG instead of corruption, Albuquerque 
(2003) likewise finds a negative yet insignificant effect.   
 
More specifically on regulation, its impacts on various economic outcomes are 
extensively studied4.  Its role in attracting FDI is less frequently explored.  
Regulations are generally justified as a way for governments to serve the public 
interest and address externalities or market failures.  Indeed, there are 
legitimate and important functions fulfilled by regulations.  However, 
regulations can also carry costs in terms of bureaucratic delays or expenses to 
meet compliance that too often have little bearing on the rationale of the 
regulation.  Particularly in developing countries, excessive regulations usually 
lead to widespread corruption. 
 
Only recently, there are few papers specifically devoted to regulation and FDI.  
Hermes and Lensink (2003) and Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, et al. (2004) 
                                                 
4 For example, a number of papers find important effects of labour regulations on firm entry, 
job creation and economic growth (e.g. Botero, Djankov, Porta, et al. (2003), Besley and 
Burgess (2004), Almeida and P. (2005), Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2006), Petrin 
and Sivadasan (2006) and Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007)).  Other papers examine the effect 
of business regulations on firm entry, growth and informality (see Djankov, Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silane, et al. (2003b) and Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén (2004)).  Others look at 
regulatory developments in financial market (e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(2005), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Galindo and Micco (2005)).  Almost all of 
them focus on cross-country variations. 
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examine the linkages between financial market regulations, FDI and growth.  
They both concur that countries with better financial systems and financial 
market regulations can exploit FDI more effectively and thus achieve high 
growth rates.  A well-functioning financial market allows entrepreneurs to 
obtain credit for their new businesses or for business expansion.  As such, 
countries could benefit from inward investment to promote economic growth.    
 
Busse and Groizard (2006), on the other hand, study the impact of broader 
government regulations on the interaction between FDI and growth.  They 
argue that countries need sound business environment in the form of good 
government regulations to be able to benefit from FDI.  Countries may only 
benefit from foreign investment flows if they have appropriate local 
government regulations and institutions in place.  Excessive regulations are 
likely to restrict growth through FDI if human and capital resources are 
prevented from reallocation.  Using the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
Indicators, they find evidence that excessive regulations restrict growth through 
FDI only in the most regulated economies.  This result holds true for both 
OLS and 2SLS estimations.  Their findings also suggest that FDI does not 
stimulate growth in economies with excessive business and labour regulations, 
after controlling for GDP growth rates.   
 
Our work follows the line of Busse and Groizard (2006) to examine the impact 
of government regulations on FDI.  However, our approach has a number of 
differences. Firstly, we use various sub-indices from the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom Index to measure government regulations.  Like the 
World Bank’s survey, our indicators are also subjective in nature.  However, 
our time span covered is longer, which allows us to undertake panel data 
analysis.  Therefore, unlike Busse and Groizard (2006), which is 
cross-sectional in nature, our models introduce a greater degree of freedom.  
As their analysis is cross-sectional, they have to rely on clustering samples or 
incorporating regional dummies to capture the specific heterogeneity of the 
destination economies partially.  In our case, panel data models readily allow 
us to capture the unobserved panel-specific heterogeneity.  Finally, like other 
empirical work studying the impact of institutions on FDI, aggregate FDI data 
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are often used.  One limitation as such, as pointed out by Bénassy-Quéré, 
Coupet, and Mayer (2007), is that the specific characteristics of the destination 
and source economies cannot be included at the same time since the 
estimations do not rely on bilateral FDI data.  In other words, these empirical 
studies primarily assessed the impact of the overall institutional environment of 
the destination economy on FDI inflows.   
 
More recent research henceforth has started to explore the FDI determinants 
more specifically in respect of characteristics of the destination and source 
economies.  Using bilateral FDI data is therefore inevitable.  Table  4.2.2-1 
below summarises some recent empirical studies estimating the impact of 
institutions on bilateral FDI flows/stocks.  However, as we note, the majority 
of these empirical estimations still relies on cross-country analyses due to the 
short time span of institution data.  Specific analyses on the three 
determinants as we proposed do not yet exist so far. 
 
Table  4.2.2-1: Selected Recent Empirical Studies Estimating the Impact of Institutions on 
Bilateral FDI  
 
Study 
Institutional  
Variables 
Estimation 
Techniques 
Year/ 
Country Coverage 
Daude and Stein 
(2004) 
World Bank’s Governance 
Indicators (all 6 clusters) 
OLS 
Tobit 
1998 
Source economies: 20 
OECD 
Destination economies: 
58 
Liu, Chow, and Li 
(2006) 
International country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) indicators 
OLS 
90-95; 96-99; 00-05 
Source economies: 
OECD 
Destination economies: 7 
East Asian economies 
Mishra and Daly 
(2007) 
ICRG indicators : law and 
order, government stability, 
bureaucracy quality and 
corruption 
OLS 
IV 
1991-2001 
Source economies: 11 
OECD 
Destination economies: 
19 OECD and Asian 
economies 
Bénassy-Quéré, et al. 
(2007) 
Fraser Institute Economic 
Freedom Index and 
Institutional Profiles (1P) 
Database from French 
Ministry of Finance 
OLS 
Panel 
1985-2000 
Source economies: 
OECD economies 
Destination economies:  
OECD and developing 
economies 
-127- 
Hattari and Rajan 
(2008) 
ICRG political risk index 
OLS 
Tobit 
1990-2005 
Source economies: 14 
Asian economies 
Destination economies: 
10 Asian economies 
 
 
4.2.3 Regional Integration and FDI 
 
One of the most essential elements of regional integration is the promotion of 
free trade.  However, on openness, Lim (2001) suggests that its net impact on 
FDI could be uncertain.  Horizontal FDI, aiming at getting behind trade 
barriers (i.e. “tariff-jumping”), may decrease with an increase in openness, e.g. 
low tariffs.  In contrast, vertical FDI that requires substantial intermediate 
inputs and goods flows in or out of the destination economy will benefit from a 
liberal trade environment.  Furthermore, a liberal and open trade environment 
is also positively conducive to the general business climate.  It may thus 
attract horizontal FDI.   
 
Conceptually, regional trade agreements (RTAs) provide the benefits of free 
trade within the confined regional group.  Jaumotte (2004) suggests that these 
benefits include the exploitation of comparative advantage with partner 
countries, increased competition leading to greater efficiency, and a larger 
market allowing the exploitation of economies of scale.  These efficiency 
gains can turn into dynamic gains by increasing growth, as well as domestic 
and foreign investment.  FDI may also act as an essential catalyst for these 
dynamic benefits to materialise.   
 
Regionalism is indeed one of the key features of recent global development.  
According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)5, RTAs in recent years have 
become a very prominent feature of the Multilateral Trading System.  The 
surge in the number of RTAs has continued unabated since the early 1990s.  
Some 421 RTAs have been notified to the GATT/WTO up to December 2008. 
At that same date, 230 agreements were in force6.  RTAs were used to focus 
                                                 
5 Source: www.wto.org 
6 If we take into account RTAs which are in force but have not been notified, those signed but 
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on removing trade barriers on goods, but are later expanded to cover trade in 
services and bilateral investment.  
 
Figure  4.2-1: No. of RTAs notified to WTO 
 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat  
(retrieved from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm) 
 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) is amongst the first to assess the impact of 
regional integration on FDI.  Focusing on three specific RTAs7, they find that 
the impacts of a regional agreement on FDI largely depend on the 
environmental change brought about by the agreement.  If the regional 
agreement leads to improved resource allocation and increased competition, 
overall economic efficiency is expected to be enhanced and as growth rate.  
The effects also depend on the locational advantages of the participating 
countries and industries.  Their empirical findings also suggest that RTAs 
bring more positive significant impact on FDI if RTAs coincide with domestic 
liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisation in the member economies.   
 
The ambiguous results, as they argue, may also arise from the potentially 
                                                                                                                                 
not yet in force, those currently being negotiated, and those in the proposal stage, the figure is 
close to 400 RTAs which are scheduled to be implemented by 2010. Of these RTAs, free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements account for over 90%, while customs unions 
account for less than 10 %. 
7 Their work assessed North-North integration (Canada joining CUSFTA), North-South 
integration (Mexico’s accession to NAFTA) and South-South integration (MERCOSUR).    
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offsetting influences from two dimensions.  On one hand, some FDI continues 
to be motivated primarily by the desire to get behind trade barriers.  Other 
FDI is motivated by foreign investors seeking to exploit input or output 
markets located abroad in activities where operating a foreign affiliate is the 
most efficient governance structure.  Nevertheless, a reasonable 
generalization is that regional integration should enhance the attractiveness of 
investing in the region as a whole by creating a large common market and 
contributing to improved overall efficiency and higher income levels in that 
market.   
 
To test such expanded market size effect could be resulted from RTAs, 
Jaumotte (2004) examines a sample of 71 developing countries during the 
period of 1980-99 and concludes that the aggregate market size of the RTA 
imposed a positive impact on FDI inflows of the member countries.  
Nevertheless, not all countries in the RTA benefitted to the same extent.  In 
particular, countries with a relatively more educated labour force and/or a 
relatively more stable financial situation tend to attract a larger share of FDI at 
the expense of their RTA partners.  He also suggests that for all RTA countries, 
it is essential to improve the business environment.   More generally, the 
creation of an RTA may stimulate virtuous competition between the 
participating countries, forcing them to improve their investment environment 
to the best available in the region.   
 
To sum up, the positive effects of RTAs on inward investments can go through 
two channels.  The first-order effect of RTAs is the market size effect.  An 
expanded market size as a result of RTA also encourages both inter-regional 
and intra-regional vertical FDI.  The second-order effect is the result of keener 
competition amongst member states, leading to greater efficiency and perhaps 
better business environment.  These, thereafter, may increase interregional 
FDI as a result of the RTA.   
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4.3 Data 
 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable we use for the present study is the bilateral outward 
FDI stock from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (Vol. 2008 
release 01).  As Bénassy-Quéré, et al. (2007) suggest, there are several 
advantages in working on stocks rather than flows.  Firstly, foreign investors 
decide on the global allocation of output, hence on capital stocks.  Second, 
stocks account for FDI being financed through local capital markets.  It is 
therefore a better measure of capital ownership.  Last but not least, stocks are 
much less volatile than flows which are sometimes skewed by one or two large 
takeovers, especially in relatively small countries.  Implicitly, by using stock 
figures, we assume that capital can be flowing in and out of the economy 
instantaneously in response to the determinants we identified.   
 
As we explained earlier, OECD economies account for the largest share of 
global FDI inflows and outflows.  Hence, the aforementioned OECD database 
in fact covers a significant share of global capital flows.  The database covers 
most of the observations corresponding to FDI sourcing from each of the 30 
OECD member economies, to destination economies which are either OECD 
economies or emerging and developing economies.  Our dataset covers 28 
OECD source economies (except Belgium and Mexico due to data limitation) 
and 60 destination economies (30 OECD and 30 non-OECD economies).  A 
full list of economies covered is at Appendix Section  A.4.  Bilateral FDI stock 
data covers the period of 1985 – 2006.   
 
A total of 16,183 observations are available.  A non-negligible portion of them 
are zero observations, amounting to 2,169 observations (around 13% of the 
total).  Since we will work on the log-form of FDI data, dropping zero 
observation may give rise to selection bias.  As such, a conventional solution 
to this problem is to estimate )ln( FDIa +  (where a is a constant) instead of 
estimating )ln(FDI .  We use a =0.3, and therefore the dependent variable for 
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estimation, labelled as lnfdi, implies ln(0.3+FDI)8 as in Bénassy-Quéré, et al. 
(2007).     
 
 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
 
4.3.2.1 Gravity Variables 
 
Since we will use an augmented gravity model (to be discussed in details in the 
next Section) to estimate the impacts of natural barriers, regional integration 
and regulatory environment on FDI, the specification will include some 
standard gravity variables.  To capture the market sizes of the source and 
destination economies (denoted by subscript i and j respectively), we will use 
three measures.  First is the natural log of real GDP (expressed in constant US 
dollars) (i.e. ln(GDPi) and ln(GDPj)).  Second is the natural log of population 
(ln(POPi) and ln(POPj)).  These data come from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI).  The third is the log product of land areas of economies i 
and j (ln(Areaij)) to demonstrate the combined market size impact.  Data are 
from Rose (2004).  
 
With regard to “natural barriers” in the gravity model framework, we 
incorporate the geographical and historical variables as in Rose (2004)’s 
specification.  These include the natural log of distance between economy i 
and j (ln(Dist)), land border dummy for the pair of economies sharing the same 
border (Border), common language dummy (Common Lang), dummy for the 
economy-pairs ever in colonial relationship (Colonyij), dummy for having 
common colonizer (Common coloniser) and dummy for the destination 
economy is an island (Island).  These time-invarying variables are obtained 
from Rose (2004). 
 
                                                 
8 Putting a = 1 is also quite frequently used in the existing literature.  Such transformation 
nevertheless does not change our results significantly.  Indeed, it is also interesting to study 
these zero observations in greater details in respect to their regulatory environment.  However, 
this is beyond the scope of this Chapter.   
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4.3.2.2 Regional Integration and Regulatory Variables 
 
“At-the-border” barrier refers to whether the two economies are in a RTA 
(RTA), a constructed dummy variable to proxy regional integration.  Based on 
Rose (2004)’s database on bilateral RTA membership9, we further update the 
database in respect to the 60 economies of our interest for 2000 onwards.  
Information is gathered from the WTO’s website.  In total, an addition of 20 
more RTAs or bilateral trade agreements are augmented in our dataset.  
Details of these information are at Appendix Section  A.5. 
 
To measure “behind-the-border” domestic regulatory institutions, we employ 
sub-indicators of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index from 
Gwartney, et al. (2008).  We use the “catch-all” index of regulation (REG) as 
a measure of the overall regulatory environment, ranging from 0 to 10 with 
higher score signifying less regulatory burden in the economy.  Sub-indices 
on measuring credit market regulations (Credit Reg), labour regulations 
(Labour Reg) and business regulations (Business Reg) will also be tested 
separately.  That said, a total 4 different regulatory variables will be used, 
ranging from a “catch-all” broadest measure to specific components.  
Nevertheless, ratings on business regulation are only available since 1995.  
Hence the sample size is significantly reduced.   
 
The regulatory index intends to measure the regulatory restraints of the credit, 
labour and product markets.  Credit Reg measures the degree of using a 
private banking system to allocate credit to private parties.  Economies which 
refrain from controlling interest rates receive higher ratings from these 
components.  Labour Reg measures the regulation of labour market.  If 
wages are largely determined by market forces, hiring and firing conditions are 
well established and the use of conscription is retrained, the economy will have 
a higher score.  Business Reg identifies the extent to which regulations and 
bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce competition.  Less business 
                                                 
9 Rose (2004)’s RTAs dataset covers EU, USIS, NAFTA, CARICOM, PATCRA, ANZD, 
CACM, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and SPARTECA.  Only EU, NAFTA and SPARTECA are 
relevant to the economies covered in our dataset.  See Appendix Section  A.5 for the full 
names of these abbreviations.    
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regulations result in higher scores.   
 
The composite index of REG is calculated based on quantitative hard data (e.g. 
percentage of domestic credit consumed by the private sector) where 
appropriate as well as qualitative business survey data from compiled sources 
such as the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey and World 
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (EoDB) Survey10.  The latter data source, as 
we discussed in our literature survey, is also very prevalently used in the 
empirical literature since it provides a consistent and comparable methodology 
for measuring cross-country regulatory environment.  We, however, do not 
directly employ EoDB’s data to measure regulation because the survey only 
started in 2003.  Such short time period imposes many difficulties and 
limitations to carry out panel data analysis.  In contrast, by constructing a 
composite index on regulation from various sources, the Fraser Institute’s 
indices span over reasonably long time.  A detailed description of the 
regulation index and its sub-components is at Appendix Section  A.2. 
 
4.3.2.3 Instrumental Variables 
 
FDI and regulatory environment could be endogenously determined.  More 
foreign investment may prompt the government to response closely to the 
needs of foreign investors by improving the business environment and 
relieving excessive regulatory burden of doing business.  In return, destination 
economies, with better quality of regulatory environment, are more appealing 
for foreign investors and are more likely to attract inward investment.  
Nevertheless, there is so far neither theoretical nor empirical work suggests any 
sound and valid instrumental variable which directly affects domestic 
regulatory environment but not FDI.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, existing economic growth and institution literature 
also mentions extensively such endogeneity problem.  Despite their 
imperfections, similar instrumental variables will also be employed for our 
                                                 
10 Further information on the Ease of Doing Business Report can be retrieved from 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/. 
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estimations to tackle endogeneity.  The instrumental variables used in our 
estimation are primarily from Alesina, et al. (2003).  They provide a new set 
of measures of ethnic fragmentation, religion fragmentation and language 
fragmentation for about 190 economies11.  Also, as in Glaeser and Shleifer 
(2002), UK legal origin and latitude of the destination economy are also used 
as instrumental variables for our IV estimations.   
 
4.3.2.4 Data Limitation 
 
One major limitation of this study is data.  First of all, our bilateral FDI data 
are restricted to OECD economies as FDI source economies only.  Further 
study is worth pursuing for developing economies as source to investigate if 
they have any different investment behaviour.  Secondly, although our dataset 
constitutes a longer time span of regulatory indices than those used in the 
existing literature, our variables are only available from 1990.  Apparently, 
using longer time span is more desirable in our case.  This also explains 
partially why previous literature generally adopted a cross-sectional approach, 
for example using OLS and Tobit models12.   
 
 
4.4 Model and Estimation Strategy  
 
4.4.1 Augmented Gravity Model  
 
Our estimation is based on an augmented gravity model.  Gravity models 
have been extensively used in empirical economics, in particular in relation to 
regional integration and international flows of goods, capital as well as labour 
                                                 
11 The aim of their paper is to revisit the effects of all these variables on economic growth and 
the quality of institution.  They suggest that the degrees of endogeneity of these instrumental 
variables to the dependent variables are actually quite different.   
12 Using Tobit model is due to censoring of the dependent variable, FDI.  We do not undertake 
panel Tobit estimations in our case.  As Greene (2008) has pointed out, most of the attention 
in the theoretical literature on panel data methods for the Tobit model has been focused on 
fixed effects.  Fixed effects models will assume away all the time-invarying effects.  
Therefore, the impact of natural barriers in our case cannot be assessed.  More importantly, 
empirical evidences suggest that unconditional estimation of the Tobit model behaves 
essentially like that for the linear regression model.  For further research, a generalised Tobit 
model could be considered, especially it is more conceptually appealing by allowing the two 
parts of the model (whether the economy has FDI or not) to be correlated.  
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movement.  The simple form of the model assumes that the bilateral flow of 
commodities increase with economic sizes (measured by national incomes) and 
decrease with the cost of transportation (measured by the distance between the 
two economic centres).  An augmented gravity model implies an extension of 
the model to incorporate factors on top of these two.   
 
There have been critics arguing that, despite the empirical success in 
explaining various types of bilateral trade and FDI movements, the gravity 
model lacks theoretical foundation to justify any addition of policy variables.  
Furthermore, it also implies that estimation may suffer from omitted variables 
bias and that comparative static analysis is unfounded.  In this light, based on 
earlier theoretical foundations of gravity model developed in Anderson (1979), 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) derive a general equilibrium model relating 
bilateral trade to size, bilateral trade barriers and, most importantly, multilateral 
price indices.  They argue that this form of multilateral resistance reflects the 
average relative trade costs.  Average trade costs faced by a country will 
influence its bilateral commodity or investment flow decisions.  Estimations 
that fail to control for such countries’ average trade costs would induce omitted 
variable bias.  They apply the model to investigate the impact of national 
border on trade and find that national borders reduce trade between US and 
Canada by a considerable amount of 20-50%.   
 
On the other hand, when assessing the WTO effect on trade, Eicher and Henn 
(2009) reiterate the importance of controlling for unobserved bilateral 
heterogeneity to help further reduce omitted variable bias.  They argue that a 
bilateral relationship is typically defined by characteristics extending beyond 
distance, geography and others that can be explicitly controlled, for examples 
cultural, personal, political and/or civic factors.   
 
In practice, Cheng and Wall (2005) show that using standard 
pooled-cross-section methods to estimate gravity models of trade typically 
suffers from omitted or misspecification bias.  Unless heterogeneity is 
accounted for correctly, gravity models can greatly overestimate the effects of 
integration on trade flows.  To alleviate these problems, they suggest using a 
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two-way fixed-effects model with country-pair and period dummies to reflect 
the bilateral relationship between trading partners.  
 
Against these concerns on estimating gravity models, we will specify our 
model by introducing a country-pair dummy to capture unobserved 
country-pair heterogeneity.  As in Rose (2004) and Rose (2006), we will also 
incorporate a period dummy to capture the changing trade costs over time to 
reflect multilateral resistance so as to minimise omitted bias as far as possible.  
Nevertheless, we are also aware that by introducing a country-pair dummy also 
significantly increases the number of parameters estimated and thus loses a 
large degree of freedom.   
 
 
4.4.2 Specification 
 
The basic model to be estimated is an augmented gravity model as specified in 
Rose (2004) and is further extended to incorporate regulation variables as 
below: 
 
ijttijij
ijtjtijtijt
uEASIAREGION
RTAREGGRAVfdi
εδββ
ββββ
+++++
+++=
54
3210ln
 ( 4.4-1) 
 
The dependent variable is defined as before.  Subscripts i, j and t represent the 
source economy, the destination economy and time respectively.  GRAVijt and 
REGjt are vectors of gravity and regulatory variables respectively.  The 
former may include time-invarying variable like distance.  RTAijt is a dummy 
variable for regional trade agreement for mutual membership for economies i 
and j in year t.  Regional dummies for the destination economies are also 
included.  Impact of East Asian OECD economies as source is captured by the 
dummy variable EASIA.  uij estimates the unobserved country-pair 
heterogeneity.  δt  captures time effect.  εijt is the residual.  
 
4.4.3 Estimation Strategies 
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4.4.3.1 Linear Panel Data Models 
 
Since we have a dataset in panel form, we could estimate eq.( 4.4-1) using the 
standard, yet most restricted, form of linear panel models – fixed effects (FE) 
and random effects (RE) models.  In the FE model, iju  and tδ are assumed 
to be fixed parameters and the stochastic disturbances are assumed to be 
),0(~ 2εσε IIDijt .  The right-hand sided regressors, collectively called ijtx , are 
assumed to be independent of the ijtε  for all i and t.  Although we have the 
unobserved individual effect iju and time effect tδ  (i.e. two-way error 
component model), the estimation technique is essentially similar to that of a 
one-way error component model, where only the unobserved individual effect 
is present.  In the case of a two-way error component model, using dummy 
variables to perform least square estimations is undesirable as we have a matrix 
of TxNT  time dummies, where N is the number of country-pair and T is the 
number of time periods.  Since N is large in our case, there will be too many 
dummies (i.e. )]1()1[( −+− TN ) in the regression.  This causes an enormous 
loss in degree of freedom.   
 
One can obtain the Within estimator in a one-way error component model by 
averaging over individuals using the restriction that ∑ =i iu 0 .  For 
simplicity, let us denote subscript i to be a panel unit, instead of ij as in our 
specification for demonstration purpose in eqs.( 4.4-2)-( 4.4-3).  We get 
 
tttt xy ..0. εδββ +++=  ( 4.4-2) 
 
where y is the dependent variable.  
 
By imposing ∑ =t t 0δ , we can similarly deduce that 
 
)(
)()(
....
........
εεεε
β
+−−
++−−=+−−
tiit
tiittiit xxxxyyyy
 ( 4.4-3) 
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One can note that the Within estimator thus obtained cannot estimate the effect 
of time-invariant and individual-invariant variables due to the transformation in 
eq.( 4.4-3).  However, its advantage is that it allows uij be correlated with the 
regressors as it will be ultimately differenced away.   
 
In a two-way random effect model (RE), ),0(~ 2uij IIDu σ , ),0(~
2
δσδ IIDt  
and ),0(~ 2εσε IIDijt are assumed to be independent of each other.  ijtx  is 
independent of iju , tδ and ijtε .  The disturbances are assumed to be 
homoskedastic with variances 222 εδ σσσ ++u . 
 
The RE estimator is a generalised least squares (GLS) estimator.  A one-way 
error component RE model uses both within-group (deviation from individual 
mean) and between-group (individual mean) variations, but weights them 
according to the relative sizes of 
22
uiTσσ ε +  and 2εσ .  The estimation 
follows 2 steps: (i) transform iiitit yyy θ−=
*  and iiitit xxx θ−=
*  where 
22
2
1
ui
i
Tσσ
σ
θ
ε
ε
+
−= ; (ii) regress *ity on 
*
itx .  The variance parameters of the 
stochastic disturbance and the individual specific term can be estimated from 
the within-group and between-group regression residuals. 
 
On choosing between random effects model and fixed effects model, Hausman 
(1978) suggests a specification test comparing the RE estimator and the FE 
estimator.  A rejection would be interpreted as an adoption of the fixed effects 
model and non-rejection as an acceptance of the random effects model. This 
test is done and discussed further in Appendix Section  A.6. 
 
As Greene (2008) suggests, the RE model would be appropriate if we believed 
that sampled cross-sectional units were drawn from a large population.  The 
payoff of this model is that it greatly reduces the number of parameters to be 
estimated.  The cost is the possibility of inconsistent estimates, should the 
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assumption turn out to be inappropriate.   
 
4.4.3.2 Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) Estimation 
 
Nevertheless, it is rather typical in panel data that the covariance matrix is 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated.  If we ignore heteroskedasticity, the 
estimates of the linear panel data models are still consistent and unbiased but 
inefficient.  If we ignore autocorrelation, the estimates would be biased and 
inconsistent.  As it is unlikely that the variance components are known, we 
also adopt the FGLS procedure.  It allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) 
autocorrelation within panels (i.e. ijttijijt νρεε += −1, , where 1>ρ and 
cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels13.   
 
4.4.3.3 Hausman and Taylor Estimator 
 
As shown earlier, the RE model hinges heavily on the assumption that the 
individual effects are strictly uncorrelated with the regressors.  Otherwise, 
modelling the individual specific constant terms as randomly distributed across 
cross-sectional units might be inappropriate.   
 
In our case, it is also likely that regulatory environment and having RTA may 
correlate with the country-pair heterogeneity.  The RE effect model may not 
be appropriate in this case.  Using FE model can get rid of this problem 
completely.  However, it will sweep the time-invarying variables, such as 
geographical and historical factors in the gravity model. To take a middle-point 
between FE and RE models, Hausman and Taylor (1981) propose a model 
where some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the unobserved 
individual-level random effect, while keeping the time-invarying variables in 
the estimation.  Their model is in the form: 
 
iitiiititit uzzxxy ++′+′+′+′= εααββ 22112211 . 
 
All individual effects denoted as zi are observed.  Hausman and Taylor define 
                                                 
13 Technical details can be referred to Chapter 5 of Baltagi (2001). 
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four sets of observed variables in the model: 
 
• itx1 is 1Κ  variables that are time varying and uncorrelated with 
iu  , 
• iz1 is 1L  variables that are time invariant and uncorrelated with iu ; 
• itx2  is 2Κ  variables that are time varying and are correlated with 
iu ; 
• iz2  is  2L  variables that are time invariant and are correlated with 
iu  . 
 
The model assumes that 
 
[ ] 0,1 =ititi zxuE  although [ ] ,0, 22 ≠iiti zxuE  
var [ ] ,,,, 22211 uiitiiti zxzxu σ=  
cov [ ] ,0,,,, 2211 =iitiitiit zxzxuε  
var [ ] ,,,, 2222211 uiitiitiit zxzxu σσσε ε +==+  
corr [ ] 222211 /,,,, σσρεε uiitiitiisiit zxzxuu ==++  
 
The strategy for estimation, first by taking deviations from group means, 
( ) ( ) .2.221.11. iitiitiitiit xxxxyy εεββ −+
′−+′−=−  
 
which implies that the ßs can be consistently estimated by least squares (as in 
FE model), in spite of the correlation between x2 and u.  For efficiency, the 
authors show that the group mean deviations can be used as (K1+K2) 
instrumental variables for estimation of (ß, α).  Because z1 is uncorrelated 
with the disturbances, it can likewise serve as a set of L1 instrumental variables. 
Group means for x1 can serve as the remaining instruments for L2. For 
identification purposes, then K1 must be at least as large as L2 
14.   
 
                                                 
14 Greene (2008) (p.338) provides a summary of steps for consistent and efficient estimation of 
the model.   
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The main advantage of the Hausman and Taylor approach is that one does not 
have to use external instruments, but has to identify the endogenous variables.  
Moreover, it combines the advantage of taking into account the fixed effect and 
keeping the time-invariant variables in the equation.  
 
 
4.4.3.4 Two Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
 
Endogeneity causes inconsistency of the least square estimates and requires 
instrumental variable methods like two-stage least squares (2SLS) to obtain 
consistent parameter estimates.  Given some of the right-hand-side covariates 
are potentially endogenous, we also consider to deploy estimators using 
two-stage least-squares generalizations of simple panel-data estimators for 
exogenous variables as described in Baltagi (1981).   
 
As compared to Fixed effects IV (FE2SLS) and random effects IV (RE2SLS), 
Baltagi (1981)’s error component two-stage least squares (EC2SLS) estimates 
are preferred in our case.  While FE2SLS cannot provide estimates for time 
invariant variables, this would not be desirable for our case.  By contrast, 
Baltagi’s EC2SLS is a matrix-weighted average of between 2SLS and fixed 
effects 2SLS.   
 
It should be noted that although both Hausman and Taylor estimator and IV 
estimator use the method of instrumental variables, they have different 
underlying assumptions.  The IV estimator assumes that a subset of the 
explanatory variables in the model is correlated with the idiosyncratic error εit.  
In contrast, the Hausman and Taylor estimator assumes that some of the 
explanatory variables are correlated with the individual-level random effects ui, 
but that none of the explanatory variables are correlated with the idiosyncratic 
error εit.  In short, they are designed to tackle different assumptions.  In 
practice, Hausman and Taylor estimator uses “internal” transformed 
endogenous variables and exogenous variables as instruments.  IV estimator, 
on the other hand, seeks “external” instruments. 
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In retrospect, our empirical study first starts from estimating the gravity model 
in eq.( 4.4-1) using pooled OLS.  We proceed to panel analysis, starting from 
RE and FE models and further extend to FGLS and Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
estimators to take into account of the problem of autocorrelation and 
correlation between unobserved country-pair effect and regressors.  Finally, to 
tackle endogeneity, we also perform IV estimations.  In the following, unless 
otherwise stated, all panel data analyses incorporate country-pair and 
period-specific effects.  Estimations using inter-OECD and intra-OECD 
sub-samples will also be carried out to test the sensitivity of our results.   
 
 
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Pooled Regressions  
 
We first estimate the augmented gravity model as specified in eq.( 4.4-1) by 
pooled regression using OLS.  Such estimation will ignore the country-pair 
heterogeneity, as a result leading to bias results.  However, as a preliminary 
test and check if the gravity model works, we start from the OLS estimations 
and intend to suggest that we cannot ignore the country-pair heterogeneity.  
The results are presented as Models OLS(1) – OLS(4) in Table  4.5.1-1.   
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Table  4.5.1-1: Pooled OLS Regression Results: Full Sample 
 
 Model OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4) 
ln(GDPi) 2.9954*** 2.9764*** 3.1574*** 3.1344*** 
  (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0318) (0.0317) 
ln(GDPj) 0.9458*** 0.9605*** 0.7488*** 0.7552*** 
  (0.0317) (0.0318) (0.0436) (0.0435) 
ln(POPi) -1.8325*** -1.8214*** -1.9473*** -1.9297*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0357) (0.0355) 
ln(POPj) -0.1004*** -0.1249*** 0.1966*** 0.1800*** 
  (0.0326) (0.0328) (0.0464) (0.0464) 
ln(Dist) -0.9691*** -0.9125*** -1.1413*** -1.0887*** 
  (0.0228) (0.0242) (0.0300) (0.0316) 
Landlock 0.0474 0.1116*** 0.2487*** 0.3073*** 
  (0.0388) (0.0403) (0.0495) (0.0509) 
Colonyij 1.3014*** 1.3275*** 1.3664*** 1.3906*** 
  (0.0807) (0.0801) (0.1071) (0.1065) 
1.1063*** 1.1042*** 0.7956*** 0.7952*** Common Lang 
(0.0497) (0.0492) (0.0656) (0.0647) 
4.7286*** 4.7065*** 4.2028*** 4.1854*** Common Coloniser 
(0.1692) (0.1694) (0.1368) (0.1360) 
Island 0.0195 0.0499 -0.0691 -0.0394 
  (0.0433) (0.0433) (0.0611) (0.0607) 
Border 0.3972*** 0.4036*** 0.4327*** 0.4356*** 
  (0.0711) (0.0713) (0.0980) (0.0983) 
ln(Areaij) -0.0460*** -0.0413*** -0.0529*** -0.0485*** 
  (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0121) (0.0121) 
RTA  0.3959***  0.3863*** 
   (0.0529)  (0.0671) 
  0.5565*** 0.5575*** REG 
(catch-all)   (0.0311) (0.0311) 
Obs 15876 15876 9210 9210 
Adj. R-sq 0.695 0.696 0.722 0.723 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi.  Regional dummies with year effects are included.  
Intercepts are not reported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 
It is shown that the gravity variables generally fit well in explaining bilateral 
FDI.  Gravity variables (including region and time dummies) alone account 
for about 70% of bilateral FDI in our sample data (see Model OLS(1)).  
Economic sizes of both source and destination economies are significantly and 
positively related to FDI while geographical distance, as expected, is 
negatively related.  Populations in both source and destination economies, 
contrary to our expectation, is negatively related to FDI.  In our sample, 
therefore, it suggests that economies with smaller populations attract more FDI 
from OECD economies.  In particular, the effect is more prominent for the 
source economies having small population.  However, we note that in Model 
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OLS(4), a larger population in the destination economy actually attracts more 
FDI.  This suggests the possible market size effect. 
 
On geographical characteristics, both economies sharing common border is 
also conducive to bilateral FDI.  The cross-product of land area is also 
negatively related to FDI.  These indicate a negative and significant impact of 
high transport costs on attracting FDI.  Landlocked economies in our sample 
show significant and positive results on attracting FDI.  In our sample, the 
landlocked economies are more likely to share national borders with other 
countries and are thus more likely to attract FDI nearby due to lower transport 
costs as a result of geographical proximity.  Island economy, generally 
believed to have higher transport costs, does not show any significant impact 
on FDI in our estimations.  In fact, the estimation results on this variable are 
quite sensitive to additional covariates.  Its coefficients are positive in Models 
OLS (1) and (2), but negative in Models OLS (3) and (4).   
 
Cultural and historical ties between the economy pair also matter for FDI.  
Colonial relationship of the pair, sharing common language and having 
common colonizer all positively and significantly determine inward investment 
between the country pair.   
 
Model OLS(4) is the final specification of our interest, with RTA and the 
“catch-all” regulation index REG incorporated.  The results show that, despite 
controlling for all the factors of natural barriers, forming a RTA with the source 
economy and domestic regulatory environment of the destination economy 
remain to be significantly positive to FDI.     
 
To test the sensitivity of the results, we further divide the sample into 
intra-OECD and inter-OECD bilateral FDI stock and perform pooled OLS 
estimations again (as shown in Models OLS(5) – (12) in Table  4.5.1-2 – Table 
 4.5.1-3 respectively).  The results do not show striking difference.   
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Table  4.5.1-2: Pooled OLS Regression Results: Intra-OECD Sample 
 
 Model OLS(5) OLS(6) OLS(7) OLS(8) 
ln(GDPi) 3.2672*** 3.2406*** 3.4231*** 3.3915*** 
  (0.0340) (0.0356) (0.0425) (0.0430) 
ln(GDPj) 1.0563*** 1.0802*** 0.6549*** 0.7378*** 
  (0.0310) (0.0667) (0.0984) (0.0987) 
ln(POPi) -2.1639*** -2.1483*** -2.2558*** -2.2362*** 
  (0.0362) (0.0379) (0.0463) (0.0462) 
ln(POPj) -0.2450*** -0.2627*** 0.2413** 0.1485 
  (0.0357) (0.0720) (0.1062) (0.1069) 
ln(Dist) -1.0772*** -0.9372*** -1.0914*** -1.0408*** 
  (0.0316) (0.0366) (0.0503) (0.0501) 
Landlock 0.0166 0.0876* -0.0317 0.0494 
  (0.0456) (0.0529) (0.0654) (0.0687) 
Colonyij 1.0666*** 1.0218*** 0.8034*** 0.8372*** 
  (0.1107) (0.1091) (0.1489) (0.1471) 
Common Lang 1.4241*** 1.4906*** 1.0589*** 1.0565*** 
  (0.0667) (0.0658) (0.0985) (0.0967) 
Common Coloniser 5.3003*** 5.2805*** 4.9434*** 4.8882*** 
  (0.1676) (0.1686) (0.1719) (0.1688) 
Island -0.3318*** -0.3687*** -0.6850*** -0.6474*** 
  (0.0615) (0.0626) (0.0918) (0.0912) 
Border -0.1499** -0.0772 0.0761 0.0886 
  (0.0723) (0.0741) (0.1021) (0.1012) 
ln(Areaij) 0.0540*** 0.0374** -0.0541** -0.0433** 
  (0.0130) (0.0156) (0.0212) (0.0215) 
RTA  0.4425***  0.3344*** 
   (0.0594)  (0.0780) 
  0.7973*** 0.7913*** REG 
(catch-all)   (0.0404) (0.0403) 
Obs 9180 9180 5055 5055 
Adj. R-sq 0.722 0.725 0.754 0.754 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi.  Regional dummies with year effects are included.  
Intercepts are not reported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table  4.5.1-3: Pooled OLS Regression Results: Inter-OECD Sample 
 
 Model OLS(9) OLS(10) OLS(11) OLS(12) 
ln(GDPi) 2.7718*** 2.7629*** 2.9889*** 2.9786*** 
  (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0446) (0.0447) 
ln(GDPj) 1.4514*** 1.4403*** 1.3064*** 1.2897*** 
  (0.0522) (0.0522) (0.0694) (0.0698) 
ln(POPi) -1.5390*** -1.5340*** -1.7253*** -1.7208*** 
  (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0529) (0.0530) 
ln(POPj) -0.4386*** -0.4284*** -0.1781*** -0.1675*** 
  (0.0427) (0.0429) (0.0641) (0.0644) 
ln(Dist) -1.0490*** -1.0429*** -1.2739*** -1.2628*** 
  (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0570) (0.0573) 
Landlock 0.2094*** 0.1959** 0.6253*** 0.6098*** 
  (0.0777) (0.0777) (0.0946) (0.0949) 
Colonyij 1.5629*** 1.5744*** 1.8061*** 1.8157*** 
  (0.1113) (0.1111) (0.1484) (0.1482) 
Common Lang 0.6180*** 0.5999*** 0.4398*** 0.4208*** 
  (0.0727) (0.0731) (0.0925) (0.0926) 
Island 0.5396*** 0.5333*** 0.5574*** 0.5368*** 
  (0.0642) (0.0641) (0.0895) (0.0898) 
Border 2.8389*** 2.8341*** 2.8731*** 2.8705*** 
  (0.1943) (0.1942) (0.2096) (0.2094) 
ln(Areaij) -0.1130*** -0.1130*** -0.0717*** -0.0698*** 
  (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0245) (0.0244) 
RTA  0.5308***  0.4920*** 
   (0.1561)  (0.1699) 
  0.3539*** 0.3489*** REG 
(catch-all)   (0.0521) (0.0521) 
Obs 6696 6696 4155 4155 
Adj. R-sq 0.663 0.664 0.68 0.681 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi. Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Dummy 
for common coloniser is dropped from the specification due to nil sample.  Intercepts are not 
reported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote significance 
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
The gravity variables alone fit the model slightly better with adjusted R2 = 
0.722 for the intra-OECD sub-sample (comparing Models OLS(1) vs. OLS(5)) 
but only 0.663 for the inter-OECD sub-sample (comparing Models OLS(1) vs. 
OLS(9)).   
 
We concentrate our discussion on the full baseline models (i.e. Models OLS(8) 
and OLS(12)).  With regard to geographical variables, landlocked economies 
in the intra-OECD sample do not have any significant result, but it carries a 
significantly positive impact in the inter-OECD sample.  It suggests that 
landlocked non-OECD economy attracts more FDI than the non-landlocked 
ones.  Island economies on the other hand carry significantly negative impact 
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on FDI in the intra-OECD sample but significantly positive impact in the 
inter-OECD sample.  Theoretically, an island economy may reflect certain 
level of isolation in the region and thus it may incur higher transport costs for 
others to access the entity.  Nevertheless, having a coastal line by its very own 
nature may also imply easier access for foreign goods and capital.  The effect 
of being an island economy on FDI is therefore ambiguous, as shown in our 
dataset.  Having a common border significantly determines FDI in the 
inter-OECD region, whereas such effect is not significant in the intra-OECD 
region.  In both sub-samples, physical areas are negatively related to FDI.  It 
possibly reflects the higher transport costs from one economic centre to 
another.   
 
Cultural ties significantly explain bilateral FDI in both samples. If the FDI 
destination economy and the source were ever in a colonial relationship, the 
volume of FDI is also likely to be greater.  Such effect is comparatively more 
prominent in the inter-OECD region as expected since there are very few 
OECD countries ever in a colonial relationship with each other.  In contrast, 
the effects of common language and having a common coloniser play a more 
significant role in the intra-OECD sub-sample, demonstrating that the effect of 
cultural ties are equally played between the rich country pair.  All these 
effects are statistically significant at 1% level in both sub-samples.   
 
On the variables of our interest – RTA and REG, the baseline specifications 
using the three sets of samples (i.e. Models OLS(4) vs. OLS(8) vs. OLS(12)) 
are largely consistent.  The coefficients remain statistically significant.  
Comparing the two sub-samples, we find that the coefficients of REG impose a 
much greater impact on FDI in the intra-OECD sample than that in the 
inter-OECD sample.  It signifies that domestic regulatory environment 
comparatively explains intra-OECD FDI more.  Amongst the intra-OECD 
countries, those with better domestic regulatory environment are also more 
likely to attract FDI.  In contrast, the coefficient of RTA is slightly bigger in 
the inter-OECD sample.  In other words, for inter-OECD region, FDI from 
OECD economies is more responsive to RTA than the domestic regulatory 
environment of the destination economy.   
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4.5.2 Linear Panel Data Regressions 
 
As shown above, all OLS results point to the positive association of regional 
integration and favourable regulatory environment with FDI.  Nevertheless, as 
discussed before, pooled regressions ignore country-pair specific heterogeneity.  
In addition, this does not take into account multilateral resistance.  All these 
may inflate the coefficients on RTA and REG and lead to biased inference.  
Hence, we proceed to undertake our panel data analyses.  We start from the 
most restricted FE and RE models.  Comparing the test results between OLS 
and FE estimates, as well as between OLS and RE estimates allows us to test if 
the country-pair specific heterogeneity is present or not.  Breusch and Pagen 
Lagrangian multiplier test is used to test the RE estimate as against that of OLS.  
The F-test is used to test the FE estimates as against the one from OLS.  
These diagnostic test results are shown in Appendix Section  A.6.  Both tests 
suggest that country-specific heterogeneity cannot be ignored and pooled 
regressions are therefore not preferred.     
 
Since most of the gravity variables for capturing geographical factors and 
cultural ties are time invariant, FE model cannot assess their effects 
individually since these characteristics will be absorbed into the fixed effects.  
Nevertheless, we have still performed the fixed effect estimations for the sake 
of comparison.   
 
RE and FE estimations with country-pair specific effect and time-specific 
effect are shown in Table  4.5.2-1 and Table  4.5.2-2 respectively.  To compare 
the results on the gravity variables, we can only make reference to the OLS 
results and RE results obtained.  Generally speaking, the magnitudes of the 
gravity variables in the RE models do not show significant differences as 
compared to that in the pooled OLS regressions (Models OLS(4) vs. RE(1)).  
The signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients are largely similar.  
 
However, the coefficients of both RTA and REG systematically become 
smaller in the RE models, but they remain statistically significant at 1% level.  
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The coefficients on RTA fell from 0.37 in Model OLS(4) to 0.25 in Model 
RE(1).  The coefficients on REG in the corresponding models decrease even 
more notably from 0.56 to 0.29.   
   
Table  4.5.2-1: RE Models for Full Sample 
 
Model RE(1) RE(2) RE(3) RE(4) 
ln(GDPi) 2.8304*** 2.8262*** 2.8329*** 2.7999*** 
  (0.0802) (0.0804) (0.0812) (0.0844) 
ln(GDPj) 1.0977*** 1.0642*** 1.3304*** 1.2524*** 
  (0.0861) (0.0864) (0.0866) (0.0929) 
ln(POPi) -1.5873*** -1.5792*** -1.5766*** -1.5347*** 
  (0.0861) (0.0869) (0.0888) (0.0927) 
ln(POPj) -0.2363** -0.2201** -0.4762*** -0.3746*** 
  (0.0942) (0.0943) (0.0937) (0.0996) 
ln(Dist) -1.2150*** -1.1667*** -1.1834*** -1.1891*** 
  (0.0815) (0.0814) (0.0818) (0.0835) 
Landlock 0.3228** 0.3648** 0.3321** 0.3184** 
  (0.1411) (0.1421) (0.1423) (0.1488) 
Colonyij 1.7521*** 1.7440*** 1.7823*** 1.7651*** 
  (0.3033) (0.3096) (0.3156) (0.3221) 
Common Lang 0.8074*** 0.8617*** 0.8318*** 0.8232*** 
  (0.1802) (0.1826) (0.1837) (0.1858) 
Common Coloniser 3.7050*** 3.7776*** 3.7070*** 3.7169*** 
 (0.3584) (0.4534) (0.3946) (0.4242) 
Island 0.0596 0.061 0.0798 0.0898 
  (0.1429) (0.1443) (0.1415) (0.1414) 
Border 0.4867* 0.4874* 0.4708* 0.4661* 
  (0.2583) (0.2590) (0.2679) (0.2690) 
ln(Areaij) -0.0211 -0.0239 -0.0313 -0.0459 
  (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0310) (0.0311) 
RTA 0.2455*** 0.2685*** 0.2754*** 0.1477 
  (0.0819) (0.0824) (0.0844) (0.0999) 
0.2902***    REG 
(catch-all) (0.0330)    
Credit Reg  0.1711***   
   (0.0200)   
Labour Reg   0.0598***  
    (0.0174)  
Business Reg    0.0393** 
     (0.0193) 
Obs 9210 9211 8967 8517 
chi2 9475 9481 8938 6549 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi. Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Intercepts 
are not reported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustering by country-pairs.  ***, 
** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table  4.5.2-2: FE Models for Full Sample 
 
Model FE(1) FE(2) FE(3) FE(4) 
ln(GDPi) 2.0998*** 2.0883*** 1.9803*** 0.5548* 
  (0.2484) (0.2438) (0.2665) (0.3133) 
ln(GDPj) 1.3031*** 1.1217*** 1.5761*** 1.0506*** 
  (0.1545) (0.1542) (0.1679) (0.1967) 
ln(POPi) -3.0266*** -2.9762*** -2.7927*** -3.2234*** 
  (0.8003) (0.7916) (0.8580) (1.2086) 
ln(POPj) -4.6574*** -4.3910*** -5.0683*** -5.6375*** 
  (0.4152) (0.3965) (0.5004) (0.6074) 
ln(Dist) -- -- -- -- 
      
Landlock -- -- -- -- 
      
Colonyij -- -- -- -- 
      
Common Lang -- -- -- -- 
      
Common 
Coloniser -- -- -- -- 
     
Island -- -- -- -- 
      
Border -- -- -- -- 
      
ln(Areaij) -- -- -- -- 
      
RTA 0.1495 0.1673* 0.1945** 0.0975 
  (0.0919) (0.0917) (0.0961) (0.1184) 
REG 
(catch-all) 0.1441***    
 (0.0337)    
Credit Reg  0.1206***   
   (0.0206)   
Labour Reg   0.0028  
    (0.0194)  
Business Reg    -0.0014 
     (0.0202) 
Obs 9210 9211 8967 8517 
RMSE 0.712 0.71 0.691 0.659 
R-sq (within) 0.455 0.46 0.425 0.302 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi.  Regional dummies with year effects are included.  
Intercepts are not reported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustering by 
country-pairs.  ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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In the panel analysis, we also investigate the impact of three sub-indices of 
REG, including Credit Reg, Labour Reg and Business Reg on FDI.  As 
shown in Models RE(2) – RE(4), all three measures of regulation stay 
statistically significant.  As expected, the impact of individual sub-index is 
less than that of the “catch-all” aggregate measure.  Yet the significant results 
imply that less credit regulations, labour regulations and business regulations in 
the destination economy are significant determinants of FDI even after 
controlling for country-pair heterogeneity and other factors of natural barriers.  
Nevertheless, the coefficients of Labour Reg and Business Reg are much 
smaller.  This may be affected by the reduced sample size due to quite a large 
number of missing observations for these two sub-indices.   
 
On RTA, the only insignificant coefficient is in Model RE(4).  Coefficients in 
the other three models are quite consistent and comparable.  In overall terms, 
REG explains FDI more than RTA (see Model RE(1)).  This implies that, 
generally speaking, domestic regulatory environment plays a more significant 
role in attracting FDI than having a regional trade agreement alone.    
 
As discussed earlier, RE models restrictively assume that all the regressors are 
independent of the unobserved country-pair specific effect.  Or else, the 
results will not be consistent.  The results of our FE models suggest that it 
may be the case for our sample.  As shown in Models FE(1) to FE(4), the 
coefficients of RTA and REG are generally smaller.  The coefficients of RTA 
are even not statistically significant in Models FE(1) and FE(4).  For the 
various measures of regulatory environment, the broad aggregate REG index 
remains positively associating with bilateral FDI and so as Credit Reg.  
However, Labour Reg and Business Reg are no longer significant in Models 
FE(3) and FE(4).   
 
To verify whether the RE estimations are sensitive to sample selection, RE 
estimates using intra-OECD and inter-OECD sub-samples are also carried out.  
Results on the key variables are presented below in Table  4.5.2-3 and Table 
 4.5.2-4.  Comparing to the Models RE(1) – RE(4), we argue that the key 
results are not particularly sensitive to the sample selection.  REG and Credit 
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Reg of the destination economy are positively associated with FDI.  Labour 
reg is only significant in the intra-OECD sample (i.e. Model RE(7)), but not in 
the inter-OECD sample (i.e Model RE(11)).  It may suggest that labour costs 
of the developing economies are so low that labour regulation, albeit 
burdensome, will not hamper FDI.  In developed countries, where they do not 
have comparative advantages on labour costs, labour regulations (i.e. 
institutional costs) in turn will determine foreign investors’ decisions 
significantly.  Business Reg does not have any significant impact in both 
sub-samples.   
 
 
Table  4.5.2-3: RE Estimations by Sub-samples (Key Variables): Intra-OECD Sample 
 
Model RE(5) RE(6) RE(7) RE(8) 
RTA 0.3082*** 0.2473** 0.3512*** 0.0570 
  (0.1021) (0.1048) (0.1035) (0.1319) 
0.2818***    REG 
(catch-all) (0.0592)    
Credit Reg  0.1968***   
   (0.0430)   
Labour Reg   0.0618**  
    (0.0274)  
Business Reg    0.0212 
     (0.0278) 
Obs 5055 5055 5017 4656 
chi2 5117 5096 4944 3362 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi. Specification is eq.( 4.4-1).  Regional dummies with year 
effects are included.  Results on other variables and intercepts are not shown.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses, clustering by country-pairs.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
-153- 
 
 
Table  4.5.2-4: RE Estimations by Sub-samples (Key Variables): Inter-OECD Sample 
 
Model RE(9) RE(10) RE(11) RE(12) 
RTA 0.1777 0.3237** 0.2414* 0.3024** 
  (0.1320) (0.1322) (0.1389) (0.1437) 
0.2733***    REG 
(catch-all) (0.0400)    
Credit Reg  0.1801***   
   (0.0200)   
Labour Reg   0.0211  
    (0.0230)  
Business Reg    0.022 
     (0.0265) 
Obs 4155 4156 3950 3861 
chi2 4085 4140 3533 2833 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi. Specification is eq.( 4.4-1).  Regional dummies with year 
effects are included.  Results on other variables and intercepts are not shown.  Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis, clustering by country-pairs.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
In panel data analysis, the presence of autocorrelation is fairly likely. In this 
case, the standard errors obtained from the estimates tend to be underestimated, 
thereby inflating the coefficients.  Supported by the test results of Wooldridge 
(2002)’s autocorrelation test for panel data in Appendix Section  A.6, we 
confirm that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation can be rejected.  In 
other words, it suggests that the error terms may undergo an AR(1) process.  
Against this background, FGLS estimation is also carried out.  In theory, 
FGLS estimators are more efficient than the RE estimates (which are GLS 
estimators).  We present the coefficients of the key variables in Table  4.5.2-5 
below.  
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Table  4.5.2-5: FGLS Estimation Results by Sub-Samples (Key Variables) 
 
  RTA REG  
(catch-all) 
Credit 
Reg 
Labour 
Reg 
Business 
Reg 
Obs chi2 p-value 
0.2904*** 0.1234***       4104 17620 [0.0000] 
(0.0968) (0.0178)             
0.3357***   0.1004***     4105 18433 [0.0000] 
(0.0970)   (0.0091)           
0.2213**     0.0314***   3901 26749 [0.0000] 
(0.0919)     (0.0107)         
0.2293***       0.0004 3813 21027 [0.0000] 
Inter-OECD 
Sample 
(0.0838)       (0.0111)       
0.2544*** 0.2432***       5018 25022 [0.0000] 
(0.0471) (0.0201)             
0.2480***   0.1899***     5018 25823 [0.0000] 
(0.0460)   (0.0137)           
0.2751***     0.1124***   4979 24821 [0.0000] 
(0.0459)     (0.0115)         
0.1741***       0.0414*** 4618 26327 [0.0000] 
Intra-OECD 
Sample 
(0.0525)       (0.0100)       
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi.  Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Results 
on other variables and intercepts are not shown.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, 
clustering by country-pairs.   ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
If we compare the results of Table  4.5.2-3 and Table  4.5.2-4 against Table 
 4.5.2-5, we note that the coefficients on RTA do not differ a lot even after 
controlling for heteroskedasticity and AR(1) in the FGLS estimations.  For the 
inter-OECD sample, the effect of RTA lies somewhere between 0.22 to 0.34.  
For the intra-OECD sample, the corresponding parameter ranges from 0.17 to 
0.28.  Seemingly, RTA plays a slightly more significant role in attracting FDI 
in the inter-OECD region than that in the intra-OECD region, after controlling 
for most of the geographical and cultural factors.  However, the difference is 
very small.  In any case, countries having the same membership in a regional 
trade agreement tend to increase their bilateral FDI.    
 
In terms of domestic regulatory environment, not only the broad aggregate 
measure of regulation has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
bilateral FDI, but so do its sub-indices.  Perhaps except business regulation, 
its coefficient is relatively small as compared to that of credit market regulation 
and labour regulation.  In the inter-OECD sub-sample, it even shows no 
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significant effect.  We reckon that it is very likely due to data limitation.  
Unlike the other two sub-indices which have a reasonably good coverage in the 
sample period, a more comprehensive coverage of business regulation is only 
available since 2000.  The sample size is inevitably greatly reduced. 
 
Comparing the effects of domestic regulatory environment in the intra-OECD 
region vis-à-vis inter-OECD region in Table  4.5.2-5, we find consistently that 
the effects of regulation are stronger in the intra-OECD region.  It may 
suggest that, in the inter-OECD region, the non-OECD economies have 
comparative advantages in production costs.  Despite their institutional 
inadequacy, they still have locational advantages in attracting foreign capital.  
However, amongst OECD economies, comparative advantages do not lie on 
production costs.  Institutional differences would turn out to be a more 
significant factor to be considered by foreign investors.   
 
Furthermore, we can also note that credit market regulations exert the largest 
effects on FDI amongst the three types of regulations.  These results are also 
consistent with the IMF (2005)’s view that one of the most prominent 
constraint for foreign investors are credit constraints.    
 
A final extension of our linear panel data model before we proceed to IV 
estimation is to test our specification using Hausman and Taylor estimator.  
We are aware that there is no prior reason to justify that the correlation between 
the regressors and the unobserved country-pair heterogeneity does not exist.  
In addition, our FE models are supported by the test results of Hausman 
specification tests (see Appendix Section  A.6) instead of RE models, 
suggesting that we cannot reject that the country-pair specific effects correlate 
with the regressors.  As a robustness check, henceforth, we further relax this 
assumption and employ the Hausman and Taylor estimators in order to 
accommodate time-invariant variables as well as to allow the unobserved 
country-pair specific effects to be correlated with the regressors.  In our case, 
we assume that REG and RTA are correlated with the unobserved country-pair 
specific effects.   
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Table  4.5.2-6 to Table  4.5.2-8 show our Hausman and Taylor estimation results 
using the full sample, inter-OECD and intra-OECD sub-samples respectively.  
After using Hausman and Taylor estimators, different geographical variables 
behave differently in the two sub-samples.  Basic gravity variables, e.g. GDP, 
population and distance between the two economies, have the expected signs.  
Other than that, being an island economy is negatively affecting FDI inflows in 
the intra-OECD region.  However, such effect is not found in the inter-OECD 
region.  Having common border positively explains FDI between two 
economies, but this effect is not statistically significant in the intra-OECD 
sub-sample.  Area product is not significant at all in both sub-samples.  In 
overall terms, geographical variables do account partially for bilateral FDI.  
However, the effects of specific geographical characteristics will differ slightly 
in the inter-OECD and intra-OECD regions.  
 
In terms of cultural linkages, similar to the qualitative results obtained from our 
OLS estimates, we find that the effect of common language is significant in 
determining bilateral FDI.  The effect, however, primarily comes from the 
intra-OECD sample.  In other words, for OECD economies, whether the 
destination economy has common language as the source is not a statistically 
significant determinant when they consider outward investment to non-OECD 
economies.  However, if the destination economy is also an OECD economy, 
such factor will be significant.  For the inter-OECD region, such sort of 
cultural proximity may have been captured by the colonial relationship variable 
instead of the common language variable.  We find that in the inter-OECD 
region, if the FDI source and destination economies are ever in a colonial 
relationship, they are more likely to have more bilateral FDI.  
 
The positive and significant impacts of RTA and REG survive even if we use 
Hausman and Taylor estimators.  The results still hold after using sub-samples.  
In respect to individual regulatory sub-index, only credit market regulations are 
statistically significant throughout.  Labour market regulations and business 
regulations are not significant in either sub-sample.  This reiterates earlier 
results that an economy with less regulated credit markets fosters a more 
favourable business environment, thereby inducing more inward investment. 
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Table  4.5.2-6: Hausman and Taylor Estimation Results -- Full Sample 
 
Model  HT(1) HT(2) HT(3) HT(4) 
ln(GDPi) 2.3165*** 2.3132*** 2.3627*** 2.4406*** 
 (0.1249) (0.1280) (0.1374) (0.1371) 
ln(GDPj) 1.1949*** 1.1015*** 1.6484*** 1.6303*** 
 (0.1037) (0.1052) (0.1169) (0.1262) 
ln(POPi) -1.4091*** -1.4037*** -1.3984*** -1.3453*** 
 (0.1471) (0.1555) (0.1637) (0.1564) 
ln(POPj) -0.8712*** -0.9038*** -1.3159*** -0.9261*** 
 (0.1376) (0.1451) (0.1503) (0.1509) 
ln(Dist) -1.2075*** -1.2132*** -1.1692*** -1.0497*** 
 (0.1806) (0.1973) (0.2050) (0.1888) 
Colonyij 1.6920** 1.6978** 1.7597** 1.6811** 
 (0.7506) (0.8204) (0.8533) (0.7798) 
Common Lang 1.0269** 1.0567** 0.9904** 1.0009** 
 (0.4348) (0.4749) (0.4934) (0.4541) 
Island -0.4094 -0.4127 -0.3355 -0.2312 
 (0.3221) (0.3516) (0.3668) (0.3402) 
Border 0.4788 0.4167 0.3877 0.7595 
 (0.6269) (0.6852) (0.7124) (0.6518) 
ln(Areaij) 0.1556** 0.1822** 0.1394* 0.0657 
 (0.0663) (0.0720) (0.0756) (0.0705) 
Common Coloniser 3.6104 3.8589 3.6456 3.5165 
  (3.2345) (3.5349) (3.6721) (3.3679) 
RTA 0.2053*** 0.2430*** 0.2540*** 0.0806 
 (0.0711) (0.0708) (0.0710) (0.0851) 
REG 0.2635***    
(catch-all) (0.0231)    
Credit Reg  0.1597***   
  (0.0117)   
Labor Reg   0.0400***  
   (0.0148)  
Business Reg    0.0230 
    (0.0164) 
          
Obs 9210 9211 8967 8517 
chi2 7457 7523 6423 3707 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi.  Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Results 
on intercepts are not shown.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, clustering by 
country-pairs.   ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table  4.5.2-7: Hausman and Taylor Estimation Results -- Inter-OECD Sample 
 
Model  HT(5) HT(6) HT(7) HT(8) 
ln(GDPi) 2.0891*** 2.1933*** 2.1206*** 2.2612*** 
 (0.1588) (0.1515) (0.1779) (0.1694) 
ln(GDPj) 1.2873*** 1.3034*** 2.0861*** 2.4236*** 
 (0.1320) (0.1278) (0.1560) (0.1766) 
ln(POPi) -1.1381*** -1.1123*** -0.9789*** -0.9457*** 
 (0.1905) (0.1773) (0.2065) (0.1897) 
ln(POPj) -0.8779*** -0.6518*** -1.2744*** -1.1645*** 
 (0.1737) (0.1615) (0.1797) (0.1765) 
ln(Dist) -1.3559*** -1.3150*** -1.3410*** -1.1493*** 
 (0.2584) (0.2338) (0.2672) (0.2429) 
Colonyij 2.1268** 2.0188** 2.0914** 2.0535** 
 (0.9336) (0.8446) (0.9737) (0.8716) 
Common Lang 0.6784 0.6720 0.6101 0.4823 
 (0.5315) (0.4811) (0.5545) (0.4970) 
Island 0.0236 0.1573 0.3580 0.7470** 
 (0.3875) (0.3516) (0.4081) (0.3749) 
Border 2.5592** 2.5788** 2.5280** 2.8226** 
 (1.1933) (1.0801) (1.2451) (1.1163) 
ln(Areaij) 0.1812* 0.0750 0.0099 -0.0881 
 (0.0956) (0.0874) (0.1028) (0.0932) 
          
RTA 0.1785* 0.3208*** 0.2490** 0.3041*** 
 (0.1015) (0.1012) (0.1023) (0.1030) 
REG 0.2544***    
(catch-all) (0.0286)    
Credit Reg  0.1745***   
  (0.0138)   
Labor Reg   0.0101  
   (0.0200)  
Business Reg    0.0144 
    (0.0237) 
          
Obs 4155 4156 3950 3861 
chi2 3047 3215 2163 1584 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi.  Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Results 
on intercepts are not shown.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, clustering by 
country-pairs.   ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table  4.5.2-8: Hausman and Taylor Estimation Results -- Intra-OECD Sample 
 
Model  HT(9) HT(10) HT(11) HT(12) 
ln(GDPi) 2.5982*** 2.6227*** 2.6464*** 2.5129*** 
 (0.1875) (0.1865) (0.1891) (0.2130) 
ln(GDPj) 1.9852*** 1.9173*** 2.2953*** 1.9234*** 
 (0.2048) (0.2045) (0.2145) (0.2631) 
ln(POPi) -1.7436*** -1.7162*** -1.7485*** -1.6027*** 
 (0.2327) (0.2308) (0.2349) (0.2681) 
ln(POPj) -1.5930*** -1.5141*** -1.8785*** -1.4054*** 
 (0.2513) (0.2499) (0.2583) (0.3152) 
ln(Dist) -0.9277*** -0.9312*** -0.8701*** -1.0634*** 
 (0.3233) (0.3193) (0.3272) (0.3804) 
Colonyij 1.2106 1.2153 1.2542 1.1719 
 (1.2267) (1.2118) (1.2423) (1.4324) 
Common Lang 1.3157* 1.3188* 1.3310* 1.5299* 
 (0.7465) (0.7375) (0.7553) (0.8757) 
Island -1.1288** -1.0069* -1.0879* -0.9061 
 (0.5745) (0.5676) (0.5818) (0.6743) 
Border 0.1974 0.1228 0.1855 0.1583 
 (0.8716) (0.8610) (0.8823) (1.0194) 
ln(Areaij) 0.1269 0.1085 0.1141 0.1469 
 (0.1324) (0.1308) (0.1344) (0.1591) 
Common Coloniser 4.2548 4.4887 4.5291 3.6807 
  (3.8186) (3.7720) (3.8636) (4.4764) 
RTA 0.2539** 0.2048** 0.2957*** -0.1577 
 (0.0997) (0.0997) (0.0988) (0.1456) 
REG 0.2265***    
(catch-all) (0.0390)    
Credit Reg  0.1714***   
  (0.0208)   
Labor Reg   0.0189  
   (0.0232)  
Business Reg    0.0038 
    (0.0234) 
          
Obs 5055 5055 5017 4656 
chi2 4437 4496 4279 2227 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi.  Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Results 
on intercepts are not shown.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, clustering by 
country-pairs.   ***, ** and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
To sum up so far, we use several linear panel data estimators to assess the 
effects of natural barriers, RTA and regulatory environment on bilateral FDI in 
an augmented gravity model.  The various estimators have their own merits 
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and shortcomings.  Despite so, the qualitative conclusion is largely similar.  
Our empirical findings suggest that the gravity model fits our data fairly well.  
Geographical characteristics and cultural ties are essential FDI determinants, 
although they are not particularly robust to different samples used.  More 
importantly, both external institution – RTA and domestic regulatory 
environment are also significant determinants of bilateral FDI in both the 
intra-OECD and inter-OECD regions.   
 
This conclusion is encouraging from the economic development perspective.  
While we understand that FDI is growth-promoting, we provide empirical 
evidence to support that improving regulatory environment and being actively 
engaged in regional integration are two possible channels to promote FDI.  
More specifically, relaxing credit market regulations carries even more 
pronounced impacts.  These results have been controlled for physical and 
historical elements, like geography and culture, which are time-invarying and 
deterministic.   
 
To quantify the results we have for easy reference, the following tables show 
the impact of our key variables on FDI based on the Hausman and Taylor 
estimators.  Table  4.5.2-9 shows that if a source country k has a mutual 
membership of RTA with a destination country j, it is estimated that j would 
receive around 19.5% to 37.8% more FDI stock from country k.  The 
magnitude depends on whether country j is an OECD economy in our case.  
 
Table  4.5.2-9: Effect of RTA on FDI 
 
Model HT(5) e0.1785-1 = 19.5% 
Inter-OECD Region 
Model HT(6) 37.8% 
Model HT(9) 28.9% 
Intra-OECD Region 
Model HT(10) 22.7% 
 
 
Table  4.5.2-10 estimates the impact of REG and Credit Reg on bilateral FDI.  
In our sample, the standard deviations of the two variables are 1.15 and 2 
respectively.  The estimated impact, therefore, means that a one standard 
deviation improvement in the respective regulatory indices increases overall 
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received FDI stock by 30% - 40% accordingly.  The positive impact of 
improvements in domestic institutional environment on FDI is quite 
substantial.    
 
 
Table  4.5.2-10: Effect of REG and Credit Reg on FDI 
 
REG: Model HT(5) 33% 
Inter-OECD Region 
Credit Reg: Model HT(6) 40% 
REG: Model HT(9) 30% 
Intra-OECD Region 
Credit Reg: Model HT(10) 40% 
 
 
 
4.5.3 IV Estimations 
 
Finally, along the line of the existing literature on institution and growth, we 
tackle the potential endogeneity problem between regulation and FDI by means 
of IV estimation.  More specifically, we use the Baltagi (1981)’s EC2SLS 
estimator.  The hypothesis is that destination economies with less burdensome 
regulatory environment will be more likely to attract FDI.  Simultaneously, 
more FDI may also induce structural reform to improve business environment 
by reducing regulations.   
 
Before we discuss the IV estimation results, we deploy the Hausman 
specification test to test whether various measures of regulation correlate with 
the disturbance terms in our models.  Test details are in Appendix Section  A.6.  
The test results suggest that there is no evidence to show REG and Labor Reg 
are endogenous variables.  However, Credit Reg and Business Reg do 
correlate with the disturbance terms.  With the absence of endogeneity, using 
IV estimates or least square estimations yield consistent results.  However, if 
endogeneity does exist, only IV estimators provide consistent results.  In any 
case, we perform IV estimators for all 4 indices of regulatory environment to 
facilitate comparison.   
 
Following Alesina, et al. (2003) and Bénassy-Quéré, et al. (2007), we consider 
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using ethnic fragmentation, religion fragmentation, latitude of the economy and 
UK legal origin of the destination economies as instruments.  Sargan-Hansen 
test, as shown in Appendix Section  A.6 and in the results tables follow, 
supports that our instruments used are relevant.     
 
The estimation results using panel EC2SLS for the full sample and 
sub-samples are shown in Table  4.5.3-1 – Table  4.5.3-3.  Key gravity 
variables (GDP, population and distance) and variables measuring cultural and 
historical ties remain significantly associating with bilateral FDI.  Other 
geographical variables such as area, common border and island economy are 
no longer significant.  However, their effects are statistically significant in 
different sub-samples and behaving differently. 
 
On the effects of RTA, the results using the full sample show that the 
coefficients of the IV estimations are systematically larger than those 
previously obtained in various linear models, for example in the RE models (i.e. 
Models IV(1) – IV(4) vs. RE(1) – RE(4)).  Comparing the coefficients of RTA 
of the intra-OECD sample (i.e. Models IV(9) – IV(12)) vis-à-vis inter-OECD 
sample (i.e. Models IV(5) – IV(8)), the results generally suggest that RTA 
exerts stronger impact on inter-OECD bilateral FDI.     
 
The overall impact of regulation also turns out to be more significant in Models 
IV(1) – IV(4) after controlling for endogeneity.  One point to note is that the 
“catch-all’ index of REG consistently has larger coefficients than those of RTA 
in the full samples and both sub-samples.   
 
With respect to the three sub-indices, we find that the effects of both Credit 
Reg and Business Reg are statistically significant in both sub-samples (i.e. 
Model IV(6) vs. IV(10) and Model IV(8) vs. IV(12) respectively).  The effect 
of credit market regulation is more profound in the intra-OECD sample, 
whereas the effect of business regulations is greater in the inter-OECD sample.  
Labour Reg, on the other hand, only associates positively with FDI in the 
intra-OECD sample (i.e. Model IV(11)), whereas such an effect is not 
statistically significant in the inter-OECD sample at all (i.e. Model IV(7)).  In 
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sum, we find empirical evidence to show that regulatory environment 
positively and significantly relates to bilateral FDI, in particular to intra-OECD 
region.   
 
One may wonder if RTA is also a potential endogenous variable, such that 
economies with more bilateral FDI flows in-between are more likely to engage 
in an RTA or vice versa.  However, as Rose (2004) reckons, there is no 
theoretical basis for choosing an appropriate instrument for RTA.  Despite so, 
we have attempted to use the same instruments as in our IV estimations for 
considering both RTA and regulation as endogenous.  Nevertheless, the 
Sargan-Hansen test rejects the validity of the instruments for RTA.  Hence, we 
do not show this set of IV estimations here.   
 
In sum, we find that even having considered the potential endogeneity problem 
of regulation, our qualitative conclusion does not change.  That said, regional 
integration and regulatory environment of the destination economy do matter 
for bilateral FDI.  However, we should note that our IV estimation results tend 
to inflate the coefficients of the variables of our key interest when compared to 
those obtained in our linear panel data models.  Although the Sargan-Hansen 
test supports the validity of our instruments, we should be very cautious when 
interpreting the IV estimation results.   
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Table  4.5.3-1: IV Estimation Results – Full Sample 
 
Model IV(1) IV(2) IV(3) IV(4) 
ln(GDPi) 2.9091*** 3.0960*** 3.1114*** 2.6777*** 
 (0.0693) (0.0721) (0.0624) (0.1547) 
ln(GDPj) 0.9511*** 0.8644*** 1.5215*** 0.6267*** 
 (0.1019) (0.1099) (0.0778) (0.1854) 
ln(POPi) -1.7141*** -1.8497*** -1.8832*** -1.3497*** 
 (0.0773) (0.0823) (0.0695) (0.1720) 
ln(POPj) -0.0435 0.1302 -0.6351*** 0.7029*** 
 (0.1129) (0.1274) (0.0832) (0.2439) 
ln(Dist) -1.3519*** -1.3053*** -1.2971*** -1.3895*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0916) (0.0760) (0.1890) 
Colonyij 1.5451*** 1.5130*** 1.5608*** 1.4654** 
 (0.3210) (0.3546) (0.2907) (0.7326) 
Common Lang 0.7088*** 0.7065*** 0.6985*** 0.7772* 
 (0.1920) (0.2119) (0.1753) (0.4373) 
Island -0.0419 0.0428 -0.0049 0.2668 
 (0.1436) (0.1582) (0.1310) (0.3329) 
Border 0.1733 0.0677 0.1647 0.1590 
 (0.2698) (0.2979) (0.2441) (0.6153) 
Landlock 0.3016** 0.5280*** 0.3838*** 0.0506 
 (0.1242) (0.1360) (0.1141) (0.2810) 
ln(Areaij) 0.0252 0.0133 0.0160 -0.1734* 
 (0.0370) (0.0409) (0.0338) (0.0929) 
Common Coloniser 4.1363** 4.3895** 4.0915** 4.0523 
 (1.8264) (2.0172) (1.6486) (4.1771) 
RTA 0.2545*** 0.3410*** 0.4330*** 0.2497* 
 (0.0823) (0.0857) (0.0802) (0.1409) 
0.6289***    REG  
(catch-all) (0.0683)    
Credit Reg  0.6413***   
  (0.0641)   
Labor Reg   0.2292***  
   (0.0585)  
Business Reg    1.5933*** 
    (0.2150) 
          
Obs 8278 8279 8062 7635 
chi2 8617 7447 8679 2073 
p-value [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000] 
     
Sargan-Hansen Stat 1.0160 1.3190 2.1500 0.0040 
Chi-sq(1) p-value [0.3135] [0.2507] [0.1426] [0.9509] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi. Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Intercepts 
are not reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Discussion on Sargan-Hansen tests is at 
Appendix Section  A.6.  The IV estimators are EC2SLS estimators.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table  4.5.3-2: IV Estimation Results – Inter-OECD Sample 
 
Model IV(5) IV(6) IV(7) IV(8) 
ln(GDPi) 2.6341*** 2.7288*** 2.7895*** 2.8227*** 
 (0.1120) (0.1000) (0.1051) (0.1233) 
ln(GDPj) 1.3140*** 1.3843*** 1.6840*** -0.0464 
 (0.1522) (0.1152) (0.1176) (0.2925) 
ln(POPi) -1.3712*** -1.4379*** -1.4279*** -1.4655*** 
 (0.1309) (0.1161) (0.1182) (0.1332) 
ln(POPj) -0.3045* -0.3605*** -0.6173*** 1.2836*** 
 (0.1789) (0.1330) (0.1315) (0.3322) 
ln(Dist) -1.6428*** -1.6255*** -1.6414*** -1.7587*** 
 (0.1629) (0.1427) (0.1409) (0.1556) 
Colonyij 2.2773*** 2.2086*** 2.2604*** 2.3454*** 
 (0.5731) (0.5013) (0.4968) (0.5414) 
Common Lang 0.2764 0.3193 0.2364 0.2080 
 (0.3249) (0.2845) (0.2840) (0.3084) 
Island 0.6342** 0.5893*** 0.7966*** 0.9622*** 
 (0.2473) (0.2185) (0.2180) (0.2487) 
Border 2.9837*** 3.0543*** 3.1575*** 3.3006*** 
 (0.7996) (0.6991) (0.6921) (0.7558) 
Landlock 0.5325** 0.5636** 0.5926*** 0.7021*** 
 (0.2540) (0.2228) (0.2216) (0.2441) 
ln(Areaij) -0.0095 -0.0316 -0.0839 -0.0371 
 (0.0723) (0.0637) (0.0646) (0.0730) 
RTA 0.3179** 0.4960*** 0.3410* 0.1549 
 (0.1392) (0.1354) (0.1761) (0.2234) 
0.3881***    REG 
(catch-all) (0.1134)    
Credit Reg  0.2045***   
  (0.0474)   
Labor Reg   0.1093  
   (0.1140)  
Business Reg    1.7151*** 
    (0.2924) 
          
Obs 3511 3512 3329 3258 
chi2 2848 3087 2536 1489 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
      
Sargan-Hansen Stat 0.3480  0.2970  3.2390  0.6910  
Chi-sq(1) p-value [0.5553] [0.5856] [0.1980] [0.4057] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi. Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Dummy 
for common coloniser is dropped from the specification due to nil sample.  Intercepts are not 
reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Discussion on Sargan-Hansen tests is at 
Appendix Section  A.6.  The IV estimators are EC2SLS estimators.  ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table  4.5.3-3: IV Estimation Results – Intra-OECD Sample 
 
Model IV(9) IV(10) IV(11) IV(12) 
ln(GDPi) 3.1775*** 3.3599*** 3.3555*** 2.9452*** 
 (0.0891) (0.0872) (0.0644) (0.1849) 
ln(GDPj) 1.2292*** 0.9567*** 1.3380*** 1.6504*** 
 (0.1909) (0.1746) (0.1258) (0.2886) 
ln(POPi) -2.0327*** -2.0861*** -2.2306*** -1.7338*** 
 (0.0981) (0.0954) (0.0695) (0.2060) 
ln(POPj) -0.3957** 0.0911 -0.5668*** -0.5924** 
 (0.2007) (0.1908) (0.1283) (0.3012) 
ln(Dist) -0.9983*** -1.0466*** -0.9990*** -0.9164*** 
 (0.1090) (0.1059) (0.0764) (0.2427) 
Colonyij 0.9018** 0.6410* 0.8330*** 0.8044 
 (0.3906) (0.3789) (0.2706) (0.8792) 
Common Lang 1.2982*** 0.9868*** 0.9656*** 1.3920** 
 (0.2488) (0.2438) (0.1781) (0.5594) 
Island -0.7376*** -0.3342* -1.0022*** -0.7437* 
 (0.1919) (0.1879) (0.1380) (0.4326) 
Border 0.0037 0.0653 0.1807 0.1102 
 (0.2870) (0.2780) (0.2007) (0.6453) 
Landlock -0.0095 -0.0269 -0.0267 -0.2935 
 (0.1536) (0.1499) (0.1097) (0.3369) 
ln(Areaij) -0.0427 -0.1572*** -0.0208 -0.1949* 
 (0.0466) (0.0469) (0.0325) (0.1103) 
Common Coloniser 4.9015*** 4.7629*** 4.8501*** 4.8709 
 (1.6861) (1.6314) (1.1663) (3.8049) 
RTA 0.2730*** 0.0423 0.5872*** 0.0693 
 (0.0998) (0.1211) (0.0968) (0.1708) 
0.5252***    REG 
(catch-all) (0.0863)    
Credit Reg  1.4175***   
  (0.1287)   
Labor Reg   0.5879***  
   (0.0550)  
Business Reg    0.8464*** 
    (0.1650) 
          
Obs 4767 4767 4733 4377 
chi2 5641 4581 7297 1948 
p-value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
     
Sargan-Hansen Stat 1.4890  0.0040  0.0850  1.9460  
Chi-sq(1) p-value [0.2224] [0.9505] [0.7705] [0.1630] 
 
The dependent variable is lnfdi. Regional dummies with year effects are included.  Intercepts 
are not reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Discussion on Sargan-Hansen tests is at 
Appendix Section  A.6.  The IV estimators are EC2SLS estimators. ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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4.6 Conclusion  
 
In this Chapter, we investigate the impacts of natural barriers, “at-the-border” 
regional integration and domestic regulatory environment in the destination 
economy on FDI.  Our study demonstrates that all three factors do matter for 
bilateral inward FDI stock.   
 
The existing literature argues that favourable institutional quality of the 
destination economy attracts more FDI.  Nevertheless, these studies are 
usually based on cross-sectional data.  Not only is the use of panel data 
limited, country-specific characteristics of the source and destination 
economies are not controlled simultaneously.  Furthermore, there is not yet 
any study specifically devoted to the impact of domestic regulatory 
environment on FDI.  On the impact of regional integration on FDI, as 
proxied by mutual membership in an RTA, earlier studies show mixed results.  
We are also interested in examining the impact of such external institution 
vis-à-vis domestic institution on FDI.   
 
We use a bilateral FDI stock dataset of 60 FDI destination economies sourcing 
from OECD economies during 1985 - 2006.  The augmented gravity 
framework fits our data quite well.  Our empirical results suggest that 
geographical, historical and cultural factors generally explain bilateral FDI 
significantly, even after controlling for unobserved country-pair heterogeneity 
and time effect.  However, the effects of geographical determinants on FDI 
are differently felt in the intra-OECD and inter-OECD regions.  
 
Panel data analysis shows that a lax regulatory environment and an RTA are 
positively associating with inter- and intra-OECD bilateral FDI.  These 
qualitative results survive when we use different estimation techniques, 
including FE, RE, FGLS and Hausman and Taylor estimations.  All 
sub-indices of regulation show the results that less burdensome regulatory 
environment is favourable to FDI.  With regard to specific type of regulation, 
results of credit market regulations are most robust to different estimators.  
Results on labour market regulation and business regulation, though positive, 
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are insignificant in some cases.  These results on one hand suggest that credit 
market constraints are perhaps one of the key concerns for foreign investors.  
This also echoes the view that financial development is important to economic 
development (amongst others, see Rajan and Zingales (1998)).  On the other 
hand, labour market rigidity and business regulation may not be such prime 
concerns for foreign investors as one anticipates.  According to our Hausman 
and Taylor estimation results, engaging in an RTA could possibly lead to more 
bilateral FDI stock by 19.5%-37.8%.  Improving domestic regulatory 
environment by, say, around 1.5 to 2 points in our sample, bilateral FDI stock 
could increase by some 30% to 40%.     
 
To investigate the potential endogeneity problem of regulation, we also carry 
out IV estimation.  For the inter-OECD region, RTA is significantly 
associating with FDI and shows a more significant impact than that in the 
intra-OECD sample.  For the intra-OECD region, regulatory environment of 
the destination economies plays a more significant role.  Indeed, using IV 
estimations reinforces further the significance of regulatory environment of the 
destination economy in attracting FDI than the results obtained in panel data 
linear models where endogeneity is not accounted for.   
 
Regionalism remains a key issue, in particular during the financial turmoil the 
world is experiencing.  Despite global trade imbalances, world leaders remain 
committed to prevent the surge of protectionism.  The empirical results 
presented here may add some support on this commitment.  Regionalism does 
not only foster trade.  As shown here, it also leads to more FDI.  
Furthermore, it also strengthens the investment linkage between groups of 
economies with different stages of economic development and institutional 
environments. 
 
As a strategy for long-term growth, domestic structural reform efforts have 
been made across the board to improve domestic institutional frameworks so 
that the efficient functioning of markets can be supported.  Our sub-sample 
analysis also demonstrates that even amongst the developed economies (i.e. the 
intra-OECD sample), regulatory environment still plays a significant role in 
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attracting foreign capital.  In particular, when the comparative advantages of 
the economy do not lie on the production costs, institutional strengths and 
differences turn out to be more essential in affecting foreign investors’ 
decisions.  As shown in our findings, regulatory environment affects 
intra-OECD bilateral FDI equally as (or even more than that) in the 
inter-OECD sub-sample.   
 
From a policy implication perspective, this paper highlights the importance of 
removing “behind-the-border” regulatory barriers to attract foreign investment 
irrespective to the stage of development of the economies.  In our work, we 
nevertheless do not provide enough evidence to conclude that RTAs are 
necessarily desirable.  In particular, we have not considered the cost and trade 
diversion brought about by RTAs.  However, our findings support that 
promoting regional integration may also open up a channel of development, i.e. 
to attract FDI.   
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CHAPTER 5 : INSTITUTIONS AS THE SOURCE OF 
CROSS-COUNTRY ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCES – A STOCHASTIC 
PRODUCTION FRONTIER APPROACH* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 29th General Conference of International 
Association for Research in Income and Wealth (IARIW) on August 20-26, 2006 at Joensuu, 
Finland.  During the meeting, the author received useful comments which are duly reflected in 
the present version.   
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Previous Chapters have attempted to provide some empirical evidence on the 
interrelationships between institutions and economic development from 
different dimensions (such as economic growth, economic reform and FDI).  
We essentially try to argue that institutions matter to different economic 
outcomes.  This last Chapter discusses the role of institutions in cross-country 
economic performances.   
 
In Chapter 2, we have investigated the effect of institutions on economic 
growth.  The key research questions there are asking primarily asking do and 
what institutions matter.  Nevertheless, institutions are not production inputs.  
The mechanism of how they affect output is not demonstrated.  The existing 
literature suggests that institutions may affect productivity, as measured by 
total factor productivity (TFP) obtained in standard growth accounting 
framework.  This strand of literature argues that cross-country economic 
performances are due to different rates of technical change.  However, one 
should note that such TFP obtained as residual from growth accounting 
implicitly assumes that input allocations are efficient in all economies.  This 
assumption is indeed fairly strong in cross-country analysis.   
 
In this light, this Chapter proposes to measure technical efficiency instead of 
TFP growth.  We propose that institutional differences affect inputs 
allocations, thereby resulting in diverse economic performances across 
countries.   
 
Earlier work by Olson (1996) succinctly points out that an institution is 
probably one of the most important factors to explain the consistent growth 
divergence among countries.  He argues, 
 
“… large differences in per capita income across countries 
cannot be explained by differences in access to the world’s stock 
of productive knowledge or to its capital markets, by differences 
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in the ratio of population to land or natural resources, or by 
differences in the quality of marketable human capital or 
personal culture.”  
 
His empirical findings show that not all poor economies grow faster than the 
rich ones as what the theory of convergence has predicted.  Even worse, the 
gap in per capita incomes between the relatively poor and relatively rich 
countries has increased over time.  Prichett (1997) estimates that the 
proportional gap in GDP per capita between the richest and poorest countries 
has grown more than five-fold from 1870 to 1990.  The proportional gap 
between the richest group of countries and the poorest grew from 3 in 1820 to 
19 in 1998 (see Maddison (2001)).  
 
North (1990) argues that all those determinants of growth – human capital, 
technological diffusion and innovations as traditional growth theories 
suggested – shed no light on the source of growth because they are growth.  
North and Thomas (1973) note that,  
 
“We are left wondering: if all that is required for economic growth is 
investment and innovation, why have some societies missed this 
desirable outcome? … The factors we have listed (innovation, 
economies of scale, education, capital accumulation, etc.) are not 
causes of growth; they are growth. … Growth will simply not occur 
unless the existing economic organization is efficient. Individuals must 
be lured by incentives to undertake the socially desirable activities. 
Some mechanism must be devised to bring social and private rates of 
return into closer parity.” 
 
A better understanding of the source of growth may be efficiency.  Countries 
are “inefficient” in the sense that there is a considerable discrepancy between 
private benefit and social benefit whenever an economic transaction occurs1. 
Given an institutional arrangement, undertaking an economic activity may be 
socially profitable, but individuals rationally will not do it if private cost 
                                                 
1 North and Thomas (1973) suggest that this discrepancy is caused and shaped by the 
institutional structure, especially when property rights are poorly defined.   
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exceeds private benefit.  Hence, the gains from transaction cannot be realized.  
In other words, there actually exists a Pareto optimal (more efficient) outcome, 
but it cannot be achieved.  It is, thus, interesting to investigate how much 
institutional rigidity could explain such disparity.   
 
Against North (1990)’s analytical framework aforementioned, estimating 
technical efficiency (TE) may help explain the diverse cross-country 
performances.  Hultberg, Nadiri, and Sickles (1999), while measuring 
international TPF growth, also concur that technology diffusion and technical 
inefficiency are possibly caused by institutional rigidities.  Unlike the 
previous work, on the methodology front, we propose to adopt the stochastic 
production frontier (SPF) model.  This technique allows us to compare the 
level of technical inefficiency across countries vis-à-vis the global best practice.  
In addition, the model can also incorporate explanatory factors of technical 
inefficiency, namely, institutions in our case.   
 
Similar “benchmarking” exercise is not new in cross-country analysis.  The 
standard way is to assume the United States to be the best practice and be used 
for comparison.  These studies then address how far the poor economies are 
falling behind the best practice.  While the key focus of these studies is the 
comparative performances vis-à-vis the US, time-varying “best practice” is 
often neglected.  In our study, we do not impose such comparison.  Instead, 
we estimate the world frontier without prior assumption.  In other words, we 
allow the global stochastic production frontier to shift over time.  
 
With regard to the source of technical inefficiency, we consider to test the 
effects of institutions, human capital and openness.  The literature survey we 
discussed in Chapter 2 has set out the competing debate amongst these three 
parameters.  In an alternative framework as we now propose, we will see if 
we can contribute some renewed empirical evidence to the debate – i.e. 
whether institutions, human capital and/or openness explain cross-country 
economic performances, measured in terms of technical efficiency. 
 
In short, there are three research objectives of this Chapter.  Firstly, instead of 
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using TFP measurement obtained from growth-accounting to understand the 
divergence of cross-country economic performances, we propose to use the 
stochastic production frontier model to measure technical efficiency.  It does 
not assume away the inefficiency resulted from input misallocation.  Yet, the 
technique allows us to construct a TFP index if we so wish.  Subject to the 
model specification, the model can also capture any inter-temporal changes of 
both technological progress and technical efficiency. 
 
Secondly, while understanding the fact that an institution is not a production 
input, we attempt to investigate exactly what role institutions play in the 
production process.  Based on North’s seminal work on institutions and 
economic development, we propose to measure the impact of institutions on 
cross-country technical efficiency, i.e. the efficiency of input allocations across 
economies.  
 
Thirdly, we revisit the competing debate between the institutional view 
vis-à-vis the impacts of openness and human capital on economic development.  
From our empirical results, we will evaluate whether cross-country technical 
efficiency can be explained by any or all of these three factors.        
 
This Chapter is organised as the following.  First, we will survey the previous 
relevant literature of the effects of institution, openness, human capital on 
productivity in Section  5.2.  We outline the fundamental concepts of 
stochastic production frontier in Section  5.3.  The model we adopted for 
estimation is further elaborated in Section  5.4.  Data used are discussed in 
Section  5.5.  Section  5.6 presents the estimation results.  We conclude in 
Section  5.7. 
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5.2 Literature Survey: Human Capital, Openness and Institutions as 
Sources of Efficiency 
 
Productivity is the source of growth and deep determinants of cross-country 
economic development.  Sources of TFP growth are considered to provide an 
opportunity for enhancing general welfare of the society.  The large and 
growing literature consistently provides support to the claim that productivity, 
rather than factor accumulation, is the key explanation for international income 
disparities.     
 
Productivity, frequently measured in terms of TFP, can be further segregated 
into technical progress and efficiency change.  The former represents the 
country’s knowledge as to how factors of production can best be combined.  
This can be the results of innovations or learning and imitation.  Efficiency, 
on the other hand, represents how effective a country’s factors are actually used.  
A distinct point between the two dimensions worth noting is that the presence 
of obsolete production techniques does not necessarily imply a technology gap.  
In fact, it may reflect a situation in which producers are discouraged from 
adopting best-practice techniques.  The presence of suboptimal technologies 
may be a symptom of poor efficiency instead of resulting from unavailable 
technology.   
 
Most of the existing empirical literature focuses on the source of TFP.  From 
these empirical studies, nevertheless, we are unable to tell whether the 
differences in cross-country TFP growth are the results of technical change or 
efficiency change.  In fact, there are views that technology is quite readily 
available, especially in this globalised era.  The differences in economic 
performances across countries are believed to be the results of technical 
inefficiency.   
 
Efficiency becomes more prominent in recent studies of economic 
development.  Echoing the view of North on the role of efficiency differences 
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as the source of diverge economic performances, Parente and Prescott (2005) 
lately also develop a theory to explain international income levels.  From a 
historical perspective, they develop a relative efficiency theory of economic 
development to explain the evolution of international income levels in the last 
millennium.   
 
The essence of their theory provides a sensible link between efficiency and 
institutions.  They argue that a country starts to experience sustained increases 
in its living standard when production efficiency reaches a critical point.  
Countries reach this critical level of efficiency at different dates not because 
they have access to different stocks of knowledge, but rather because they 
differ in the amount of society-imposed constraints on the technology choices 
of their citizenry.  Their theory argues that country-specific TFP, which they 
refer to as a theory of relative efficiency, is a consequence of policy differences. 
Their theory predicts that after a country reaches a critical point of efficiency, it 
begins to grow.  Its income gap with the leader eventually stops increasing.  
Nevertheless, to reduce such a gap (i.e. to improve efficiency), the late starter 
has to use resources in the modern production function by making 
improvements in its policies and institutions.  Growth miracles, as observed in 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are also the results of large increase in a late 
starter’s relative efficiency.  Parente and Prescott (2005) provide an essential 
theoretical foundation of our empirical investigation, even though technically 
speaking, we adopt a more refined measurement of cross-country technical 
efficiency instead of TFP, which we will discuss in the next section.   
 
While efficiency is essential to close income gap, it is natural henceforth for us 
to explore the potential factors determining efficiency2.  Sources of 
international technical efficiency are not frequently explored.  Therefore, we 
will consider key factors previously examined in the productivity literature and 
see if they are applicable in our context.  In our study, we consider three key 
dimensions: (i) human capital; (ii) openness, and (iii) institutions and 
macroeconomic policies.  We will review the arguments and the empirical 
                                                 
2 See Isaksson (2007a) for a comprehensive survey on the sources of productivity. 
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evidence put forth in the literature in turn.  
 
5.2.1 Human Capital 
 
Human capital enhances productivity in two possible ways.  On one hand, it 
improves average labour productivity.  On the other hand, it strengthens the 
innovation capacity and promotes technological progress.  When summarising 
recent empirical work on the relationship between human capital and economic 
growth, Isaksson (2002) concludes that empirical results are diverse with 
respect to statistical significance (significant or not), magnitude (small or large) 
and sign (positive or negative) of the estimated parameter.  Incorporating 
human capital or not in the production process produces mixed and somehow 
puzzling empirical results.  For relatively rich countries, human capital is 
important, while its effect is negative for the relatively poor ones. 
 
In terms of empirical evidence, Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) refine their own 
established model in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) by allowing for different 
functional forms for predicting TFP growth.  Studying 84 countries between 
1960 and 1995, they find a positive role for human capital as an engine of 
innovation, as well as a facilitator of TFP catch-up.  The predictive capacity 
of the model seems very good because 22 of 27 countries that were forecast to 
fall behind did in fact do so.  
 
Along the line of Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006), Vandenbussche, 
Aghion, and Meghir (2006) specifically develops a theoretical model to 
understand the ambiguous effect of human capital on technological 
improvements.  They argue that labour composition determines the form of 
technological improvements, either innovation or imitation, in an economy.  
Innovation requires relatively more skilled labour, whereas unskilled labour 
better suits imitations.  A country’s level of technological development 
therefore depends on the endogenous labour allocations across these two 
activities.  The authors opine that both the economy’s distance to the 
technological frontier and on the composition of its human capital determine 
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economic development.  Skilled labour (i.e. human capital) is 
growth-enhancing only when the country is proximate to the frontier.  
 
5.2.2 Openness: Trade, FDI and Financial Integration 
 
Isaksson (2007a) reckons that knowledge is only created by a few leading 
technologically advanced developed economies.  Elsewhere, technology is 
just being acquired.  Identifying the channels through which technology can 
be transferred effectively is thus important.  Amongst different forms of 
technology transfer, international trade, in particular imports, and FDI have a 
relatively high knowledge content embodied.  Thus understandably openness 
is treated as the source of learning.  It then presents indirect effects on 
productivity.  Trade liberalisation may lead to increased competition and 
reduce a firm’s X-inefficiency.  Foreign competition may also lead domestic 
producers to expand or cease operation to improve overall efficiency.  As 
Tybout (1992) recognises, demand shifts accompanied by trade liberalisation, 
market flexibility (entry and exit) and the nature of competition may all affect 
the net effect of liberalisation on TFP. 
 
FDI is also generally viewed as the key channel for the transfer of advanced 
technology from industrialised to developing economies.  It is also believed to 
generate positive externalities in the form of knowledge spillovers to domestic 
firms.  However, foreign capital may also crowd-out domestic investment, 
replace domestic production and reduce competition.  Hence, the net effect of 
technology transfer and efficiency gain as a result of openness is not definite.   
 
Empirical studies of whether FDI spurs productivity are mostly micro-level in 
nature.  Granér and Isaksson (2001) find that both mixed and pure foreign 
ownership is positively correlated with productivity growth.  Keller (2004) 
uses case studies to show large positive FDI spillovers.  On the contrary, 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) show a negative effect from FDI on productivity 
among Venezuelan plants, explaining that foreign firms recruit most skilled 
workers and hence deprive domestic plants of their services.  Cases in Hanson 
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(2001) also show that spillovers from foreign capital are limited.   
 
Also using SPF, Nourzad (2008) investigates the effect of FDI at macro-level 
technical inefficiency.  His results suggest that increased FDI increases 
potential output in both developed and developing countries with the effect 
being more profound in the former.  Furthermore, FDI reduces technical 
inefficiencies in developed economies, but not in those developing ones.   
 
In a nutshell, these empirical results point to a general conclusion that FDI only 
has a positive impact on TFP growth in industrialised countries, while such 
positive results are harder to observe in developing countries.  Isaksson 
(2007a) explains that it may be because technology transfer can be costly.  
Different absorptive capacity across countries may also help explain such 
pattern.   
 
This also suggests that openness and human capital may have to interact 
together to have any impact on productivity.  Mayer (2001) attempts to 
interact technology transfer with human capital in a cross-country growth 
regression.  The proxy of absorptive capacity is captured by an interaction 
term between human capital and imports of machinery and equipment (as 
percentage of GDP).  During the studied period of 1970-1990 in 53 
developing countries, the results show that the interaction term has a significant 
coefficient, meaning human capital is significant for technology adoption.  
 
Separately, Isaksson (2001) uses data on 73 countries between 1960 and 1994 
and shows that trade can be viewed as a significant carrier of knowledge or 
technology unless the recipient countries have the necessary level of human 
capital.  Miller and Upadhyay (2000), covering 83 countries over the period 
1960 and 1989, present a statistically significant impact of the interaction of 
exports and human capital on productivity.  More specifically, they argue that 
the interactive term works differently in countries with different income levels.  
At low-income levels, human capital is negatively associated with TFP growth, 
while for middle- and high-income countries the effect is positive.  
Nevertheless, in the case of Harrison (1996), while analysing 51 countries 
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between 1960 and 1987, shows that such interaction terms are seldom 
statistically significant.  
 
In sum, empirical studies prevalently show that openness has positive effects 
for industrialised countries, while not necessarily for the case of developing 
countries.  Again, this leads one to suspect that institutional quality may affect 
absorptive capacity, which in turn affects productivity growth.  Although the 
trade channel could in principal facilitate technology transfer, the absorptive 
capacity of the recipient country, mainly depending on human capital and 
capital intensity, determines the magnitude of technology transfer.  
 
Other than trade openness and FDI, financial openness also raises the issue of 
financing capital accumulation, which may have repercussions for productivity 
growth (Isaksson (2007a)).  In economies where the financial system is well 
developed, investment opportunities can readily be seized, resources are more 
likely to be allocated optimally.  Specialisation can thus be promoted.  
However, in developing countries with less sophisticated financial systems, 
firms may have to rely on retained earnings for investment or forego the 
opportunity.  Financial constraints therefore may prevent poor countries from 
taking full advantage of technology transfer.  Financial repression, often 
exemplified by negative or artificially low real interest rates, thwarts incentives 
to save.  It also distorts the efficient allocation of savings into investment and 
hence brings negative effect on TFP growth. 
  
The association between financial development and productivity growth 
receives great research interests lately.  Fisman and Love (2004) study the 
relationship between industrial growth (covering 37 developed and developing 
industries with good growth opportunities in 42 countries between 1980 and 
1990) and financial development.  Based on Rajan and Zingales (1998)’s 
framework, they conclude that financial development spurs productivity 
growth.  At the macro-level, Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) 
study 71 countries between 1960 and 1995.  They find that financial 
development is a threshold variable, which affects convergence mainly through 
TFP growth rather than capital accumulation.   
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Recent studies also suggest that there are many channels through which 
financial openness can have a positive impact on productivity growth.  For 
example, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2008) argue that financial openness 
could have a positive impact on TFP growth because they lead to more efficient 
resource allocation as Mishkin (2006) suggests.  More specifically, the 
authors find that de jure capital account openness has a robust positive effect 
on TFP growth.  The effect of de facto financial integration, measured by the 
stock of external liabilities to GDP, on TFP growth is less clear.  FDI and 
portfolio equity liabilities boost TFP growth while external debt is actually 
negatively correlated with TFP growth.  They explain that financial openness 
might affect the return to capital, thereby leading to changes in the entry and 
exit decisions of firms/plants.  Aggregate factor productivity will increase 
because new plants are more productive than exiting plants.  This reallocation 
from less productive to more productive plants would ultimately increase total 
factor productivity with no significant gains in employment.  These 
productivity gains from both learning and selection effects may also have to 
spread over longer periods.  It may turn out the net effect on TFP seems 
insignificant. 
 
5.2.3 Institution and Macroeconomic Policies 
 
The institution view argues that differences in efficiency across countries are 
the results of the underlying market-friendly institutions, including the set of 
formal and informal constraints that shape an individual’s ability to act 
productively and cooperatively in the society.  The role of institutions ensures 
efficient allocation of resources across sectors.  On the other hand, policy 
instruments may also compensate for weak underlying institutions.   
 
According to Isaksson (2007a)’s survey, the existing literature generally 
highlights three main institutional issues, namely, (i) enforcement of property 
rights (encourages investment), (ii) constraints on the actions of elitist, political 
and other groups with power (thus reduce risks of expropriation of incomes and 
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others’ investments), and (iii) equal opportunity for broad segments of society 
(e.g. enhanced investment in human capital and participation in productive 
activities).  Theories argue that better security of property rights creates more 
incentives for savings and investment, leading to TFP growth.  As defined in 
Chapter 2, we consider institutions as a measure composed of economic and 
political institutions, macroeconomic policies and regulations.     
 
Openness, policy and institution are three typical deep determinants of 
productivity growth.  Empirical studies frequently test their competing roles 
simultaneously.  Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) claim that the way to measure 
trade matters to the empirical results.  They use real openness (i.e. as 
predicted trade shares estimated based on gravity model), instead of trade share 
to GDP, and find a strong positive and statistically significant effect on 
productivity.  Their results remain robust after controlling for geography and 
institutional quality.  Nevertheless, Bosworth and Collins (2003), in respect of 
84 countries during 1960-2000, show that trade renders insignificant effect in 
the presence of institutional quality.  One possible explanation is that macro 
studies mask the heterogeneity bias.  In reality, trade liberalisation might only 
benefit large firms.  The removal of protective measures could be harmful for 
smaller enterprises.  The net effect may therefore become insignificant.  
 
Hall and Jones (1999), as previously discussed in Chapter 2, strongly believe 
that the primary and fundamental determinant of a country’s long-run 
economic performance (as measured by output per worker) is its social 
infrastructure.  They argue that differences in social infrastructure cause large 
differences in capital accumulation, educational attainment and productivity, 
resulting in huge income disparities across countries.  Nevertheless, Glaeser, 
et al. (2004) suggest that human capital may be more fundamental.   
 
More specifically in terms of political regime, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) 
appear to favour dictatorships in terms of mobilising savings.  However, the 
authors also recognise that methodological limitations, such as endogeneity 
problem of institutions and economic development, may hamper one to draw 
reliable conclusion.  In the empirical work of Ulubasoglu and Doucouliagos 
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(2004), their results support that both political and economic institutional 
variables are important to TFP.  Their results show that higher levels of 
democracy have a positive and statistically significant effect on TFP and 
human capital.  Using both economic and political freedom variables in the 
estimations, their results show that these two variables have positive effects on 
TFP.  
 
Loko and Diouf (2009) consider altogether the effects of macroeconomic 
stability (in terms of inflation), FDI, trade openness and business environment 
on TFP in Maghreb countries in a dynamic panel data setting.  They attempt 
to test the complementary effect of policies to trade openness following Chang, 
Kaltani, and Loayaza (2005).  Their results demonstrate that macroeconomic 
stability, openness and the level of education are all important for productivity 
growth.  In particular, higher inflation hampers productivity gains 
significantly, confirming the negative impact of macroeconomic instability.  
Notwithstanding, their three alternative measures of institutions – the degree of 
regulation of credit, labor, and business; law and order; and the economic 
freedom index – all point to the importance of institutions to high TFP growth.  
 
On regulations, its effect on productivity appears to be straightforward.  A less 
regulatory environment is conducive to a more competitive environment, 
thereby promoting productivity and efficiency growth.  Stringent regulation is 
a hindrance to technology adoption and innovation, possibly because it reduces 
competitive pressures, technology spillovers and the entry of new high-tech 
firms.  Crafts (2006) argues that regulation can be thought of as rules imposed 
by the State.  Such rule can be used to correct market failures through acting 
to reduce the costs of negative externalities or imperfections of information by 
providing insurance or public goods.  However, such action also typically 
imposes costs on the private sector.  So there is a danger of excessive 
regulation where additional costs exceeded extra benefits.  All in all, the 
effectiveness of regulation depends on enforcement as well as legislation.    
 
One of the empirical studies investigating the effect of regulation and the 
institutional environment on productivity is Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel, et al. 
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(2002).  They note that, across OECD countries, growth paths have become 
increasingly disparate in the past decade.  They suggest two possible reasons: 
(i) differences in productivity patterns of certain high-tech industries and (ii) 
differences in the adoption of information and communications technology 
(ICT).  They find that stringent regulatory settings in the product market 
negatively affect TFP.  In addition, labour market regulations that induce high 
hiring and firing costs also have a negative effect on TFP.  In particular, such 
negative effects are worse for firms in countries which are far from the 
technological leader.   
 
Based on the World Bank’s investment climate survey in five transition 
economies – the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
Bastos and Nasir (2004) similarly conclude that productivity differences across 
countries can be explained largely by differences in the investment climate, e.g. 
policy, institutional and regulatory environment, in which businesses operate.  
In particular, competition seems to be the most important factor behind 
productivity performance, followed in the second place by infrastructure, while 
rent predation (e.g. corruption) occupies the third place.  
 
To sum up, we have reviewed some of the recent theoretical and mostly 
empirical literature, discussing the sources of productivity in this Section.  
The deep determinants of productivity include human capital, openness and 
institutions.  Studies examining the effects of these factors alone do not bring 
conclusive evidence.  Conflicting results are often found between developed 
and developing economies.  The literature suggests that one would expect the 
determinants of productivity growth in technological leaders and recipients to 
be different (i.e. their relative positions in the global technology frontier 
matter).  However, exactly how much the less developed economies are 
falling behind the technological leaders is not clear.  By its very own nature, 
TFP per se does not allow us separately to understand how technical change 
and efficiency change take place.  We fail to know if the economy does not 
“catch-up” because of the barriers of technological adoption or inefficient 
allocation of resources.  In this regard, we consider an alternative 
measurement technique – i.e. stochastic production frontier – to estimate the 
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efficiency change across countries.   
 
5.3 Fundamentals of Stochastic Production Frontier (SPF) 
 
To estimate the efficiency of production, Farrell (1957) suggests that the 
efficiency of an individual cross-section, say a firm, consists of two 
components: (i) technical efficiency, measuring the ability of a firm to obtain 
maximal output from a given set of inputs; (ii) allocative efficiency, measuring 
the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their 
respective prices.  In a cross-country context, our primary research interests 
lie on the measurement of technical efficiency.  In this section, we will discuss 
the basis of our estimation methodology, i.e. stochastic production frontier 
(SPF), and present a brief survey of some of its applications.   
 
Generally speaking, efficiency measurement relies on estimating a “global” 
production frontier of a number of cross-sections.  Data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) and stochastic frontiers are two convention methods for such purpose.  
Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998) compare the merits and characteristics between 
these two, which are summarised in Table  5.2.3-1 below: 
 
 
Table  5.2.3-1: Comparison of Stochastic Production Frontier and Data Envelopment 
Analysis 
 
Stochastic Production Frontier Data Envelopment Analysis 
(a) Estimation method 
Parametric Non-parametric 
(b) Account for stochastic disturbance  
Yes 
(more realistic) 
No 
(yet conform with economic theory) 
(c) Assume all inputs are efficiently used 
No 
(d) Data requirements 
Input and output quantities 
(e) Technical efficiency (TE) obtained 
Mean TE distribution Exact Level of TE 
 
Source: Coelli, et al. (1998) 
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As compared to DEA (also known as deterministic frontiers), although it 
ignores the stochastic effect on production frontier, they are more consistent 
with economic theory.  DEA is also more advantageous in terms of obtaining 
the exact measure of technical inefficiency for each observation instead of its 
distribution.  However, its chief disadvantage is that they are bound to be 
confounded by statistical ‘noise’, whereas stochastic frontiers are more realistic, 
at least in terms of econometrics.  Moreover, due to its non-parametric 
approach, DEA is more sensitive to outliers.  Since this study is primarily 
empirical in nature, the readiness of hypothesis tests developed for SPF 
provides an added advantage for us to choose SPF over DEA for our 
estimation.   
 
5.3.1 Basic Framework  
 
SPF is an estimation of a “global” production frontier of a number of 
cross-sections while incorporating stochastic assumptions.  Based on this 
concept of productivity, we can measure the economic performance of each 
country relative to the world’s best possible output given the available 
resources and technology at each time period.  This comparative measurement 
of economic performance against the world production frontier is regarded as 
technical efficiency. 
 
SPF assumes a mixture of one-sided and two-sided (e.g. normal) errors.  The 
error term is composed of two parts.  The one-sided component captures the 
effects of inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier.  The two-sided 
component permits random variation of the frontier across cross-sections, and 
captures the effects of measurement error, other statistical ‘noise’, and random 
shocks outside the cross-sections’ control.  
 
In a nutshell, the measurement attempts to capture that given the quantities of a 
list of inputs, there is a maximal possible output.  However, this maximum 
level is random (to be precise, which is randomly distributed as a function) 
rather than exact.  This assumes that some inputs or external effects have 
maximal possible effects, but others have potentially unbounded effects, e.g. 
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weather.  
 
In general form, a production function can be specified as followed: 
 
( )β;iii xfay =  10 ≤< ia  ( 5.3-1) 
 
where i denotes the i-th cross-section.  y denotes the unit of output.  a 
measures the technology parameters.  x is a (1 x k) vector of inputs of 
production and other explanatory variables and β is a vector of coefficients of 
inputs to be estimated.  
 
Rewriting eq.( 5.3-1) in log-form gives: 
 
( ) iii uxfy −= β;lnln  ( 5.3-2) 
 
where 0ln ≥−= ii au  represents technical inefficiency. Thus technical 
efficiency (TE) is given by )exp( iu− .  A Taylor-series expansion of 
)exp( iu− around u=0 yields ...!321)exp(
32 +−+−=− uuuu . Hence for 
small values of iu , ii uu −≈− 1)exp( as Cornwell and Schmidt (1996) suggest. 
 
Following Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977), 
an SPF can thus be expressed as an error-component model: 
 
( ) )exp(; iiii uvxfy −= β  ( 5.3-3) 
 
),0(~ 2vNiidv σ is a stochastic error independently distributed of u .  It 
accounts for the measurement such as the effects of weather, strikes, luck etc 
on the value of the output variable together with the combined effects of 
unspecified input variables in the production function.  Therefore it is simply 
treated as random disturbances. 
  
u , on the other hand, is assumed to be a non-negative random variable 
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associated with technical inefficiency of production and is again assumed to be 
independently distributed.  Among the different cross-sectional SPF models, 
there are a number of specifications of u commonly proposed.  For examples, 
Aigner, et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) assume 
),0(~ 2ui Niidu σ
+ , Stevenson (1980) assumes ),(~ 2ui Niidu σµ
+ whereas 
Greene (1990) assumes gammaiidui ~
3.   
 
Since it is assumed that 0≥iu , it implies that, for each cross-section, its 
output must lie on or below its frontier ( )[ ]ii vxf +β; .  Any deviation implies 
technical and economic inefficiency.  That said, the ratio of the output for the 
i-th firm relative to the maximum potential output, defined by the frontier 
function given the input vector xi, can be used to obtain technical efficiency of 
the i-th firm: 
 
{ }
( ) { }ii
i
ii
vxf
y
uTE
exp;
exp
⋅
=−=
β
 ( 5.3-4) 
 
By definition, TEi takes a value of zero to one. 
 
Eq.( 5.3-4) suggests that if 0=iu , then εi (sum of 2-sided errors, u+v) is vi, the 
error term is symmetric, and the data do not support a technical inefficiency 
story.  However, if ui > 0, then εi = vi – ui is negatively skewed, and there is 
evidence of technical inefficiency in the data.  In other words, the production 
process is subject to two random disturbances, namely u and v.  The frontier is 
stochastic with random disturbance of vi ≤ or ≥ 0.  Technically speaking, we 
can estimate the variances of vi and ui for each cross-section. 
 
5.3.2 Some Applications of SPF  
 
There are numerous studies using the stochastic frontier approach for various 
                                                 
3 We do not aim at providing a survey on various SPF models for cross-sectional analysis since 
we will carry out panel data analysis.  For further reference, Coelli, et al. (1998) and 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide excellent surveys of different SPF models. 
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applications, mostly for firm-level and industry-level analyses.  Models 
derived from different assumptions and techniques have been extensively 
employed.  The technique was initially developed for the applications at 
firm-level and industry-level studies, especially on agricultural economics 
(such as in Battese and Coelli (1992) and Battese and Coelli (1995)) 
concerning the measurement of inefficiency across different producers. 
Meeusen and Broeck (1977) were probably among the first to test their model 
on several manufacturing industries.  
 
After developing panel data stochastic frontier models4, recent work like Paul, 
Johnson, and Frengley (2000), Bhattacharyya, Bhattacharyya, and Mitra (1997), 
Mahadevan (2002) and Kruger, Canter, and Hanusch (2000) deploy several 
variations of panel data SPF models for their micro-level studies.  
 
Empirical applications of SPF have been reasonably extended to country-level 
data.  Macro-level work mostly intends to estimate the efficiency levels across 
countries under different political environment and/or regime changes.  In 
particular, the political changes that took place in Eastern Europe facilitate the 
comparison of efficiency levels in market-oriented vis-à-vis planned economies.  
For examples, Koop, Osiewalski, and Steel (1999) initially focus their 
measurement exercise in 17 OECD countries.  Koop, Osiewalski, and Steel 
(2000) extend further the measurement and make special reference to Poland 
and Yugoslavia in comparison to 20 Western economies.  Moroney and Lovell 
(1997) share a similar interest and measure the relative efficiencies of 7 
transition economies in comparison to other Western economies. 
 
Klein and Luu (2003), on the other hand, use the indices of economic freedom 
and political constraints as independent variables for explaining inefficiencies 
in 39 countries from 1975 to 1990.  Their results show that technical 
efficiency relates positively to policies supporting laissez-faire and political 
structures that promote policy stability.  Adkins, et al. (2002) on the other 
                                                 
4 Among others, more prevalently used panel data SPF models include Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984), Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992) and Battese and 
Coelli (1995).  See Appendix Section  A.7 for details.  
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hand investigate the impact of economic freedom on promoting efficiency. 
 
However, SPF models are mostly applied to mere measurements of technical 
efficiency.  The sources of technical inefficiencies are not considered and/or 
incorporated in these models.  To incorporate exogenous variables to explain 
the sources of technical inefficiency, some of the researchers approach the 
problem using a 2-stage approach.  In the first stage, they use the 
aforementioned SPF models to obtain the technical inefficiency measures, 
typically by maximum likelihood estimation (ML).  In the second stage, the 
estimated technical inefficiency is treated as dependent variables to be 
regressed on a vector of explanatory variables in the form such as 
 
( ) ( ) iiiii zguvuE εγ +=− ;|  ( 5.3-5) 
 
where zi is the vector of exogenous variables given γ = 22
2
vu
u
σσ
σ
+
. 
 
In some cases, it is recognised that since the dependent variable u lies between 
0 and 1, OLS estimates cannot be used.  Instead, estimation technique such as 
Tobit for limited dependent variable estimation is employed.   
 
Amongst various studies of such kind, Liu, Liu, and Wei (2001) make special 
reference to trade openness in the case of India and China.  They first employ 
a dynamic approach on the estimation of a production function and then in the 
second stage, technical efficiency is treated as dependent variable.  Their key 
results show the relationship of trade openness and their relative technical 
inefficiencies for the case of India and China. 
 
Although it is fairly often that early literature associating technical inefficiency 
and its sources uses the aforementioned 2-stage approach, estimations of such 
kind are fundamentally problematic in terms of econometrics.  As Battese and 
Coelli (1995), Coelli, et al. (1998) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) argue, 
such an approach has at least 2 obvious flaws.  Firstly, 2-stage estimations 
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ignore the fact that SPF models in the first stage have assumed a particular 
distribution of the level of technical inefficiency, u.  In other words, u is 
frequently assumed to be an independent random variable with particular 
distribution.  This contradicts with the second stage, where the predicted 
mean efficiencies are assumed to have a functional form of zi.  It is thus 
statistically inconsistent to assume u again at the second stage with any form of 
specification.   
 
Secondly, the 2-stage approach imposes a restricted assumptions that zi are 
uncorrelated with xi, the production inputs.  Otherwise, the estimates obtained 
in the first stage are biased due to omitted variables.  The biased estimates of 
technical inefficiency being used as dependent variables inevitably undermine 
the validity of results obtained in the second stage of estimation.  
 
Since our primary research interest of this Chapter is to investigate whether 
institutions can explain the cross-country technical inefficiencies, SPF models 
that allow us to incorporate exogenous explanatory factors are essential.  
While recognising the inadequacies of using a 2-stage approach as in the 
current literature, we will employ an alternative approach to tackle the problem 
of such kind.  The models we use will be discussed in more details in the next 
section (i.e. Section  5.4).   
 
5.3.3 General Critics on SPF 
 
We do not intend to argue that SPF models are strictly superior to DEA.  
Indeed, we fully recognise the limitations of this methodology.  As Førsund, 
Lovell, and Schmidt (1980) point out, even though SPF captures a more 
realistic world, unfortunately there is no way of determining whether the 
observed performance of a particular observation compared with the 
deterministic kernel of the frontier is due to inefficiency or to random variation 
in the frontier.  This constitutes the main weakness of the SPF model – i.e. it 
is not possible to decompose individual residuals into their two components, 
and so it is not possible to estimate technical inefficiency by observation.  
What we are estimating is simply the mean inefficiency over the sample, but 
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not its “true” value.  
 
Secondly, Coelli, et al. (1998) realise that when using the stochastic frontier 
approach, the specification of the functional form of the production function 
matters for the results.  Monte Carlo simulation results from Giannakas, Tran, 
and Tzouvelekas (2003) indicate that the bias in the mean efficiency measures 
from stochastic frontier methods due to misspecification of functional form is 
sizeable.  It can suggest a high level of inefficiency (10-30%) of output for the 
most efficient producers.  As Ravallion (2003) also criticises; the approach 
using non-parametric methods is more preferable in some cases, especially 
when measuring social efficiency using social indicators.  Parametric 
estimation, like SPF, is very sensitive to outliers and one must assume a 
continuous frontier.  Likewise, the distribution of the inefficiency term also 
has to be specified.    
 
The stability and reliability of the results are also concerns too. The measured 
efficiency is only relative to the best cross-section in the sample.  Including 
extra cross-sections may alter the efficiency scores.  Furthermore, 
measurement error and other noise may influence the slope and position of the 
frontier.  Not surprisingly, measurement errors and outliers will likewise 
influence results significantly.  In our estimations, we attempt to alleviate 
some of these problems by using a reliable source of data to minimize the 
measurement errors as far as possible.  
 
 
5.4 Model Estimation and Specification 
 
There are primarily four dimensions of SPF models developed and could be 
considered in our case.  These include cross-sectional versus panel data 
models and with or without assuming time-varying technical efficiency.  We 
will consider the most flexible forms of SPF models – i.e. panel data model 
with time-varying technical efficiency.  The availability of panel data 
generally implies that there is a large number of degree of freedom for 
estimation.  It also permits the simultaneous investigation of both technical 
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change and technical efficiency change over time.   
 
There is also one added advantage of using panel data SPF models.  
Specification of the error term and the inefficiency term is one of the major 
challenges of using stochastic production frontier estimation.  However, 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) show that when panel data are available, 
assumptions on the distribution of technical inefficiency could be relaxed since 
the parameters can be estimated using the traditional panel data methods of 
fixed-effects estimation or error-components estimation.  Measuring the 
technical efficiencies of the sample can be rather straightforward hereafter as 
they can be obtained relative to the most efficient one(s).  This view is also 
shared by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).  
 
The basic framework of panel SPF model is generally similar to the 
cross-sectional one set out in Section  5.3.1.  Appendix Section  A.7 
summarises some key panel time-varying SPF models, which are often used in 
the existing literature.   
 
5.4.1 Battese and Coelli (1993) and (1995) Model  
 
Our model of estimation is based on the Battese and Coelli (1993) and Battese 
and Coelli (1995) model.  The key advantage of their model is that it allows 
incorporating the technical efficiency model in the stochastic production 
frontier estimation to perform a one-stage simultaneous estimation.   
 
Following eq. ( 5.3-2), the stochastic production frontier in panel data form is 
defined as: 
 
ititit xY Ε+= β  ( 5.4-1) 
 
where ititit UV −=Ε  and Ni ,...,1=  and Tt ,...1=  
    
 
 -194- 
itY  is the logarithm of production output.  itV  is assumed to be 
),0(~ 2vNiid σ , independently distributed of the itU , which are non-negative 
random errors associated with technical inefficiency of production.   
 
The technical efficiency model is specified as: 
 
ititit WzU += δ  ( 5.4-2) 
 
where itW  is a random variable and is defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance 2σ  and δitit zW −≥ .  Technical 
inefficiency )( itU is assumed to be independently distributed for all t and i and 
is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with mean δitz  
and variance 2uσ .  itz  is a (1 x m) vector of country specific institutional 
environment which may vary over time. δ  is an (m x 1) vector of unknown 
coefficients.  Technical efficiency of production can be defined as: 
 
( ) ( )itititit WzUTE −−=−= δexpexp  ( 5.4-3) 
 
Therefore, the density functions for itV  and itU  are: 
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V
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0≥u  ( 5.4-5) 
 
where subscripts i and t are omitted for simplicity.  )(⋅Φ represents the 
distribution function for the standard normal random variable. 
 
The joint density function for E = V – U and U is 
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Alternatively, 
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where 
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Such that the density function for E = V – U is 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )[ ]
du
u
z
z
f
v
v
E ∫
∞ ∗∗∗∗
−−
⋅
Φ⋅
−+−
=
0
222222
2
2
1
exp
2
2
1
exp
π
σµ
σδσσπ
σµσδσε
ε  
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∗∗
∗∗
ΦΦ+
−+−
=
σµσδσσπ
σµσδσε
z
z
v
v
2
1
22
2222
2
2
1
exp
 ( 5.4-8) 
 
Alternatively,  
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The conditional density function for U given E =ε  is thus 
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Conditional expectation of ε -U given E = ε  is  
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such that the density function for itY  in eq.( 5.4-1) can be derived from 
eq.( 5.4-9): 
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where *
** /,/ σµσδ itititit dzd ==   and 
( )[ ]
( )22
22
*
σσ
βσδσµ
+
−−=
v
itititv
it
xYz
 
 
 
The logarithm of the likelihood function for the sample observations y is: 
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where ( )'22''* ,,, σσδβθ v= . 
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Put 222 σσσ +≡ vs  and 2
2
sσ
σγ ≡ , eq.( 5.4-13) can be expressed as  
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where  ( ) 212Sitit zd γσδ=   
 ( )[ ] 212** 1/ sititd σγγµ −=  
 ( ) ( )βγδγµ itititit xyz −−−= 1*  
 ( )[ ] 212* 1 sσγγσ −=  
 
and  ( )'2'' ,,, γσδβθ s= .  
 
The partial derivatives of eq.( 5.4-13) with respect to γσδβ ,,, 2s are, 
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where ( )⋅φ  is the density function for the standard normal random variable.  
The necessary condition for maximizing the log-likelihood function is that 
these partial derivatives equal 0. 
 
Estimation output can be obtained from the FRONTIER 4.1 program devised 
by Coelli (1996).  The estimation follows a three-step procedure in estimating 
the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of a stochastic frontier 
production function.  The three steps involve:  
 
1) OLS estimates of the production function (including ß0 and 
σS
2 are obtained), such that all coefficients (except the intercept 
and σS
2) will be unbiased.  
 
2) A two-phrase grid search of γ (between zero and one) is 
conducted.  The OLS estimates of σS
2 and ß0 are adjusted 
)]ˆ2(/[)]([22 γππσσ −−= TKTOLSS and π
σγ
ββ
2
)(00
ˆˆ2ˆˆ S
OLS +=  
respectively.  The OLS estimates are used for the remaining 
parameters in ß.  
 
3) The values selected in the grid search are used as starting 
values in an iterative procedure to obtain the final maximum 
likelihood estimates.  
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5.4.2 Post-estimation Test 
 
The one-sided generalized likelihood-ratio test (hereafter called LR-Test) can 
be used for hypothesis testing.  This aims at providing a statistical test of the 
goodness-of-fit between two models.  In short, a relatively more complex 
model is compared to a simpler model to see if it fits a particular dataset 
significantly better.  If so, the additional parameters of the more complex 
model are often used in subsequent analyses.  The LR-Test is only valid if it is 
used to compare hierarchically nested models.  That is, the more complex 
model must differ from the simple model only by the addition of one or more 
parameters.  Further addition of parameters will always result in a higher 
likelihood score.  However, there comes a point when adding additional 
parameters is no longer justified in terms of significant improvement in the 
goodness of fit for the model to a particular dataset.  The LR-Test provides 
one objective criterion for selecting different possible models.  This will also 
serve as the basis of our model selection among different specifications.   
 
The LR-Test begins with a comparison of the likelihood scores of the two 
models.  The likelihood-ratio test statistic is calculated as: 
 
λ = -2 [log(likelihood(H0))- log(likelihood(H1))] ( 5.4-19) 
 
which has approximately chi-square distribution with degree of freedom equal 
to the number of parameters assumed to be equal to zero in the null hypothesis, 
0H .  Kodde and Palm (1986) design a Wald test to jointly test the equality of 
restrictions and provide the critical values for the LR-Test.  
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5.4.3 Model Specification  
 
We specify our stochastic production frontier in the translog form as proposed 
by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1973): 
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( 5.4-20) 
 
where ),0(~ 2vit Niidv σ  is a random disturbance. itu  is the level of 
technical inefficiency of i-th cross-section at time t.  0β  is the constant term 
in the production function to capture the initial level of technology.  The 
translog production function does not restrict the returns to scale of the 
production function and substitution possibilities.  It is thus a more general 
and flexible form of specification in comparison to Cobb-Douglas production 
function for example.  
 
As suggested by Coelli, et al. (1998), we also incorporate a time trend (t) to 
capture the potential shifts of the production frontier over time, which reflects 
the rate of technological change.  In our specification, therefore, the 
coefficient ßt provides an estimate of the annual percentage change in output 
resulting from technological change.  Since the translog specification is a 
second-order approximation, t2 is also included.  An estimate of the annual 
percentage change in output resulting from technological change is provided by 
the first partial derivative of eq.( 5.4-20) with respect to t.   
 
For the time-varying technical inefficiency model, our general form of 
specification is  
 
ittopen
ititiHHitiit
wtopenness
HinstitHinstitu
+++
⋅+++=
δδ
δδδδ 0
 ( 5.4-21) 
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where itw  is a random disturbance with a truncated normal distribution.  
instit is a set of variables measuring institutions.  H measures human capital. 
The interaction term of human capital and institution allows us to see if the 
institution affects technical efficiency given the necessary level of human 
capital.  openness is a set of variables measures openness to trade, financial 
integration and capital account openness.  δ is a vector of coefficients of the 
respective areas to be estimated.  The final specification of the model will 
depend on the LR-Test results for different specifications.  
 
All in all, our empirical investigation primarily concerns the sources of 
cross-country technical inefficiency.  With regard to methodology, our work 
intends to contribute in three ways.  Firstly, compared to the other 
growth-accounting (e.g. TFP growth measurement) literature, we extend the 
work to decompose the different sources of growth and attempt to seek the 
sources of cross-country divergence, in terms of technical change and 
efficiency change.  Secondly, our study uses a one-stage approach to estimate 
the stochastic production frontier while incorporating the explanatory factors of 
technical inefficiency.  Such design will avoid the inconsistent assumptions 
used when employing two-stage estimations.  Finally, as we will discuss in 
the following, we use a relatively large number of economies comparing to 
other studies for a longer period of time.  We are of the view that only 
employing a substantial amount of economies would bring the estimation of a 
“world frontier” more meaningful.    
 
 
5.5 Data 
 
We have a panel dataset for 108 cross-sections covering 24 OECD economies 
and 78 economies in East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Middle 
East and North Africa, Latin American and Caribbean, South Asia and Africa.  
Six high-income economies are also included but they are not classified by 
regions5.  The full list of economies covered in our study is at Appendix 
                                                 
5 Country classification by income groups and regions are based on World Bank Country 
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Section  A.4.   
 
The study period starts from 1971 to 2000, signifying the beginning of 
globalization, free flow of information and capital. It also better reflects the 
uprising of emerging markets, in particular towards the latter periods of the 
studied period.  The sample is nevertheless limited by the availability of 
institutional variables, which are only in place starting from 1970. 
 
5.5.1 Output and Production Inputs 
 
Output is measured as chain-weighted real GDP in constant 1996 prices, which 
is PPP-adjusted to facilitate cross-country comparison.  We derive output (Y) 
data from the Penn World Table (PWT ver 6.1) (Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2002)), where Y is obtained from real GDP per capita multiplied by 
population.   
 
The labour force (L) is the number of workers from PWT, derived from real 
GDP per worker data.  We understand that using employment data is a more 
accurate measure of production input than total labour force.  However, as far 
as we understand, only the OECD and Asia Development Bank (ADB) produce 
employment data.  The International Labour Organisation (ILO) also collects 
cross-country unemployment rates, which could also be used to derive 
employment from labour force data.  However, the sample size will be 
significantly reduced if these data sources are used.   
 
Based on Isaksson (2007b), capital stock (K) can be calculated from real 
investment data.  Total real investment is measured as real total output (Y) 
multiplied by investment share of real GDP per capita in PWT.  For missing 
values, we follow Isaksson (2009) to interpolate the series by taking the 
average of two years.   
 
Our capital stock estimates are heavily based on Isaksson (2007b).  As in 
                                                                                                                                 
Classification.   
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King and Levine (1994), Benhabib and Spiegel (1997) and Limam and Miller 
(2004), amongst others, the standard way is to use the perpetual inventory 
method with the steady-state initial capital stock.  The 1960 capital stock is 
assumed to be the initial steady-state value for each country11 and it is then 
incorporated with investment data to derive the capital stock for subsequent 
periods (till 2000). 
 
It is commonly assumed that the capital-output ratio is constant in the 
steady-state. That said, physical capital and real output grow at the same rate.  
The depreciation rate δ is assumed to be 6% across countries over time.  
Hence, the steady-state capital-output ratio for country i is derived as: 
 
))1(/( wiii ggi λλδκ −++=  ( 5.5-1) 
 
ii is the steady-state investment rate for country i, which is proxied by average 
real investment rate for the first 10 years.  wi gg )1( λλ −+  is the steady-state 
growth rate which is the weighted average of the country’s growth rate and the 
world growth rate.  λ is a measure of mean reversion of growth rates and 
equals to 0.25 as in Easterly, Kremer, Prichett, et al. (1993).  ig is the 
country’s average growth rate over the period 1960 to 1969.  wg  is the world 
growth rate and is approximated to be 4%.  
 
Initial capital stock in year 1960 (or earliest possible year in our sample) can 
thus be expressed as: 
 
60,60, iii YK ⋅=κ  ( 5.5-2) 
 
where Yi,60 is real GDP of country i in year 1960.  
 
The calculation of capital stock for the remaining years, using perpetual 
inventory method, comes as the following: 
 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, we use data in the earliest possible year during the 60’s subject to availability. 
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ititit KIK )1(1 δ−+=+  ( 5.5-3) 
 
The series of capital stock from 1960 to 2000 can thus be obtained.   
 
We further take a non-overlapping 5-year average for all the variables to get rid 
of the business cycle effect.  Islam (1995) also suggests that using a 5-year 
average series is less likely to be serially correlated.  Our dataset therefore 
collapses to 6 periods in total.  
 
5.5.2 Explanatory Variables for TE Models 
 
Regressors for the TE models have been defined in details in previous Chapters 
and set out in details in Appendix Section  A.2.  Descriptive statistics of our 
sample are at Appendix Section  A.3.  To recap, we consider three aspects of 
explanatory variables in the TE model, which include:  
 
1. Human capital (H): average years of schooling of aged 15 or 
above from Barro and Lee (2001).  
 
2. Institution: Our measures of different institutional variables 
primarily come from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of 
the World Report of Gwartney, et al. (2008) and Polity IV project 
dataset of Marshall and Jaggers (2009).  As in Chapter 2, Rodrik 
(2000)’s taxonomy of institutions are again adopted.  We will first 
use the composite quality of government index (QOG) from ICRG 
for testing the various specifications of the production function.  
In our key models, specifically, we use the Fraser’s legal structure 
and security of property rights index (LEGAL) for 
“market-creating institutions”.  We use the composite index of 
regulation (REG) as a measure of “market-regulating institution”.  
For “market-stabilising institutions”, we consider the use of the 
access to sound money index (SM) to proxy the effectiveness of 
monetary policy.  For “market-legitimising institutions”, we use 
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the institutionalised democracy index from Polity IV project 
(DEMOC).   
 
3. Openness: We use four indicators (i) financial integration index 
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) (FIN); (ii) capital account 
openness index from Chinn and Ito (2006) (KAOPEN), and (iii) 
total trade to GDP (TRADE), and; (iv) total FDI inflows to GDP 
(FDI).  Both (iii) and (iv) are from World Development 
Indicators.   
 
 
5.6 Estimation Results  
 
5.6.1 Specification of Production Function 
 
We first take a preliminary test of the specification of the production function 
as set out in eq.( 5.4-20).  For simplicity, we incorporate QOG, a composite 
index of the quality of government, as the only explanatory variable in the 
technical inefficiency model at this stage.  The key aim of the results is to 
provide support to our specification of the production function.  Test results 
are given in Table  5.6.1-1.   
 
A Cobb-Douglas production function is specified in SPF Model (1), A 
Hicks-neutral translog production function is used for SPF Model (2) and a 
non-neutral translog production function is at SPF Model (3).  As we 
explained earlier, the translog production function is a more flexible form of 
the Cobb-Douglas production function.  Comparing SPF Models (2) and (3), 
the former model only accounts for Hicks-neutral technical change.  That is, 
the production function shifts up and down but their slopes (e.g. marginal rate 
of technical substitution) do not alter.  In SPF Model (3), non-neutral 
technical change is also accounted for by including terms involving the 
interactions of the other regressors and time.  Non-neutral technical change is 
also referred to as biased technical change.  That said, the movement of the 
production function will be biased in favour of certain inputs and against 
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others. 
 
All three SPF models show that the signs of elasticities of both capital and 
labour (ßK and ßL) are positive as the theory predicted.  Compared to the 
standard assumption of input shares of capital and labour to be one-third and 
two-third respectively, the parameters in SPF Model (1) show rather awkward 
results – ßK is around 0.6 whereas ßL is around 0.3.  In SPF Models (2) and (3), 
the input elasticities are more sensible.  The production functions in both 
models exhibit a decreasing return to scale, with ßK is around 0.25 and ßL is 
around 0.6. 
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Table  5.6.1-1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stochastic Production Frontier Models 
 
 SPF Model (1)  SPF Model (2)  SPF Model (3) 
  
Coeff. 
(std. error)   
 Coeff. 
(std. error)   
 Coeff. 
(std. error)   
Dep var: ln(Y)         
         
β0 1.6486 ***  3.0593 ***  2.8515 *** 
 (0.1282)   (0.7104)   (0.7104)  
βK 0.6358 ***  0.2468 ***  0.2503 *** 
 (0.0065)   (0.0686)   (0.0686)  
βL 0.3321 ***  0.5897 ***  0.6132 *** 
 (0.0091)   (0.0909)   (0.0909)  
βKK -   0.0254 ***  0.0219 *** 
    (0.0036)   (0.0036)  
βLL -   0.0101 *  0.0086  
    (0.0061)   (0.0061)  
βKL -   -0.0329 ***  -0.0284 *** 
    (0.0086)   (0.0086)  
βt -0.1790 ***  -0.1580 ***  -0.1579 *** 
 (0.0340)   (0.0318)   (0.0318)  
βtt 0.0207 ***  0.0184 ***  0.0160 *** 
 (0.0045)   (0.0043)   (0.0043)  
βKt -   -   0.0140 *** 
       (1.6482)  
βLt -   -   -0.0152 *** 
         (1.8987)   
         
Dep. var: uit         
δ0 -3.4124   -3.5042 **  -3.3153 *** 
 (2.8724)   (1.6482)   (0.4794)  
δQOG -6.2458   -5.9513 ***  -5.9151 *** 
 (3.9504)   (1.8987)   (0.0091)  
         
σ2 1.4331   1.3565 ***  1.2926 *** 
 (0.9350)   (0.4794)   (0.3263)  
γ 0.9731 ***  0.9757 ***  0.9750 *** 
 (0.0190)    (0.0091)    (0.0058)   
         
Log(likelihood) -141.5746   -106.6068   -100.2863  
 
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance respectively. 
 
 
We use the LR-test described in Section  5.4.2 as a basis for model selection.  
The test results are summarised in Table  5.6.1-2.  The hypothesis test suggests 
that SPF Model (3) is supported.  It will also form the baseline specification 
of our models. 
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Table  5.6.1-2: Hypothesis Testing for SPF Models (1) - (3) 
 
 
Null Hypotheses (H0) 
χ
2
- 
stat 
χ
2
-critical
7
 Decision 
(1) 
ßKK= ßLL= ßKL= ßKt= ßLt=0 
(i.e. Model (1) vs. Model (3)) 
82.58 10.371 
Reject H0 
(i.e. Accept Model (3)) 
     
(2) 
ßKt= ßLt=0 
(i.e. Model (2) vs. Model (3)) 
12.64 5.138 
Reject H0  
(i.e. Accept Model (3)) 
 
Since panel data are used, the SPF Model (3) also suggests that we can 
estimate the rate of technological change in our specification.  The percentage 
change in output over periods resulting from technological change is provided 
by ßt+2tßtt, varying for different values of period t.  Since ßtt is positive in our 
model, our results suggest that the rate of technological change increased over 
the measured periods.  Moreover, it is also noted that ßKL and ßLt are negative, 
implying a possible substitution effect between K and L over time and 
technical change is biased toward the use of capital.   
 
The bottom panel of Table  5.6.1-1 is the technical inefficiency model.  The 
parameter of ßQOG is negative at the 1% statistically significance level.  
Results of SPF Model (3) imply a negative relationship between QOG and 
technical inefficiency.  γ, representing the percentage of variance of technical 
inefficiency to the total variance of the model, is around 98%.  In other words, 
98% of the variation of the model can be explained by the technical efficiency 
model.  The figure is also statistically significant at 1% level, providing 
support to the technical inefficiency story.   
 
 
5.6.2 Sources of Technical Inefficiency 
 
Our main research interest is to investigate the sources of technical inefficiency.  
As specified in eq.( 5.4-21), the estimation results of this full model (i.e. TE 
Model (1)) are in Table  5.6.2-1.  The stochastic production function is 
                                                 
7 Critical values of test statistics are obtained from Kodde and Palm (1986). 
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specified in a way similar to SPF Model (3), i.e. a non-neutral translog 
production function.  The technical inefficiency model incorporates δt, 
allowing technical inefficiency (uit) to be time-varying.   
 
Table  5.6.2-1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stochastic Production Frontier Model 
(TE Model (1)) 
 
 
Coeff. 
(std. error) 
   
Coeff. 
(std. error) 
 
     
Dep var: ln(Y)  Dep. var: uit   
       
β0 4.3784  ***  δ0 0.3074  ** 
 (0.7388)    (0.1449)  
βK 0.0853    δLEGAL -0.0543  * 
 (0.0751)    (0.0324)  
βL 0.6009  ***  δLEGAL*H -0.0136  * 
 (0.0906)    (0.0077)  
βKK 0.0145  ***  δREG 0.2730  *** 
 (0.0036)    (0.0690)  
βLL -0.0035    δREG
2 -0.0589  *** 
 (0.0060)    (0.0119)  
βKL -0.0036    δREG*H 0.0379  *** 
 (0.0084)    (0.0119)  
βt 0.0015    δH -0.0624   
 (0.0620)    (0.0429)  
βtt 0.0120  ***  δDEMOC 0.0073   
 (0.0042)    (0.0165)  
βKt 0.0089  **  δDEMOC*H -0.0106  *** 
 (0.0045)    (0.0036)  
βLt -0.0167  ***  δFINOPEN -0.0115  * 
  (0.0056)     (0.0059)  
    δTRADE -0.0004   
     (0.0013)  
    δKAOPEN 0.0611   
     (0.0381)  
    δFDI 0.0220  *** 
     (0.0082)  
    δSM 0.0450  * 
     (0.0240)  
    δSM*H -0.0282  *** 
     (0.0073)  
    δt 0.0498  * 
      (0.0296)   
       
σ 2 0.2612  ***  Log(likelihood) -43.9305   
 (0.0355)      
γ 0.9306  ***     
  (0.0161)       
 
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance respectively. 
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First of all, on the effect of human capital (H) on technical inefficiency, the 
estimated parameter (δH) suggests negative association between the two.  This 
implies that economies with more human capital tend to be more technically 
efficient, but the effect is not statistically significant.    
 
In terms of institutions, the full model tests their direct impact on technical 
inefficiency as well as the interactive term of institutions with human capital, 
which attempts to measure the impact of institutions given a necessary level of 
human capital.  Market-creating institution, LEGAL and its interactive term 
with H are both negative and statistically significant, albeit at 10% level only.  
In other words, economies with better secured property rights and legal system 
are less technically inefficient.  δLEGAL*H is negative, signifying economies 
with more human capital are less technically inefficient even if their 
market-creating institutions are comparable.   
 
Such a negative relationship is also found to be statistically significant for 
parameters of δSM*H and δDEMOC*H.  However, the direct impact of the 
market-stabilising institution, SM, and the market-legitimising institution, 
DEMOC, are found to be positive, although the former is only at 10% 
significance level and the latter is not statistically significant.  These results 
are not in line with our hypothesis – better institutions tend to reduce technical 
inefficiency.  This prompts us to test the validity of these parameters in the 
model.   
 
On the impact of market-regulating institution – REG, the results are less 
straightforward.  δREG is positive, suggesting that less regulation is more 
technically inefficient.  It may first appear to be odd.  However, this may 
also imply that there is a potential optimal level of regulation.  As we argue 
earlier, market-regulating institution could be either market-promoting by 
rectifying monopoly and promoting competition or market-hampering by 
generating red-tape and bureaucratic delay.  In this light, we incorporate a 
square term REG2 to capture such an effect, which is statistically significant at 
1% level.  Taking both parameters together, our results suggest a U-shape 
relationship between technical inefficiency and the level of regulation.  It 
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implies that when the economy has a too low level of regulations, introducing 
more regulations can improve technical inefficiency.  However, once the level 
of regulation reaches a critical point, more regulation will lead to worsening 
technical inefficiency.   
 
For openness parameters, trade openness and capital account openness (δTRADE 
and δKAOPEN) do not have statistically significant impact on uit..  Financial 
openness has a positive impact on improving technical efficiency, although it is 
only statistically significant at 10% level.  Unexpectedly, more FDI inflows 
associate with technical inefficiency.  This is contrary to our expectation that 
more foreign capital leads to more foreign competition and more efficient use 
of production inputs.  Our results, however, suggest that foreign firms (in the 
form of FDI) could possibly be more competitive and thus dominate the 
domestic markets.  It thus crowds out the competition from domestic firms.   
 
Against the estimation results of unexpected signs of some parameters obtained 
in TE Model (1), we deploy the formal LR-Test to test the validity of the 
coefficients more robustly.  The test results are presented in Table  5.6.2-2 
below.   
 
Table  5.6.2-2: Hypothesis Testing for TE Model (1) 
 
Null Hypotheses Log(likelihood) χ2-stat Decision 
δLEGAL =0 -45.79 3.72 Reject H0 
δLEGAL*H =0 -45.20 2.54 Accept H0 
δREG =0 -49.30 10.74 Reject H0 
δREG
2 =0 -53.34 18.82 Reject H0 
δREG*H =0 -49.08 10.30 Reject H0 
δH =0 -44.77 1.68 Accept H0 
δDEMOC =0 -43.97 0.08 Accept H0 
δDEMOC*H =0 -46.22 4.58 Reject H0 
δFINOPEN =0 -45.13 2.40 Accept H0 
δTRADE =0 -44.66 1.46 Accept H0 
δKAOPEN =0 -45.44 3.02 Reject H0 
δFDI =0 -46.11 4.36 Reject H0 
δSM =0 -45.22 2.58 Accept H0 
δSM*H =0 -49.05 10.24 Reject H0 
 
Note: The critical value of the log likelihood ratio test for degree of 1 is 2.706.   
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Table  5.6.2-2 points out that the LR-test rejects the validity and significance of 
some parameters in our full model – TE Model (1).  This facilitates us to 
re-specify TE Model (1) into TE Model (2).  In the latter model, we drop all 
parameters that can be accepted as zero in the LR-test.  The estimation results 
of TE Model (2) are in Table  5.6.2-3.   
 
Table  5.6.2-3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stochastic Production Frontier Model 
(TE Model (2)) 
 
 
Coeff. 
(std. error) 
   
Coeff. 
(std. error) 
 
     
Dep var: ln(Y)  Dep. var: uit   
       
β0 4.1879  ***  δ0 0.3675  *** 
 (0.8048)    (0.1173)  
βK 0.0760    δLEGAL -0.0905  *** 
 (0.0800)    (0.0201)  
βL 0.6322  ***  δREG 0.3206  *** 
 (0.0904)    (0.0688)  
βKK 0.0168  ***  δREG
2 -0.0524  *** 
 (0.0038)    (0.0111)  
βLL -0.0012    δREG*H 0.0055   
 (0.0061)    (0.0055)  
βKL -0.0087    δDEMOC*H -0.0096  *** 
 (0.0086)    (0.0027)  
βt 0.0166    δKAOPEN 0.0577  * 
 (0.0618)    (0.0342)  
βtt 0.0112  ***  δFDI 0.0180  *** 
 (0.0043)    (0.0075)  
βKt 0.0098  **  δSM*H -0.0179  *** 
 (0.0045)    (0.0046)  
βLt -0.0185  ***  δt 0.0409   
  (0.0054)      (0.0281)   
       
σ2 0.2329  ***  Log(likelihood) -49.4510   
 (0.0311)      
γ 0.9188  ***     
  (0.0164)       
 
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance respectively.  
 
 
The qualitative results remain.  Comparing TE Model (1) and TE Model (2), 
the chi-square statistics of the LR-test is 11.041, which is below the critical 
value of chi-square with 6 degree of freedom (i.e. 11.911).  In this case, we 
can argue that TE Model (2) indeed is a better model and fits better our data 
sample.   
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Similarly, we further test the nested model of TE Model (2) based on LR Test 
in Table  5.6.2-4.  One point to note is that TE Model (2) suggests the absence 
of δ0.  We proceed to our final model specification – TE Model (3) – as the 
hypothesis tests suggest.   
 
 
Table  5.6.2-4: Hypothesis Testing for TE Model (2) 
 
Null Hypotheses Log(likelihood) χ2-stat Decision 
δ0 =0 -50.50 2.10 Accept H0 
δREG*H =0 -50.55 2.20 Accept H0 
δKAOPEN =0 -50.42 1.94 Accept H0 
Note: The critical value of the log likelihood ratio test for degree of 1 is 2.706.   
 
 
 
Table  5.6.2-5: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stochastic Production Frontier Model 
(TE Model (3)) – Final Model 
 
 
Coeff. 
(std. error) 
 
 
 
Coeff. 
(std. error) 
 
     
Dep var: ln(Y)  Dep. var: uit   
       
β0 3.8097  ***  δLEGAL -0.0914  *** 
 (0.8682)    (0.0223)  
βK 0.1150    δREG 0.3363  *** 
 (0.0767)    (0.0618)  
βL 0.6307  ***  δREG
2 -0.0537  *** 
 (0.0967)    (0.0100)  
βKK 0.0168  ***  δDEMOC*H -0.0086  *** 
 (0.0036)    (0.0026)  
βLL -0.0008    δSM*H -0.0153  *** 
 (0.0059)    (0.0034)  
βKL -0.0103    δt 0.0990  *** 
 (0.0082)     (0.0253)   
βt 0.0156       
 (0.0621)      
βtt 0.0111  ***     
 (0.0044)      
βKt 0.0072       
 (0.0047)      
βLt -0.0148  ***     
  (0.0058)       
       
σ2 0.2835  ***  Log(likelihood) -53.8462   
 (0.0301)      
γ 0.9326  ***     
  (0.0155)       
 
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance respectively.  
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Estimation results of TE Model (3) are in Table  5.6.2-5 above.  Comparing TE 
Models (2) without δ0 (with log-likelihood to be -50.5) and TE Model (3), we 
again carry out a LR-test in Table  5.6.2-6 to test jointly the openness 
parameters to be zero.  The test results indicate that capital account openness 
and FDI are not statistically significant in explaining technical inefficiency.  
Henceforth, we will focus our discussion on the parameters obtained in TE 
Model (3).   
 
Table  5.6.2-6: Hypothesis Testing for TE Model (2) vs. TE Model (3) 
 
Null Hypotheses Log(likelihood) χ2-stat Decision 
δKAOPEN  = δFDI = 
δREG*H = 0 -53.85 6.7 Accept H0 
 
Note: The critical value of the log likelihood ratio test for degree of 3 is 7.045. 
 
In the course of model selection through TE Models (1) to (3), generally 
speaking, only institutional factors survive in the final models.  Other 
competing factors – human capital and openness – are not statistically 
significant in explaining the sources of cross-country technical inefficiencies.  
This provides empirical support to North’s hypothesis – i.e. institutions are the 
determinant of the efficiency of production inputs, via which determine 
cross-country efficiency and hence economic performances.  Although there 
are previous studies which conclude that human capital and openness in trade, 
foreign capital, capital account or financial integration may promote growth, 
we do not find such positive effects on technical efficiency.  In other words, 
we argue that the level of technical efficiency is primarily driven by domestic 
market-friendly institutions rather than external forces like foreign competition 
brought forward by international trade or capital flow alike.    
 
However, our final model – TE Model (3) – points out that not all clusters of 
institutions are directly associating with technical inefficiency.  
Market-creating institution, i.e. the security of property rights (LEGAL) and 
market-regulating institution (REG and REG2) are directly associating with 
technical inefficiency.  We obtain the negative relationship between these 
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clusters of institutions and technical inefficiency as expected.  
Market-stabilising institution, i.e. sound monetary policy (SM), and 
market-legitimising institution, i.e. democratic institution (DEMOC), 
nonetheless have no direct and significant impact on technical inefficiency.  
Their interactions with human capital (H) are significantly negative at the 1% 
level.  These results may suggest that these two clusters of institutions would 
only improve technical efficiency given that a necessary level of human capital.  
That said, a democratic economy is more efficient given a minimum level of 
human capital is reached.  Likewise, the effectiveness of stabilising monetary 
policy to improve efficiency of production inputs also depends on human 
capital.  These effects are believed to be determined by human capital, which 
are possibly due to the effectiveness of policy execution and governance.  
These market-friendly institutions in turn are believed to shape the incentive 
structures of the society and thus affect the efficiency of production inputs.   
 
To sum up, our final model suggests that our dataset supports a technical 
inefficiency story (where γ is statistically significant at 1% level) when 
estimating a non-neutral translog stochastic production function.  The 
time-varying technical inefficiency model tests three sets of explanatory factors 
of technical inefficiency – human capital, institutions and openness.  Based on 
the test results of log-likelihood ratio tests, we find no direct effect of openness 
and human capital on technical inefficiency.  However, human capital works 
with democracy and monetary stabilisation policy to improve technical 
inefficiency across countries.  In contrast, better security of property rights 
and less regulatory environment associate with technical efficiency directly.   
 
5.6.3 Measures on Technical Efficiency  
 
Following Coelli, et al. (1998), since the SPF model can be defined as 
( ) ( ) itititit uvtxfy −+= β,,ln , the measures of technical efficiency are 
essentially obtained from ( )( )ititit euETE |exp −=  where ititit uve −= . 
Technical efficiency (TE) can thus be calculated for each period and compared 
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to the best practice.  TE represents the mean value of technical efficiency 
given the amount of inputs.  Since the production function is assumed to be 
stochastic in nature, the best possible TE lies somewhere below 1 due to 
stochastic disturbances.  A summary table of average TE over the studied 
period is in Table  5.6.3-1.  The complete measure of TE for each cross-section 
and time period is presented in Table  5.6.3-2.   
 
Over the six measured periods, USA topped the ranks of TE during 1971-75, 
1976-80, 1986-90 and 1991-95.  Trinidad and Tobago came first during 
1981-85, possibly reflecting it as an oil-exporting economy.  Ireland became 
the best-practice in the last measured period, i.e. 1996-2000.  The mean TE of 
the sample is quite stable (around 0.74-0.75) over the three decades.  As one 
can expect, the industrialised economies are among the best-practices.  In 
contrast, the least technically efficient economies are mostly Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  
 
Table  5.6.3-1: Average TE by Regions during 1971-2000 
 
Period 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 
High Income Group 0.8631 0.8707 0.8737 0.8933 0.8923 0.8895 
Latin America and Caribbean 0.8204 0.8363 0.8083 0.7991 0.8090 0.8048 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6006 0.6124 0.6079 0.6156 0.5928 0.5863 
East Asia and Pacific 0.7154 0.7453 0.7474 0.7622 0.8095 0.7774 
Middle East and North Africa 0.8317 0.8410 0.8371 0.8341 0.8442 0.8646 
Europe and Central Asia 0.8572 0.8619 0.8865 0.9093 0.8808 0.8315 
South Asia 0.5840 0.6204 0.6656 0.7141 0.7559 0.7573 
All 0.7393 0.7530 0.7493 0.7590 0.7586 0.7534 
Note: Average TE is calculated based on simple averages.  High income group includes 
OECD economies and other high income groups.  Regions are based on World Bank’s 
Country Classification.  Details of country coverage are at Appendix  A.4. 
 
Analysed by regions, there is a general upward trend of improvement in TE 
over the last three decades.  Improvements are also found in the high income 
group even though they are amongst the best practices.  However, 
sub-Saharan African countries indeed experienced a decline over the period.  
The most pronounced improvements are found in the East Asia and Pacific as 
well as South Asia regions, in particular starting from the 1990.  Such 
improvements are also found in fast-growing countries like China and India 
during the same period.  
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Table  5.6.3-2: Cross-country Technical Efficiency during 1971-2000 
 
  Period  Period  Period  Period  Period  Period  
Country code (71-75) Rank (76-80) Rank (81-85) Rank (86-90) Rank (91-95) Rank (96-00) Rank 
Algeria DZA 0.8660  [37] 0.8547  [42] 0.8635  [40] 0.8396  [47] 0.7785  [65] 0.7791  [65] 
Argentina ARG 0.8586  [39] 0.8507  [44] 0.8147  [52] 0.8019  [59] 0.8991  [30] 0.9250  [20] 
Australia AUS 0.9120  [17] 0.9241  [10] 0.9288  [7] 0.9356  [9] 0.9379  [13] 0.9388  [10] 
Austria AUT 0.8718  [34] 0.8971  [29] 0.8905  [27] 0.9024  [29] 0.9082  [25] 0.8992  [32] 
Bangladesh BGD 0.4439  [97] 0.5310  [94] 0.6039  [85] 0.6618  [78] 0.7232  [70] 0.7304  [70] 
Barbados BRB 0.8059  [55] 0.8132  [58] 0.7837  [59] 0.8849  [36] 0.9000  [28] 0.9371  [12] 
Belgium BEL 0.9136  [16] 0.9230  [11] 0.9227  [14] 0.9328  [12] 0.9283  [16] 0.9256  [18] 
Benin BEN 0.6132  [83] 0.5587  [88] 0.5515  [89] 0.5726  [91] 0.5578  [89] 0.5896  [84] 
Bolivia BOL 0.7023  [73] 0.7713  [66] 0.7623  [65] 0.7563  [69] 0.8152  [59] 0.8012  [62] 
Botswana BWA 0.5668  [89] 0.7501  [72] 0.8599  [41] 0.8972  [31] 0.8945  [31] 0.9193  [24] 
Brazil BRA 0.8041  [56] 0.8116  [60] 0.7687  [61] 0.8208  [54] 0.8050  [62] 0.8422  [49] 
Burki Faso BFA 0.4292  [99] 0.4526  [99] 0.4925  [100] 0.4872  [101] 0.4746  [99] 0.4591  [98] 
Burundi BDI 0.6395  [81] 0.6542  [78] 0.5198  [94] 0.5117  [97] 0.4804  [98] 0.4002  [103] 
Cameroon CMR 0.7097  [71] 0.8101  [61] 0.8491  [44] 0.8202  [55] 0.6643  [77] 0.7151  [71] 
Canada CAN 0.9532  [4] 0.9560  [3] 0.9501  [3] 0.9500  [3] 0.9389  [12] 0.9373  [11] 
Cape Verde CPV 0.3956  [101] 0.4166  [102] 0.5269  [92] 0.5606  [94] 0.5368  [91] 0.5393  [87] 
Central African Republic CAF 0.6990  [74] 0.7617  [68] 0.7009  [75] 0.6833  [73] 0.5659  [88] 0.4924  [94] 
Chad TCD 0.3529  [103] 0.4474  [100] 0.3798  [104] 0.4244  [104] 0.4421  [102] 0.4440  [101] 
Chile CHL 0.8319  [46] 0.8769  [37] 0.8860  [31] 0.9148  [19] 0.9398  [11] 0.9301  [16] 
China CHN 0.4972  [92] 0.5030  [96] 0.6108  [84] 0.6459  [80] 0.7195  [72] 0.7435  [68] 
Colombia COL 0.8771  [30] 0.9017  [24] 0.8973  [24] 0.9082  [24] 0.9143  [22] 0.8901  [37] 
Comoros COM 0.6608  [78] 0.5579  [89] 0.5823  [86] 0.6010  [86] 0.5042  [94] 0.4502  [100] 
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR 0.6962  [75] 0.5648  [87] 0.5148  [95] 0.4881  [99] 0.3839  [103] 0.2183  [108] 
Congo, Republic of COG 0.2663  [106] 0.3140  [105] 0.4191  [103] 0.4879  [100] 0.4962  [95] 0.4909  [95] 
Costa Rica CRI 0.9239  [12] 0.9303  [7] 0.8775  [35] 0.8775  [39] 0.8537  [45] 0.8269  [53] 
Cote d`Ivoire CIV 0.7905  [60] 0.8132  [57] 0.7512  [68] 0.7813  [64] 0.8053  [61] 0.8199  [55] 
Cyprus CYP 0.6017  [84] 0.6337  [80] 0.7533  [66] 0.8534  [43] 0.8911  [36] 0.8972  [33] 
Denmark DNK 0.8967  [23] 0.8946  [30] 0.8953  [25] 0.9177  [18] 0.9209  [18] 0.9205  [23] 
Dominican Republic DOM 0.8727  [33] 0.8823  [35] 0.8831  [32] 0.8498  [44] 0.8510  [46] 0.9117  [27] 
Ecuador ECU 0.6660  [76] 0.7972  [62] 0.7513  [67] 0.7019  [70] 0.7230  [71] 0.6472  [79] 
Egypt EGY 0.9252  [10] 0.9043  [21] 0.9235  [13] 0.9350  [10] 0.9557  [3] 0.9630  [2] 
El Salvador SLV 0.9542  [3] 0.9530  [4] 0.9068  [19] 0.9069  [27] 0.9207  [19] 0.9208  [22] 
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  Period  Period  Period  Period  Period  Period  
Country code (71-75) Rank (76-80) Rank (81-85) Rank (86-90) Rank (91-95) Rank (96-00) Rank 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 0.9227  [13] 0.7299  [74] 0.6393  [81] 0.5860  [88] 0.4539  [101] 0.4557  [99] 
Ethiopia ETH 0.5783  [86] 0.6336  [81] 0.6793  [77] 0.6746  [77] 0.6458  [81] 0.6981  [74] 
Fiji FJI 0.7478  [66] 0.7767  [65] 0.7334  [69] 0.6996  [71] 0.8123  [60] 0.7985  [64] 
Finland FIN 0.8407  [44] 0.8443  [46] 0.8799  [33] 0.9048  [28] 0.8694  [42] 0.9052  [31] 
France FRA 0.8731  [32] 0.8876  [33] 0.8937  [26] 0.9071  [26] 0.8933  [35] 0.8939  [35] 
Gabon GAB 0.8907  [26] 0.8521  [43] 0.7284  [71] 0.7933  [61] 0.8723  [41] 0.8697  [42] 
Gambia, The GMB 0.7350  [68] 0.7277  [76] 0.6401  [80] 0.5838  [89] 0.4913  [96] 0.4439  [102] 
Ghana GHA 0.4626  [95] 0.4411  [101] 0.4833  [101] 0.5931  [87] 0.6688  [76] 0.6911  [75] 
Greece GRC 0.8108  [53] 0.8460  [45] 0.8208  [51] 0.8329  [51] 0.8328  [56] 0.8496  [47] 
Guatemala GTM 0.9188  [15] 0.9333  [6] 0.9224  [15] 0.9221  [16] 0.9277  [17] 0.9234  [21] 
Guinea GIN 0.4945  [94] 0.5455  [90] 0.5300  [90] 0.5698  [92] 0.6304  [83] 0.7043  [72] 
Guinea-Bissau GNB 0.1427  [108] 0.2198  [108] 0.2336  [107] 0.2172  [108] 0.2226  [107] 0.2409  [107] 
Haiti HTI 0.7753  [63] 0.7517  [71] 0.6818  [76] 0.5736  [90] 0.6577  [78] 0.9555  [4] 
Honduras HND 0.7063  [72] 0.7549  [70] 0.7823  [60] 0.7843  [63] 0.7002  [73] 0.5991  [82] 
Hong Kong HKG 0.8514  [42] 0.9099  [18] 0.9191  [16] 0.9370  [8] 0.9467  [7] 0.9169  [25] 
Iceland ISL 0.8018  [57] 0.8366  [49] 0.8442  [46] 0.8779  [38] 0.8498  [48] 0.8591  [45] 
India IND 0.5747  [88] 0.6428  [79] 0.7146  [72] 0.8056  [58] 0.8436  [53] 0.8869  [39] 
Indonesia IDN 0.8525  [41] 0.8737  [39] 0.8568  [43] 0.8446  [45] 0.8446  [52] 0.7663  [67] 
Iran IRN 0.9389  [7] 0.8408  [47] 0.7042  [74] 0.6806  [75] 0.7679  [67] 0.8607  [44] 
Ireland IRL 0.9246  [11] 0.9393  [5] 0.9356  [4] 0.9400  [7] 0.9554  [4] 0.9632  [1] 
Israel ISR 0.8824  [28] 0.8388  [48] 0.8665  [37] 0.8862  [34] 0.9134  [23] 0.8962  [34] 
Italy ITA 0.8272  [48] 0.8702  [40] 0.8872  [28] 0.9142  [20] 0.9085  [24] 0.9073  [29] 
Jamaica JAM 0.6010  [85] 0.5420  [92] 0.5248  [93] 0.6089  [85] 0.5923  [85] 0.5301  [88] 
Japan JPN 0.8223  [50] 0.8327  [51] 0.8410  [47] 0.8656  [41] 0.8466  [51] 0.7988  [63] 
Jordan JOR 0.8216  [51] 0.9287  [8] 0.9340  [5] 0.9076  [25] 0.8326  [57] 0.8353  [51] 
Kenya KEN 0.4321  [98] 0.4777  [98] 0.5290  [91] 0.6230  [83] 0.6419  [82] 0.6535  [78] 
Korea, Republic of KOR 0.7741  [64] 0.8117  [59] 0.7901  [55] 0.8620  [42] 0.8543  [44] 0.8176  [58] 
Lesotho LSO 0.6133  [82] 0.6033  [83] 0.5084  [97] 0.4919  [98] 0.3722  [105] 0.3078  [105] 
Luxembourg LUX 0.8964  [24] 0.8940  [31] 0.9011  [23] 0.9349  [11] 0.9445  [9] 0.9465  [9] 
Madagascar MDG 0.8097  [54] 0.7925  [63] 0.7898  [56] 0.7996  [60] 0.7719  [66] 0.7770  [66] 
Malawi MWI 0.2829  [105] 0.3053  [106] 0.3130  [106] 0.3359  [106] 0.3628  [106] 0.4698  [96] 
Malaysia MYS 0.8423  [43] 0.8894  [32] 0.8871  [29] 0.8797  [37] 0.9029  [27] 0.8658  [43] 
Mali MLI 0.4282  [100] 0.5429  [91] 0.4942  [99] 0.4537  [103] 0.4624  [100] 0.5280  [90] 
Mauritania MRT 0.8736  [31] 0.9019  [23] 0.7675  [62] 0.5510  [95] 0.5300  [93] 0.4956  [92] 
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  Period  Period  Period  Period  Period  Period  
Country code (71-75) Rank (76-80) Rank (81-85) Rank (86-90) Rank (91-95) Rank (96-00) Rank 
Mauritius MUS 0.8844  [27] 0.9209  [12] 0.9279  [8] 0.9423  [5] 0.9501  [5] 0.9520  [6] 
Mexico MEX 0.8942  [25] 0.9163  [14] 0.9030  [21] 0.8850  [35] 0.8772  [39] 0.8562  [46] 
Morocco MAR 0.8197  [52] 0.7813  [64] 0.7627  [64] 0.8169  [56] 0.8166  [58] 0.8110  [59] 
Mozambique MOZ 0.9467  [5] 0.8975  [27] 0.8007  [53] 0.7678  [67] 0.7908  [64] 0.8073  [61] 
Nepal NPL 0.5782  [87] 0.5329  [93] 0.5111  [96] 0.5164  [96] 0.5340  [92] 0.5291  [89] 
Netherlands NLD 0.9022  [21] 0.9139  [15] 0.9060  [20] 0.9192  [17] 0.9284  [15] 0.9334  [13] 
New Zealand NZL 0.9398  [6] 0.9274  [9] 0.9279  [9] 0.9252  [14] 0.9353  [14] 0.9255  [19] 
Nicaragua NIC 0.9050  [20] 0.8747  [38] 0.7304  [70] 0.6159  [84] 0.5454  [90] 0.4932  [93] 
Niger NER 0.4958  [93] 0.4808  [97] 0.4258  [102] 0.4630  [102] 0.4813  [97] 0.5200  [91] 
Nigeria NGA 0.7773  [62] 0.6074  [82] 0.5629  [87] 0.6879  [72] 0.6693  [75] 0.5960  [83] 
Norway NOR 0.8004  [58] 0.8301  [52] 0.8483  [45] 0.8762  [40] 0.9000  [29] 0.9063  [30] 
Pakistan PAK 0.4993  [91] 0.5813  [85] 0.7088  [73] 0.8112  [57] 0.8401  [54] 0.8196  [56] 
Panama PAN 0.7241  [70] 0.7477  [73] 0.8582  [42] 0.8331  [50] 0.8474  [50] 0.7421  [69] 
Papua New Guinea PNG 0.6635  [77] 0.6721  [77] 0.6414  [79] 0.6767  [76] 0.7639  [68] 0.6752  [77] 
Paraguay PRY 0.8652  [38] 0.8994  [26] 0.8671  [36] 0.8421  [46] 0.8888  [37] 0.8487  [48] 
Peru PER 0.7290  [69] 0.7281  [75] 0.6735  [78] 0.6612  [79] 0.6529  [79] 0.7035  [73] 
Philippines PHL 0.7887  [61] 0.8170  [53] 0.7637  [63] 0.7687  [66] 0.7943  [63] 0.8081  [60] 
Portugal PRT 0.8369  [45] 0.8863  [34] 0.8662  [38] 0.9000  [30] 0.9042  [26] 0.8852  [40] 
Rwanda RWA 0.7676  [65] 0.8340  [50] 0.8368  [49] 0.7579  [68] 0.5966  [84] 0.6061  [81] 
Senegal SEN 0.5521  [90] 0.5780  [86] 0.6243  [83] 0.6811  [74] 0.6470  [80] 0.6847  [76] 
Sierra Leone SLE 0.9260  [9] 0.9061  [19] 0.9257  [10] 0.9129  [21] 0.7453  [69] 0.5730  [85] 
Singapore SGP 0.7393  [67] 0.7569  [69] 0.7855  [58] 0.7859  [62] 0.8490  [49] 0.8411  [50] 
South Africa ZAF 0.9215  [14] 0.9132  [16] 0.9250  [12] 0.9283  [13] 0.9411  [10] 0.9479  [7] 
Spain ESP 0.8682  [36] 0.8802  [36] 0.8647  [39] 0.8883  [32] 0.8937  [34] 0.8915  [36] 
Sri Lanka LKA 0.8239  [49] 0.8142  [55] 0.7897  [57] 0.7754  [65] 0.8387  [55] 0.8204  [54] 
Sweden SWE 0.8978  [22] 0.9056  [20] 0.9138  [17] 0.9232  [15] 0.9184  [20] 0.9258  [17] 
Switzerland CHE 0.9076  [18] 0.8975  [28] 0.9080  [18] 0.9120  [22] 0.8941  [33] 0.8717  [41] 
Syrian Arab Republic SYR 0.7934  [59] 0.8150  [54] 0.8791  [34] 0.8217  [53] 0.8944  [32] 0.9158  [26] 
Taiwan TWN 0.8781  [29] 0.9117  [17] 0.9250  [11] 0.9525  [2] 0.9576  [2] 0.9546  [5] 
Tanzania TZA 0.2239  [107] 0.2433  [107] 0.2316  [108] 0.2252  [107] 0.2213  [108] 0.2557  [106] 
Thailand THA 0.4527  [96] 0.5188  [95] 0.5606  [88] 0.6297  [82] 0.6810  [74] 0.6075  [80] 
Togo TGO 0.6452  [80] 0.5977  [84] 0.6389  [82] 0.6442  [81] 0.5869  [86] 0.4697  [97] 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 0.9557  [2] 0.9605  [2] 0.9603  [1] 0.9415  [6] 0.9450  [8] 0.9327  [14] 
Tunisia TUN 0.6571  [79] 0.7621  [67] 0.7930  [54] 0.8376  [49] 0.8638  [43] 0.8870  [38] 
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  Period  Period  Period  Period  Period  Period  
Country code (71-75) Rank (76-80) Rank (81-85) Rank (86-90) Rank (91-95) Rank (96-00) Rank 
Turkey TUR 0.8572  [40] 0.8619  [41] 0.8865  [30] 0.9093  [23] 0.8808  [38] 0.8315  [52] 
Uganda UGA 0.8290  [47] 0.8142  [56] 0.9019  [22] 0.8391  [48] 0.8747  [40] 0.9107  [28] 
United Kingdom GBR 0.9059  [19] 0.9175  [13] 0.9305  [6] 0.9439  [4] 0.9476  [6] 0.9473  [8] 
United States of America USA 0.9571  [1] 0.9614  [1] 0.9572  [2] 0.9595  [1] 0.9600  [1] 0.9577  [3] 
Uruguay URY 0.8690  [35] 0.9034  [22] 0.8392  [48] 0.8869  [33] 0.9184  [21] 0.9306  [15] 
Venezuela VEN 0.9285  [8] 0.9004  [25] 0.8362  [50] 0.8304  [52] 0.8508  [47] 0.8185  [57] 
Zambia ZMB 0.3100  [104] 0.3326  [104] 0.3412  [105] 0.3585  [105] 0.3816  [104] 0.3915  [104] 
Zimbabwe ZWE 0.3787  [102] 0.3893  [103] 0.5046  [98] 0.5663  [93] 0.5685  [87] 0.5616  [86] 
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Our measured period is long enough to compare the experiences of economic 
development in different regions.  Figure  5.6-1 clearly shows that China and 
India rapidly caught up with the USA.  The catching-up was fairly persistent 
for India during the studied period.  China only started picking up since the 
early 80s, echoing her “open-door” policy.  In comparison to other emerging 
markets like Brazil, her TE improvements were relatively gentle.  We can also 
compare these growth experiences with that of the “East Asian Tigers” as 
shown in Figure  5.6-2.  The latter four economies also enjoyed fast growth 
during the last three decades.  In conjunction, they showed rapid 
improvements in technical efficiency in the 70s and 80s.   
 
 
Figure  5.6-1: TE of Brazil, China and India vis-à-vis USA 
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Figure  5.6-2: TE of Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan vis-à-vis USA 
 
 
 
To calculate efficiency change (EC) over two periods, we can define EC as:  
 
   Efficiency change isit TETE=       from period s to period t ( 5.6-1) 
 
Based on EC calculated, the four “Asian tigers” – Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan – enjoyed an average efficiency gains of 1.5%, 2.7%, 
1.2% and 1.7% respectively over the studied period.  These figures represent 
above-average performances (around 0.85% for the full sample) on the global 
scale.  This may be one underlying source of their impressive growth 
performances.  Nevertheless, India and China show even more impressive 
improvements.  China registered an average 8.6% efficiency change whereas 
India showed an even more impressive 9.1% positive change.  All these 
provide quantitative evidence that the rapid growth we found in these 
economies may not be a mere result of capital accumulation.  Efficiency 
improvements may be their sources of growth.  Figure  5.6-3-Figure  5.6-5 
provide an overview of efficiency changes in other selected countries.   
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Figure  5.6-3: TE of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand vis-à-vis USA 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5.6-4: TE of Selected Lower Middle Income Countries in Latin America and 
Caribbean vis-à-vis USA 
 
 
Note: Countries include Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Peru and El Salvador. 
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Figure  5.6-5: TE of MENA Region vis-à-vis USA 
 
 
Note: Countries cover Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic and 
Tunisia. 
 
To better illustrate that efficiency change is possibly the source of growth, we 
separate the sources of growth by capital accumulation, technical change and 
efficiency change.  As mentioned earlier in our methodology, estimating a 
time-varying stochastic production frontier allows us to estimate technical 
change (TC) and TE.  Technical change is calculated based on the first partial 
derivative of the stochastic production frontier with respect to time.  
According to Coelli, et al. (1998), a geometric mean can be used to estimate 
the technical change index between adjacent periods s and t as the following: 
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By definition, TFP can be obtained thereafter by summing up EC and TC as in 
Lee and Kim (2006).  Measures of average EC, TC and TFP over the period 
of 1971-2000 are presented in Table  5.6.3-3.   
 
Once we have decomposed growth, it also facilitates us to compare the sources 
of growth in developed countries as against that in developing countries.  
Rankings of efficiency change reveal that the sources of growth in developing 
countries primarily come from efficiency gains.  Most of the economies 
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topping the rankings of efficiency changes (i.e. with greatest efficiency gains in 
the sample) are low or lower middle income countries – for examples, 
Republic of Congo, Pakistan, Botswana, Bangladesh, India and China.  In 
contrast, the sources of growth for high-income or developed countries come 
from technical changes (i.e. technological progress).  For example, in terms of 
technical changes, Luxembourg, Iceland, Singapore, Norway and New Zealand 
are amongst those showing most distinct technical changes.  This points out 
that the development strategy for developing countries mainly aims at 
“catching-up”, whereas that of the developed countries is by means of 
innovations.   
 
Since our sample is dominated by developing countries, we naturally find a 
strong correlation of TFP and EC.  For demonstration purpose, Figure  5.6-6 
shows a simple correlation plot between the rankings of TFP as against that of 
EC and TC of the 108 economies being studied in our sample.  
 
The most important lesson of decomposing the sources of growth after all is 
not the comparison of rankings.  The main point to note is that when we 
compare cross-country TFP growth using a standard Solow-growth accounting 
framework (i.e. by assuming that all factors of production are efficiently used), 
the results obtained may only reveal a partial picture of the sources of growth.  
Through estimating a stochastic production frontier, we are able to segregate 
the two sources conceptually.  More importantly, we could identify the 
sources of technical inefficiency which is helpful in implying policy 
implications.  
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Figure  5.6-6: Ranking s of EC, TC as against TFP of 108 Economies 
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Table  5.6.3-3: Sources of Economic Growth (rate of change in %) for the Sample Countries (1971-2000) 
 
Country Y K L EC Rank[EC] TC Rank[TC] TFP Rank[TFP] 
Algeria 4.195 5.634 3.743 -2.047 91 -0.066 48 -2.113 89 
Argentina 2.689 2.904 1.635 1.656 33 -0.256 53 1.400 49 
Australia 3.289 3.449 1.916 0.583 59 0.643 32 1.226 52 
Austria 2.77 3.536 0.59 0.630 56 1.240 20 1.871 40 
Bangladesh 4.335 3.452 2.324 10.644 6 -3.417 103 7.227 9 
Barbados 4.266 2.084 1.649 3.204 23 3.123 3 6.328 14 
Belgium 2.449 2.864 0.534 0.263 68 1.189 21 1.452 48 
Benin 3.372 5.893 2.597 -0.645 82 -1.381 77 -2.026 87 
Bolivia 2.855 2.492 2.389 2.788 26 -0.331 55 2.457 32 
Botswana 10.736 11.891 3.278 10.759 5 1.325 19 12.084 3 
Brazil 4.992 5.719 2.975 1.025 45 -1.700 85 -0.675 72 
Burkina Faso 3.818 6.78 1.991 1.470 39 -2.062 91 -0.593 71 
Burundi 0.523 5.457 1.463 -8.525 101 -2.087 92 -10.612 103 
Cameroon 4.188 6.03 2.303 0.842 50 -1.428 79 -0.586 70 
Canada 3.544 4.935 2.102 -0.334 77 0.127 40 -0.207 66 
Cape Verde 5.584 6.315 2.145 6.876 14 2.043 6 8.920 6 
Central African Republic -0.275 0.564 1.562 -6.338 99 -0.892 69 -7.230 99 
Chad 2.649 0.332 2.486 5.605 18 -1.121 74 4.484 20 
Chile 4.395 4.695 2.525 2.279 29 0.010 42 2.289 35 
China 6.759 8.673 1.954 8.618 11 -5.134 108 3.483 25 
Colombia 4.73 5.718 3.302 0.311 67 -1.233 75 -0.923 74 
Comoros 2.158 3.929 3.063 -6.963 100 1.183 22 -5.781 95 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -3.256 2.151 2.488 -19.478 108 -3.319 102 -22.797 108 
Congo, Republic of 5.905 3.184 2.733 13.692 1 0.283 36 13.975 1 
Costa Rica 3.879 5.607 3.522 -2.166 92 1.021 26 -1.145 77 
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Country Y K L EC Rank[EC] TC Rank[TC] TFP Rank[TFP] 
Cote d`Ivoire 3.506 3.638 3.49 0.827 51 -1.059 71 -0.231 67 
Cyprus 5.414 4.519 1.224 8.517 12 2.575 4 11.092 4 
Denmark 2.003 2.394 0.715 0.530 64 1.398 17 1.928 38 
Dominican Republic 5.719 7.184 2.983 0.939 47 -0.018 45 0.920 53 
Ecuador 4.257 4.08 3.271 -0.021 72 0.200 38 0.179 63 
Egypt 5.188 6.261 2.77 0.816 53 -2.135 93 -1.318 80 
El Salvador 2.145 3.82 2.701 -0.686 83 -0.041 47 -0.727 73 
Equatorial Guinea 4.22 8.686 1.648 -12.757 107 1.178 23 -11.578 106 
Ethiopia 2.988 2.579 2.329 3.982 22 -3.749 105 0.233 62 
Fiji 3.255 3.086 2.586 1.621 34 2.238 5 3.859 24 
Finland 2.934 3.047 0.565 1.534 36 1.456 16 2.991 29 
France 2.532 3.412 0.725 0.479 65 -0.238 52 0.241 61 
Gabon 4.265 5.67 2.226 -0.056 73 1.732 12 1.677 42 
Gambia, The 3.936 9.021 3.414 -9.466 103 -0.437 59 -9.903 101 
Ghana 3.728 1.527 2.887 8.748 10 -1.915 90 6.833 11 
Greece 2.695 3.122 1.135 0.969 46 0.958 28 1.928 39 
Guatemala 3.899 4.571 3.174 0.103 69 -0.415 57 -0.311 69 
Guinea 3.877 2.336 2.686 7.468 13 -0.501 61 6.967 10 
Guinea-Bissau 6.235 2.643 2.168 12.794 2 0.076 41 12.870 2 
Haiti 5.175 5.589 0.847 6.345 16 -1.732 88 4.614 18 
Honduras 3.216 4.793 3.251 -2.877 94 -0.009 43 -2.886 91 
Hong Kong 7.139 8.016 2.872 1.543 35 1.056 25 2.600 31 
Iceland 4.034 3.747 1.971 1.428 40 3.711 2 5.140 15 
India 4.876 5.253 1.998 9.121 7 -4.650 107 4.471 21 
Indonesia 6.357 10.9 2.854 -2.030 89 -3.215 101 -5.245 94 
Iran 3.698 5.588 3.157 -1.027 87 -0.732 66 -1.760 85 
Ireland 5.473 5.863 1.197 0.823 52 1.511 15 2.335 34 
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Country Y K L EC Rank[EC] TC Rank[TC] TFP Rank[TFP] 
Israel 4.593 5.027 2.885 0.365 66 1.644 13 2.009 37 
Italy 2.779 3.061 0.637 1.889 31 -0.164 50 1.726 41 
Jamaica 0.897 1.116 1.929 -2.036 90 0.895 30 -1.140 76 
Japan 3.45 5.691 0.834 -0.532 79 -1.087 73 -1.619 83 
Jordan 6.567 8.299 4.645 0.568 61 1.081 24 1.649 43 
Kenya 5.572 4.209 3.573 8.780 8 -2.201 95 6.579 13 
Korea, Republic of 7.509 10.461 2.511 1.222 42 -0.796 67 0.426 58 
Lesotho 4.262 12.226 1.723 -12.447 106 -0.113 49 -12.560 107 
Luxembourg 4.525 3.602 1.141 1.104 44 3.745 1 4.849 16 
Madagascar 1.42 1.924 2.625 -0.805 85 -2.608 98 -3.412 92 
Malawi 5.187 3.272 2.728 11.054 3 -1.679 84 9.375 5 
Malaysia 6.775 8.829 3.052 0.606 58 -0.273 54 0.333 59 
Mali 3.196 2.761 1.959 5.142 19 -1.912 89 3.230 27 
Mauritania 1.752 6.186 1.984 -10.033 104 -0.672 64 -10.705 104 
Mauritius 5.599 5.882 2.408 1.492 37 1.801 9 3.293 26 
Mexico 4.064 4.905 3.444 -0.849 86 -1.076 72 -1.926 86 
Morocco 3.931 5.764 2.741 -0.135 74 -1.019 70 -1.155 78 
Mozambique 1.121 2.963 1.95 -3.003 95 -2.989 100 -5.992 96 
Nepal 4.671 9.062 2.098 -1.680 88 -2.232 96 -3.912 93 
Netherlands 3.003 3.168 1.438 0.687 55 0.806 31 1.493 46 
New Zealand 2.291 2.954 1.85 -0.302 76 1.763 11 1.460 47 
Nicaragua 0.27 2.714 3.539 -11.306 105 0.443 33 -10.863 105 
Niger 1.715 1.48 2.75 1.251 41 -1.537 82 -0.286 68 
Nigeria 2.113 6.944 2.753 -4.128 97 -3.483 104 -7.610 100 
Norway 3.633 3.698 1.249 2.522 28 1.815 8 4.337 22 
Pakistan 4.943 4.097 2.57 10.786 4 -2.812 99 7.975 8 
Panama 3.776 5.23 2.849 0.882 49 1.340 18 2.222 36 
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Country Y K L EC Rank[EC] TC Rank[TC] TFP Rank[TFP] 
Papua New Guinea 3.037 3.41 2.409 0.702 54 -0.010 44 0.692 56 
Paraguay 4.905 7.849 3.01 -0.298 75 0.218 37 -0.080 64 
Peru 2.829 2.758 3.205 -0.589 81 -0.334 56 -0.924 75 
Philippines 3.733 4.741 2.81 0.557 62 -1.720 87 -1.163 79 
Portugal 4.449 5.806 1.437 1.180 43 0.430 34 1.610 45 
Rwanda 3.491 6.401 2.499 -4.025 96 -2.272 97 -6.298 97 
Senegal 3.131 2.965 2.526 4.524 21 -1.334 76 3.190 28 
Sierra Leone -0.104 4.476 1.832 -8.567 102 -1.487 80 -10.055 102 
Singapore 7.947 9.424 3.575 2.664 27 1.892 7 4.555 19 
South Africa 2.583 2.356 2.551 0.570 60 -0.673 65 -0.103 65 
Spain 3.311 4.238 1.145 0.543 63 -0.028 46 0.515 57 
Sri Lanka 4.658 7.801 2.161 -0.003 71 -1.392 78 -1.395 81 
Sweden 2.05 2.308 0.841 0.619 57 0.999 27 1.618 44 
Switzerland 1.261 1.938 0.915 -0.793 84 1.537 14 0.744 55 
Syrian Arab Republic 6.954 6.073 3.604 3.058 24 -0.177 51 2.882 30 
Taiwan 8.275 10.624 1.936 1.698 32 -0.435 58 1.263 51 
Tanzania 2.985 2.481 2.888 2.979 25 -2.168 94 0.811 54 
Thailand 6.282 7.637 2.365 6.468 15 -1.706 86 4.762 17 
Togo 2.197 5.849 3.043 -5.702 98 -0.880 68 -6.582 98 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.697 4.431 1.553 -0.481 78 1.797 10 1.316 50 
Tunisia 5.621 3.813 3.16 6.295 17 0.348 35 6.643 12 
Turkey 4.26 6.599 2.233 -0.551 80 -1.550 83 -2.101 88 
Uganda 4.701 6.819 2.697 2.077 30 -3.792 106 -1.715 84 
United Kingdom 2.332 2.655 0.514 0.900 48 -0.611 62 0.288 60 
United States of America 3.44 4.79 1.638 0.013 70 -1.537 81 -1.524 82 
Uruguay 2.617 3.24 0.992 1.482 38 0.954 29 2.436 33 
Venezuela 1.031 2.626 3.742 -2.436 93 0.175 39 -2.261 90 
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Country Y K L EC Rank[EC] TC Rank[TC] TFP Rank[TFP] 
Zambia 1.582 0.088 2.59 4.798 20 -0.642 63 4.156 23 
Zimbabwe 3.871 2.656 2.587 8.765 9 -0.441 60 8.324 7 
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5.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, we point out that conventional growth empirics are not 
sufficient to understand diverse economic performances.  Measuring technical 
efficiency may be more in line with the theoretical foundation of explaining 
cross-country economic performances.  Compared to TFP measurement, using 
a SPF approach may help us understand the sources of growth better as this 
methodology also allows us to disentangle technical change and technical 
efficiency change.  In addition, the model allows us to incorporate 
explanatory factors of technical inefficiency.  
 
In terms of investigating the sources of technical efficiency, we identify three 
key competing views on potential sources, firstly human capital, secondly 
openness and last but not least institutions.  In the existing literature, there is 
no conclusive empirical evidence showing which factors are more prominent.  
Effects of these deep determinants also depend on the level of economic 
development. 
 
We apply the Battese and Coelli (1993) model to estimate technical efficiency 
and incorporate its determining factors in a single model.  Using a translog 
stochastic production function specification, we cannot find empirical evidence 
to show that human capital, trade openness, financial integration and capital 
account openness have direct impacts on explaining cross-country technical 
inefficiency.  In terms of institution, we find that the rule of law has a direct 
impact of decreasing technical inefficiency.  Regulation, nevertheless, shows 
an optimal level.  That said, only after reaching a threshold of minimum 
amount of regulation, too much regulation leads to technical inefficiency.  
Democracy and stability of monetary policy have no direct impact of technical 
inefficiency as our empirical results show.  However, their interactions with 
human capital in turn are statistically significant.  It implies that these two 
aspects of institutions only work with given level of human capital to improve 
technical efficiency.  Our findings seem to support the view of North and 
Parente and Prescott’s theory that to reduce the income gap between developed 
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economies and developing economies, the late starters have to use resources by 
making improvements in its institutional quality.   
 
Our model also shows that technical efficiency is time-varying.  Based on our 
estimated stochastic production frontier, we can proceed with deriving 
cross-country efficiency changes and technical changes.  As expected, the 
industrialised economies are among the best-practice.  Comparing the 
performances across regions, we find that the emerging markets like China and 
India experienced drastic improvements in technical efficiency.  Sub-Saharan 
African countries stayed well below the frontier over our studied period, 
although performances of individual countries are quite diverse.  When we 
further segregate the sources of growth into efficiency changes and technical 
changes, we find that the main source of growth of developing countries is 
through the channel of efficiency change.  In developed economies, in 
contrast, the source of growth primarily comes from technical change (i.e. 
technological progress). 
 
Our research helps our understanding of the economic importance of 
institutions.  Also, it attempts to quantify to what extent market-sustaining 
institutions could hamper economic performances.  Our quantifiable indicator 
is the estimated mean level of technical efficiency, as compared to that of the 
best-practice.  One of our major findings is that income disparities across 
countries may result from the way production inputs are allocated, rather than 
factor accumulation.   
 
This study provides empirical support to demonstrate what the likely and 
potential benefits of structural reform are that help strengthen 
market-sustaining institutions.  In particular for developing countries, as we 
find, the main source of growth comes from efficiency change, which in turn 
relies on institutions and their interaction with human capital.   
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION 
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In this thesis, we investigate the inter-relationships between institutions and 
development outcomes, more specifically, economic growth, economic reforms, 
FDI and technical efficiency.  The fundamental question we are interested in 
is to identify the development outcomes and channels on which institutional 
quality has direct impacts.  To this end, we use Rodrik (2005)’s taxonomy to 
unbundle institutions into economic and political institution, as well as 
macroeconomic policies.  This largely follows the theoretical basis of earlier 
literature, arguing that these three aspects are endogenously determined.  We 
then disentangle their individual effects on different development outcomes.  
Also, as institution is probably not as persistent as one may have perceived, we 
explore the dynamic effect of institutions.  Causality relationships between 
institutions and macroeconomic policies and reforms are also examined.  Last 
but not least, other than domestic institutional quality, we also consider the 
impact of external institutions on development outcomes.   
 
We carry out four studies in Chapters 2 to 5 with an aim to provide empirical 
evidence for these interrelated themes.  In the following, we will summarise 
the major findings in these Chapters and discuss briefly their policy 
implications.  We will also highlight the limitations of our work and suggest 
some possible extensions for further research.  
 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings and Policy Implications 
 
In Chapter 2, we revisit the empirical evidence of institutions as the source of 
GDP per capita growth using dynamic panel GMM estimator.  As reflected in 
our brief survey of institution view of growth literature, the empirical evidence 
is rather inconclusive.  This on one hand reflects technical limitations – 
especially endogeneity – are not adequately addressed in these empirical 
studies.  On the other hand, a consensus of which aspect of institutions causes 
growth is yet to be reached.  Rodrik (2005)’s taxonomy that we deployed 
facilitates us to test the direct partial impact of four clusters of institutions 
(including democracy, security of property rights, regulatory environment and 
sound of money) on growth.  The use of panel data allows us to control for 
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country-specific and time-specific effects, especially the level of development.  
The dynamic framework further relaxes the assumption of institutional 
persistence, thereby estimating the short-run effect of institutions on growth.  
The main technical improvement in our strategy is the attempt to tackle the 
endogeneity problem.  The GMM estimator we used does not impose the need 
of “external” instruments.  The frequently used “external” instruments in the 
existing literature, being criticised by its lack of theoretical foundation and data 
accuracy, are no longer presence in this case.    
 
We first test the role of institution in an augmented Solow growth models using 
data for the period of 1970-2004.  We show that institutions, when 
incorporated in traditional growth models, have a direct partial impact on 
economic growth.  As compared to human capital, for example, the effect is 
more statistically significant.  In our model using the four clusters of 
institutions, we find that democracy – our measure of political institution – 
does not have any direct impact on growth.  Neither does the regulatory 
environment.  In contrast, market-creating institutions measured by the 
security of property rights and market-stabilising institutions measured by the 
stability of monetary and fiscal policies show direct impacts on growth.  The 
results are robust to additional covariates, alternative measures of institutions 
and different sub-samples used.  In the sub-samples, we also find that 
excessive regulation imposes significant and negative impacts, which are more 
pronounced in non-industrialised and low and middle income economies.   
 
Our results refine the cross-sectional approach adopted in the previous 
literature to test the relationship between a broad, over-generalised measure of 
institution and economic growth.  We particularly pin down two aspects of 
institutions – security of property rights and sound of money (i.e. the stability 
of monetary policy) – that have short-run direct partial impact on GDP per 
capita growth rates.  This is also in line with the qualitative conclusion in the 
literature that security of property rights and sound money constitute the 
first-order economic principles of economic development.  In other words, 
constructing a sound institutional environment to maintain productive 
dynamism and endow the economy with resilience to shocks could bring 
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economic growth in the long term.  Our dynamic analyses also imply that 
institutional quality could associate with faster growth even in a shorter 
timeframe, even after controlling for the level of development that the 
economy has attained and the characteristics of individual country.  Besides, 
we find that the negative impacts of regulations are more pronounced in the 
low and middle income countries.  It may also suggest that regulations per se 
are not growth-impeding or enhancing, but the capacity to execute these 
regulations (for example bureaucratic quality of low income countries is likely 
to be poorer) matters.   
 
In Chapter 3, we use the same estimation technique as in Chapter 2 to establish 
a causal relationship between political institutions – i.e. democracies, and 
economic reforms – i.e. measures that broaden the scope of the domestic and 
international markets.  We attempt to test if democracies, which presumably 
have greater accountability, lead to adopting those reform measures that are 
more likely to gain support from the majority.  We study the economic 
reforms in different sectors, namely fiscal measures, trade liberalisation, credit 
market liberalisation, capital account openness and labour market deregulation.  
The reciprocal causality relationship is also studied.   
 
Analysed by sectors, our empirical results suggest that democratisation is more 
likely to cause redistributive policies in the form of transfer and subsidy, trade 
liberalisation and credit market liberalisation.  There is no causal relationship 
found between democracy and tax policy, capital account openness and labour 
market deregulation.  Understandably, in a democratic society, the reform 
measures that are more likely to benefit the majority of population (i.e. workers) 
are more likely to roll out in democracies.  Trade and credit market 
liberalisation measures lead to wider range of choices of goods and services, 
thereby benefitting many sectors in the economy, are also more likely to gain 
support.  Reciprocally, redistributive policies and trade liberalisation speed up 
the democratisation process.  However, credit market deregulation does not 
have such effect.   
 
Our empirical results show how political institution and economic reforms 
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interact.  Our findings seem to support the “dictatorship of the workers” 
model (Acemoglu 2009) – i.e. policies that favour the economic interests of the 
workers will then be implemented.  In addition, redistributive policies and 
liberalisation measures may also lead to more resources for the majority of 
people to pursue more political rights.  These results may help shed light on 
those economies that have pursued liberalisation measures, but democratisation 
has yet to take place.   
 
In Chapter 4, we explore the effects of three determinants of bilateral FDI, 
including natural barriers, “at-the-border” barrier (i.e. regional trade agreement) 
and “behind the border” barrier (i.e. domestic regulatory environment).  An 
augmented gravity model is deployed to carry out the test for the inter-OECD 
and intra-OECD regions.  In total, there are 60 economies being studied for 
the period of 1985 – 2006.  The main aim is to study the roles of external 
institution vis-à-vis domestic institution on FDI.   
 
To test the robustness of the augmented gravity models, we perform several 
estimation strategies for our panel data analysis.  The overall results suggest 
that geographical, historical and cultural proximities all explain bilateral FDI 
significantly, even after controlling for unobserved country-pair heterogeneity 
and time effect.  Using a “catch-all” regulatory environment index and a 
dummy variable for country-pair membership of regional trade agreement 
(RTA), our analysis shows that lax regulatory environment and RTA are 
seemingly associating with FDI positively in both regions.  When we consider 
specific type of regulation, credit market regulation is the most statistically 
significant determinant of FDI.  The effects of labour market and business 
regulations are less significant. 
 
Domestic regulatory environment and RTA impose effects with different 
magnitudes on intra-OECD and inter-OECD FDI.  We find that for the 
inter-OECD region, RTA is more significantly associating with FDI than 
domestic regulation does.  In comparison, domestic regulatory environment of 
the destination economy is a more significant determinant of FDI rather than 
membership of an RTA in the intra-OECD region.   
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Our results point out that RTAs, originally designed to promote inter-regional 
trade, also foster FDI.  This also opens up one development channel for 
developing countries, i.e. to attract FDI, by engaging in regional integration.  
Furthermore, domestic regulatory environment of the destination economy is 
not only essential for developing economies, but also for developed economies. 
In particular, credit market regulation plays a more significant role than labour 
market regulation and business regulation.  This also helps reiterate the 
importance of financial development, not only to growth, but also to FDI 
inflows.  The significant impact of domestic regulatory environment found in 
the intra-OECD sub-sample may also interpret as the possibility that 
institutional difference could also be a form of comparative advantage.  In the 
intra-OECD region, the comparative advantages of the economies may not be 
production costs or productivity differences, institutional strengths on the other 
hand turn out to be essential in affecting investors’ decisions.  This also helps 
point out that institutional difference is a key determinant of bilateral FDI 
flows pattern between economies with comparable level of developments.  
 
In Chapter 5, we argue that differences in technical inefficiency (i.e. the 
inefficient allocation of production inputs) explain the diverse cross-country 
economic performances.  By means of estimating a “global” stochastic 
production frontier, we can then compare the mean level of technical 
inefficiency for each country to the best practice in each period.   
 
We estimate a translog production frontier using Battese and Coelli (1993)’s 
model.  The model allows us to estimate the sources of technical efficiency in 
an one-stage estimation.  In our specification, we consider three dimensions 
of variables – human capital, openness and institutions.  We find that human 
capital, trade and financial openness are not statistically significant.  By 
contrast, institutions are more fundamental to the sources of technical 
inefficiency.  More specifically, the rule of law has a direct impact of 
improving technical efficiency.  Democracy and sound money, nevertheless, 
do not have direct impact on technical efficiency.  However, their interactions 
with human capital are statistically significant.  It points out a possibility that 
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a minimum level of human capital matters for these two aspects of institutions 
to have any impact on technical efficiency.  Regulation, on the other hand, 
shows a threshold effect.  That said, after reaching a threshold level of 
regulation, excessive regulation leads to technical inefficiency.   
 
All these empirical findings support the view of North and Parente and 
Prescott’s theory that to reduce the income gap between developed economies 
and developing economies, the late starters have to use resources by making 
improvements in its policies and institutions.  Our estimations also allow us to 
decompose the sources of growth into efficiency gains (i.e. changes in 
technical efficiency) as well as technical change (technological progress).  We 
furthermore find that developing countries generally enjoy efficiency changes 
which are their major source of economic growth.  For developed economies, 
the source of growth comes from technical change (i.e. technological progress).  
Our regional analysis shows that the East Asia and Pacific and South Asia 
regions, due to the dominating effects of China and India, caught up with the 
best-practice rapidly over the last three decades.  However, for Sub-Saharan 
African countries, the performances are quite diverse across countries.    
 
These empirical studies facilitate the understanding of the economic 
importance of institutions, with an attempt to quantify to what extent 
market-sustaining institutions could hamper economic performances.  The 
results also help imply the likely pay-off and the potential benefits of reforming 
market-sustaining institutions.   
 
 
6.2 Limitations of the Study 
 
Our contributions to the literature help reduce the over-generalised effect of 
institutions on economic development.  Our work can be categorised into 2 
ambits: (i) identify the development outcomes and unbundle the specific 
aspects of institutions, and (ii) develop their richer interrelationships between 
institutions and economic development by econometrics. 
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However, like other macroeconomic studies, our work intends to investigate a 
“common” pattern across economies.  This inevitably masks cross-sectional 
heterogeneity.  The taxonomy of institution we used although facilitates the 
understanding of the specific types of institutions, there are many other 
country-specific characteristics that do not fall under such classification.  In 
our estimations, we treat country-specific characteristics as unobserved. In fact, 
understanding the country-specific situation is important for designing growth 
strategies. 
 
Secondly, data limitation is also a major problem.  On one hand, all the 
institutional variables are actually measuring the macroeconomic environment, 
without specific reference to particular sectors or industries.  Variables with 
particular focus at the micro-level may help strengthen further how 
development outcomes interact with the institutional arrangement.  However, 
these are not readily available at this stage.  On the other hand, so far, we only 
have three decades of institutional variables.  Over time, when more data 
come up from different sources, more studies in respect to institutional change 
can be undertaken for checking robustness and sensitivity.     
 
Thirdly, our work does not tie closely with a particular theoretical model. 
Although theoretical foundations suggesting the interrelationship between the 
choices of economic institution and political institutions are available in the 
literature, models that provide a link between how specific aspects of 
economic/political institution affect a particular development outcome (say, 
FDI) are far from unified.  This gives an impression that a coherent theoretical 
model to explain our results is absent.  
 
Despite all these limitations, our research provides empirical basis to identify 
the channels of particular aspects of institutions.  It also helps pin down the 
over-generalised analysis of the relationship between institutions and economic 
development in a more robust manner.  
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6.3 Further Research 
 
In the light of our empirical results and limitations aforementioned, we propose 
the following dimensions for further investigation and for polishing our work: 
 
• Firstly, we could consider a micro-level analysis investigating how 
firm- or sector-level development relates to institutional change. 
Such kind of micro-level investigation has been started in recent 
years.  However, most of these work relate to qualitative analysis 
on one hand and mostly land reform on the other (see Nunn (2009)).  
Empirical work in respect to the manufacturing and services sectors 
remain limited.  As institutional measures are largely macro in 
nature, case studies for specific data needs at sectoral-level may have 
to be built up.  Alternatively, we could also investigate how macro 
institutional arrangement could be differently felt by sectors and 
industries. 
   
• Secondly, a theoretical model to incorporate the bilateral causal 
relationship between democracy and economic reforms may need to 
be considered.  How and why economic reforms are more likely to 
be implemented in democracy have been previously studied in the 
literature.  However, a model to explain the reverse causality is 
perhaps more interesting, especially with reference to the 
experiences of emerging markets like China, where economic 
reforms have taken place but democratisation progress has been 
slow.   
 
• The third is how to formalise institutional quality – regulatory 
environment in particular – as a source of comparative advantage 
which ultimately determines the pattern of capital flow.  Models 
relating institutional quality and trade have been built up by 
Levchenko (2007) and Levchenko (2008).  Models in regard to 
capital flow are rare.  How these institutional differences could be 
reduced (or institutional convergence) after closer market integration 
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could also be empirically tested.  
 
• Finally, on estimating the stochastic production frontier, there is 
considerable merit to extend the measurement beyond 2000.  For 
monitoring international development, we could ideally extract 
continuous information on cross-country economic performances in 
respect to their efficiency change and TFP growth from these 
measurements.   
 
 
 -244- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 -245- 
A.1 Summary Table of Institution and Growth Literature 
 
To summarise the key empirical results, Pande and Udry (2006) provide an 
overview of recent empirical work of institution and growth.  We combine it 
with De Haan, et al. (2006)’s survey on the empirical work on the same subject 
using the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index (i.e. Gwartney, et al. 
(2008)), and augment the list further(1) below for easy reference.  Selection 
criteria is described in Pande and Udry (2006). 
 
 
Article Dependent variable(2) Measure of Institution Instrumental variables 
(I) CORE PAPERS 
Acemoglu, et al. 
(2001) 
Log GDP per capita 
(1995) 
Protection against 
expropriation risk1 
(1985-1995) 
Settler mortality1 
Hall and Jones 
(1999) 
Log output per 
worker1 (1988) 
Index of social 
infrastructure2 which 
combines: 
i. index of government 
antidiversion 
policies3 
ii. index of country's 
openness4 
I. Distance from 
equator2 
II. English speakers3 
III. European-language 
speakers4 
IV. Predicted trade 
share5 
Knack and 
Keefer (1995) 
I. Annual GDP per 
capita growth 
(1974-1989) 
II. Private 
investment/GDP 
(1974-1989) (all 
averages) 
I. ICRG index5 
II. BERI index6 
No IV estimates 
La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, et al. 
(1999) 
Dependent variables 
are classified in five 
groups (data from 
1990s): 
I. Interference with 
private sector 
II. Efficiency 
III. Output of public 
goods 
IV. Size of public 
sector 
V. Political freedom 
I. Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
II. Legal origin 
III. Religion 
No IV estimates 
                                                 
(1) Separately, Acemoglu, et al. (2005) provide a survey of historical account of the effect of 
institution on development.   
(2) Footnotes on outcome variables and institution measures are on separate pages at the end of 
the table.  
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Article Dependent variable(2) Measure of Institution Instrumental variables 
Mauro (1995) I.GDP per capita 
growth (1960-1985) 
II. Investment/GDP 
(1960-1985) 
III. Investment/GDP 
(1980-1985) (all 
averages) 
I. Index of institutional 
efficiency7 
II. Index of 
bureaucratic efficiency8 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization6 
(1960) 
(II)PAPERS EMPLOYING CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATIONS 
Acemoglu, et al. 
(2002) 
I. Log GDP per 
capita (1995) 
II. Urbanization2 
(1995) 
I. Current institutions: 
i. protection against 
expropriation risk 
ii. executive constraints 
in 19909 
II. Early institutions: 
i. executive constraints 
in 1900 
ii. initial executive 
constraints10 
Settler mortality 
Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) 
I. Log GDP per 
capita (1995) 
II. Average 
investment/GDP 
(1990s) 
III. Private 
credit/GDP (1998) 
IV. Average stock 
market 
capitalization3/GDP 
(1990-1995) 
I. Contracting 
institutions: 
i. legal formalism11 
II. Property rights 
institutions: 
i. executive constraints 
ii. protection against 
expropriation risk 
I. Settler mortality 
II. Log of indigenous 
population 
density in 1500
7 
III. legal origin8 
Aghion, et al. 
(2005) 
Average growth rate 
of GDP per capita 
(1960-1995) relative 
to the United States 
I. Private credit12 
II. Liquid liabilities13 
III. Bank assets14 
IV. Commercial-central 
bank15 
I. Legal origin 
II. Settler mortality 
Ciccone and 
Alcala (2004) 
Log GDP per capita 
(1995) 
Index of institutional 
quality16 
I. Settler mortality 
II. European-language 
speakers 
III. Predicted trade 
share12 
Bockstette, 
Chanda, and 
Putterman (2002) 
I. Log output per 
worker (1988) 
II. Average GDP per 
capita growth 
(1960-1995) 
I. Index of social 
infrastructure 
II. ICRG index 
I. Distance from 
equator 
II. English speakers 
III. European-language 
speakers 
IV. Log predicted trade 
share 
V. State antiquity9 
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Article Dependent variable(2) Measure of Institution Instrumental variables 
Clague, Keefer, 
Knack, et al. 
(1999) 
I. Annual per capita 
GDP growth 
(1970-1992) 
II. Output per worker 
(1988) 
III. Capital per 
worker (1988) 
IV. Years schooling 
per worker (1985) 
V.TFP (1988) 
I. Contract-intensive 
money17 
II. ICRG index 
III. BERI index 
I. Colonial origin10 
II. Ethnolinguistic 
homogeneity11 
Djankov, et al. 
(2002) 
I. Deaths from 
(i)intestinal infection 
(ii)accidental 
poisoning 
II. Quality standards 
(no. ISO 9000 
certifications) 
III. Water pollution 
IV. Unofficial 
economy:(i) size/ 
GDP (ii) employment 
V. Product market 
competition 
Number of different 
procedures that a 
start-up has to comply 
with in order to obtain 
a legal status, i.e. to 
start operating as a 
legal entity. 
No IV estimates. 
Esfahani and 
Ramirez (2003) 
I. Growth of GDP per 
capita 
II. Growth rates of 
telephones and power 
production per capita 
I. Adverseness of 
policy environment18 
II. Indices of 
democracy and 
centralization19 
III. Indices of contract 
repudiation, 
bureaucratic quality 
and corruption20 
IV. Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
No IV estimates. 
Glaeser, et al. 
(2004) 
I. Log GDP per 
capita (2000) 
II. Growth rates of 
GDP per capita 
1960-2000, overall 
and by decade 
III. Years schooling 
IV. Political 
institutions 
(III and IV are 5-year 
change) 
Executive constraints I. Settler mortality 
II. Legal origin 
III. Log indigenous 
population 
density in 1500 
Knack and 
Keefer (1997) 
I. Average annual 
growth in per capita 
income (1980-1992) 
II. Investment/GDP 
(1980-1992) 
I. Trust23 
II. Civic norms (civic 
cooperation) 
I. Ethnolinguistic 
homogeneity 
II. % Law students 
1963 
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Article Dependent variable(2) Measure of Institution Instrumental variables 
Kogel (2005) Annual average 
growth rate of TFP 
(1965-1990, panel 
data of 5-year 
averages) 
Index of social 
infrastructure 
I. English speakers 
II. European-language 
speakers 
III. Predicted trade 
shares 
IV. Distance from 
equator 
V. State antiquity 
Masters and 
McMillan (2001) 
Log output per 
worker (1988) 
Index of social 
infrastructure 
I. Distance from 
equator 
II. Predicted trade 
share 
III. English speakers 
IV. European-language 
speakers 
Rodrik (1999) Average dollar wages 
in manufacturing 
(1985-1989) 
I. Political institutions: 
i. two rule of law 
indicators24 
ii. two democracy 
indicators25 
II. Labor market 
institutions: 
i. unionization rate ii. 
number ILO workers' 
rights conventions 
ratified 
I. Dummy for oil 
exporter 
II. Colonial origins 
III. Each measure of 
democracy 
as an instrument for 
the other 
Rodrik, et al. 
(2004) 
Same as Clague, 
Keefer, Knack and 
Olson (1999), except 
they use GDP per 
capita (1995) 
Rule of law index26 I. Settler mortality 
II. European-language 
speakers 
III. Predicted trade 
shares 
(III) PAPERS EMPLOYING PANEL ESTIMATIONS USING FRASER INSTITUTE’S 
ECONOMIC FREDOM INDICIES (EF)
27 
Dawson (1998) GDP per capita 
growth (1975-1990) 
Aggregate Economic 
Freedom Index 
Fixed effects model/ 
No IV estimation 
Nelson and Singh 
(1998) 
GDP per capita 
growth (1970-1989) 
Aggregate Economic 
Freedom Index 
Fixed effects model/ 
No IV estimation 
Paldam, Wurtz, 
and Gorgens 
(2003) 
GDP per capita 
growth (1970-1999) 
Aggregate Economic 
Freedom Index 
Fixed effects model/ 
No IV estimation 
Bengoa and 
Sanchez-Robles 
(2003) 
I. GDP per capita 
growth (1970-1999) 
II. FDI 
Aggregate Economic 
Freedom Index 
Fixed effects model/ 
No IV estimation 
Bhattacharyya 
(2009) 
GDP per capita 
growth (1970-2004) 
Four components of 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
System GMM 
instruments 
(IV) OTHER PAPER EMPLOYING PANEL ESTIMATIONS  
 -249- 
Article Dependent variable(2) Measure of Institution Instrumental variables 
Law and 
Bany-Ariffin 
(2008) 
GDP per capita 
growth  
(1980-2001) 
ICRG’s 5 indicators: 
(1) corruption; (2) rule 
of law; (3) bureaucratic 
quality; (4) government 
repudiation of 
contracts, and (5) risk 
of expropriation 
Difference GMM 
instruments and pooled 
mean group estimation 
 
Source: Pande and Udry (2006), De Haan, et al. (2006) and author’s augmentation. 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
Notes on Outcome Variables: 
1) Output per worker: Output calculated as GDP minus value added in the mining industry (which includes oil and 
gas).  
2) Urbanization:% of population living in urban areas with a population of at least 5,000 in 1995. Source: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators.  
3) Stock market capitalization : Market value of all traded stocks as a % of GDP, average over 1990-95. Source: Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003b) 
 
 
 
Notes on Institution Measures: 
1) Protection against expropriation risk: A measure of risk of expropriation of foreign private investment by 
government, from 0 to 10, where a higher score indicates less risk. Originally used by Knack and Keefer (1995). 
Source: ICRG, Political Risk Services 
2) Index of social infrastructure: Institutions and government policies that provide incentives for individuals and firms 
in an economy. 
3) Index of government antidiversion policies: Created by averaging five indicators following Knack and Keefer (1995) 
for 1986–1995. Two categories relate to government’s role in protecting against private diversion: (i) law and order, 
and (ii) bureaucratic quality. Three categories relate to government’s possible role as a diverter: (i)corruption, (ii) risk 
of expropriation, and (iii) government repudiation of contracts. The index takes values from 0 to 1 (higher is better). 
Source: ICRG, Political Risk Services. 
4) Index of country's openness: Sachs-Warner index which measures fraction years between 1950 to 1994 that the 
economy has been open, measured on a 0-1scale. A country is open if it satisfies the following criteria: (i) nontariff 
barriers cover less than 40% of trade, (ii) average tariff rates are less than 40%, (iii) any black market premium was 
less than 20 % during 1970s and 1980s, (iv) country is not classified as socialist by Kornai (1992), and (v) government 
does not monopolize major exports. Source: Sachs and Warner (1995). 
5) ICRG index: Combines (i) protection against expropriation risk, (ii) rule of law, (iii) repudiation of contracts by 
government, (iv)corruption in government, and (v) quality of bureaucracy. Source: ICRG, Political Risk Services. 
6) Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) index: Combines (i)contract enforceability, (ii) infrastructure 
quality, (iii) nationalization potential, (iv) bureaucratic delays. 
7) Index of institutional efficiency: Combines nine indices of institutional efficiency: political change, political 
stability, probability of opposition group takeover, stability of labor, relationship with neighboring countries, terrorism, 
legal system, red tape, and corruption. Indices are integers between 0-10, higher values indicates that country has 
"good" institutions. All indices are simple country averages for the period 1980-1983. Source: Economist Intelligence 
Unit. 
8) Index of bureaucratic efficiency: Combines three indices used for institutional efficiency measure: judiciary system, 
red tape and corruption indices. 
9) Executive constraints: 1-7 category scale, higher score means more constraints on the executive. Equals one if 
country not independent. Source: Gurr (1997)’s Polity III data set 
10) Initial executive constraints: Executive constraints in the first year that country appears in the Gurr (1997)’s Polity 
III data set. Source: Polity III data set 
11) Legal formalism: Measures number of formal legal procedures necessary to resolve a simple case of collecting on 
an unpaid check or evicting a non-paying tenant (from 1 to 7). "Check measure" and "Eviction measure" from Djankov, 
Glaeser, Porta, et al. (2003a). Source: Djankov, et al. (2002) and Djankov, et al. (2003a). 
12) Private credit: Value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector, divided by GDP. 
13) Liquid liabilities: Currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries, divided by GDP 
14) Bank Assets: Ratio of all credits by banks (but not other financial intermediaries) to GDP. 
15) Commercial-central bank: Ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial plus central bank assets, 
which has been used by others. 
16) Institutional Quality: Combines bureaucratic quality, law/order, and property rights protection indices. Source: 
Political Risk Services (similar to Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999)). 
17) Contract-intensive money: Ratio of noncurrency money to total money supply. An objective measure of 
enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights based on the citizens' decisions regarding the form in 
which they choose to hold their financial assets. 
18) Adverseness of policy environment: Measured by black market premium on the foreign exchange rate. (Barro and 
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Lee (1994)). 
19) Index of democracy: Average of 8 indicators ranking policymaker selection process and the constraints on them. 
Index of centralization: Geographic devolution of state decision-making authority, values of 1 and 3 assigned to federal 
and unitary systems, respectively, and 2 to intermediate categories. Gurr (1997)’s Polity III data set. 
20) Index of contract repudiation: risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of repudiation, postponement, or 
scaling down due to budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government 
economic and social policies. Higher scores indicate lower risks. Index of bureaucratic quality: autonomy from 
political pressure and strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruption in government 
services as well as the existence of an established mechanism for recruiting and training. Higher scores indicate higher 
quality. Index of corruption: indicator of the degree of "improper practices" in the government. The higher the 
indicator, the lower the degree of corruption. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset, Political Risk 
Services. 
21) Index of institutional quality: Measured by scores for corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy for 1990. Three 
different measures are scaled from 1 (worst) through 6 (best). They have followed Rodrik in employing a rescaled 
unweighted average of the three measures. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset, Political Risk 
Services. 
22) Index of democratization: Measured using the "polity" variable in the Polity IV dataset. Autocrats are defined as 
having a polity score less than or equal to 0. Democrats are those leaders with a polity score greater than 0. 
23) Trust: The question used to assess trust in a society is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Trust indicator used by the authors is the percentage of 
respondents in each nation replying “most people can be trusted” (after deleting the “don’t know” responses). 
24) These indicators are: (i) ICRG from Knack and Keefer (1995) (ii) bureaucratic efficiency from (Mauro (1995). 
25) These indicators are: (i) Freedom House Index (a composite index of democracy for the 1970s, constructed from 
the indicators of political rights and civil liberties with a scale from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates a fully democratic system) 
(ii) Polity III (Gurr (1997)) 
26) Rule of law index: Composite indicator of multiple elements that capture the protection afforded to property rights 
and the strength of the rule of law. This is a standardized measure with range -2.5 (weakest institutions) and 2.5 
(strongest institutions). Approximates for 1990’s institutions. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (2002) 
27) Fraser Institue’s Economic Freedom Index.  Source: Gwartney, et al. (2008) 
 
 
Notes on Instruments: 
1) Settler Mortality: Log estimated mortality for European settlers during European colonization (before 1850). It is 
calculated from the mortality rates of European-born soldiers, sailors and bishops when stationed in colonies. It 
measures the effects of local diseases on people without inherited or acquired immunities. Source: Curtin (1989). 
2) Distance from equator: Center of county or province within a country that contains the most people. Source: Global 
Demography Project, University of California, Santa Barbara. 
3) English speakers: Fraction of the population speaking English at birth. 
4) European-language speakers: Fraction of the population speaking one of the five principal languages of Europe 
(English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish) at birth. 
5) Predicted trade share: Log value, based on a gravity trade model that only uses a country’s population and 
geographical features. Source: Frankel and Romer (1999). 
6) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Measures probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will 
not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Source: Taylor and Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators, 1972 
7) Indigenous population density: Population density is calculated as total population divided by land area usable for 
agriculture. Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978). 
8) Legal Origin: Legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (French Commercial Code 
versus English Common Law Origin) Source: La Porta, et al. (1999). 
9) State antiquity: Index for the depth of experience with state-level institutions . Scales from 0 to 1. 
10) Colonial Origin: Dummy variable indicating whether country was a British, French, German, Spanish, Italian, 
Belgian, Dutch or Portuguese colony. Source: La Porta, et al. (1999) 
11) Ethnolinguistic homogeneity: Percentage of a country’s population belonging to the largest ethnic group. Each 
ethnolinguistic group is identified by religion, race, or language depending on which of this appears to be the most 
important cleavage in the given community. Source: Sullivan (1991). 
12) Predicted trade share: A geography-based instrument for trade. They used exactly the same approach with Frankel 
and Romer (1999), except that they employ more bilateral trade data than Frankel and Romer (1999). 
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A.2 Data Description and Sources 
 
i. Variables Used in Chapter 2, 3 and 5 
 
The following table intends to summarise the detailed description of the 
variables used in Chapters 2, 3 and 5, which were briefly discussed in the 
respective Chapters before.  The variables hereby presented are in 
alphabetical order. 
 
 
Variable  Description  Source 
     
ca_open  Index for openness to capital account transactions  Chinn and Ito (2006) 
CREDIT 
 
Index of credit market regulation, ranging from 0 
to 10.  Higher scores mean less credit market 
control.  
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
DEMOC 
 The Democracy indicator is an additive 
eleven-point scale (0-10). Democracy is 
conceived as three essential interdependent 
elements. One is the presence of institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can express 
effective preferences about alternative policies 
and leaders. Second is the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of 
power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of 
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and 
in acts of political participation.  
 
Polity IV Project 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2009) 
EF 
 
Index of economic freedom, ranging from 0 to 
10.  Higher scores mean more economic free. 
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
ER 
 
Real exchange rate (against USD).  
 Penn World Table 
ver 6.2 
fdi_gdp 
 Foreign direct investment (net) as percentage of 
GDP 
 
WDI 
FIN  (see variable fin_open)   
fin_open 
 Volume-based measure of international financial 
integration, calculated by the sum of stock of 
external assets and liabilities as percentage of 
GDP 
 
Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
FREE TRADE 
 
Index of freedom to trade internationally, ranging 
from 0 to 10.  Higher scores mean more open to 
trade. 
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
gcon_gdp 
 Government consumption as percentage of GDP 
(%) 
 Penn World Table 
ver 6.2 
GDPPC_gr 
 Growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(PPP-adjusted) 
 
WDI 
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Variable  Description  Source 
GOVTC 
 
Index of government consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption, ranging from 0 
to 10.  Higher scores mean less government 
consumption. 
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
H  Average years of Schooling of aged 15 or above  Barro and Lee (2001) 
IPOLITY2 
 Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least 
democratic and 10 most democratic. Average of 
Freedom House’s political rights and civil 
liberties indices and Polity IV’s DEMOC (as 
defined above).  
 
Teorell, et al. (2009) 
K_AC 
 
Index of international capital market controls, 
ranging from 0 to 10.  Higher scores mean less 
capital market controls.  
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
KAOPEN  (see variable ca_open)   
LABOR 
 
Index of labour market regulation, ranging from 0 
to 10.  Higher score means less labour market 
controls.  
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
LEGAL 
 The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds 
to ‘no judicial independence’, ‘no trusted legal 
framework exists’, ‘no protection of intellectual 
property’, ‘military interference in rule of law’, 
and ‘no integrity of the legal system’ and vice 
versa.   
The index consists of the following indicators: 
- Judicial independence: The judiciary is 
independent and not subject to interference by the 
government or parties in dispute 
- Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework 
exists for private businesses to challenge the 
legality of government actions or regulations 
- Protection of intellectual property 
- Military interference in rule of law and the 
political process 
- Integrity of the legal system 
 
Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008)  
Lliab_gdp  Total liquid liabilities as percentage of GDP.  Beck, et al. (2009) 
ln(GDPPC)  Natural log of GDP per capita.  WDI 
ln(invest_gdp) 
 
Investment as percentage of GDP (ln) 
 Penn World Table 
ver 6.2 
ln(trade_gdp)  Total trade as percentage GDP (ln)   WDI 
POP  Natural log of population.   WDI 
pop_gr  Population growth rate  WDI 
QOG 
 The mean value of the ICRG variables of 
“Corruption”, “Law and Order” and 
“Bureaucracy Quality”, scaled 0-1.  Higher 
values indicate higher quality of government. 
 
Teorell, et al. (2009) 
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Variable  Description  Source 
REG 
 The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 is the most 
regulated.  The index consists of the following 
indicators: 
- Credit Market Regulations: corresponds to ‘low 
percentage of deposits held in privately owned 
banks’, ‘high foreign bank license denial rate’, 
‘private sector’s share of credit is close to the 
base-year-minimum’, ‘deposit and lending rates 
is fixed by the government and real rates is 
persistently negative’. 
- Labor Market Regulations: corresponds to ‘high 
impact of minimum wage’. 
- Business Regulations: corresponds to 
‘widespread use of price controls throughout 
various sectors of the economy’, and ‘starting a 
new business is generally complicated’. 
 
Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
SCHOOLING 
 Average schooling years in the total population 
aged 25 and over. 
 
Barro and Lee (2001) 
SM 
 The index ranges from 0-10 where 0 corresponds 
to 'high annual money growth’, ‘high variation in 
the annual rate of inflation’, ‘high inflation rate’, 
and ‘restricted foreign currency bank accounts’ 
and vice versa.  The index consists of the 
following indicators: 
- Average annual growth of the money supply in 
the last five years minus average annual growth 
of real GDP in the last ten years 
- Standard inflation variability in the last five 
years 
- Recent inflation rate 
- Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts 
domestically and abroad 
 
Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
TAX 
 
Index of top marginal tax rate, ranging from 0 to 
10.  Higher score means lower tax rates. 
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
TRANSFER 
 
Index of transfer and subsidies as percentage of 
GDP, ranging from 0 to 10.  Higher scores mean 
less transfer and subsidies. 
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
TRADE  Total trade (exports and imports) to GDP  WDI 
XCONST 
 Constraint on Chief Executive.  Index ranges 
from 0 – 10.  Higher Score means more 
constraints, implying better protection of private 
property rights. 
 
Polity IV Project 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2009) 
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ii. Variables Used in Chapter 4 
 
 
Variable  Description  Source 
     
Dependent Variable 
lnfdi 
 
Natural log of (FDI outward stock +0.3).  FDI is 
expressed in current million USD.  
 OECD International 
Direct Investment 
Statistics 
 
Independent Variables 
Border  Dummy for having common border.  Rose (2004) 
Business reg 
 
Economic Freedom Index of business regulation, 
0-10, higher score denotes less burdensome 
business environment 
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
Colonyij  Dummy for the pair ever in colonial relationship.  Rose (2004) 
Common coloniser  Dummy for the pair even had common colonizer.  Rose (2004) 
Common lang  Dummy for having common language.  Rose (2004) 
Credit reg 
 
Economic Freedom Index of credit regulation, 
0-10, higher score denotes less regulatory burden 
on the credit market 
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
GDPi   
GDPj  
GDP (constant 2000 US$) of economy i and j 
respectively.   
WDI 
Island  No. of island nations in the pair.  Rose (2004) 
Labor reg 
 
Economic Freedom Index of labour regulation, 
0-10, higher score denotes less regulatory burden 
on the labour market 
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
Landlock 
 Dummy for the number of economy in the pair is 
landlocked (0 / 1 / 2). 
 
Rose (2004) 
ln(Areaij)  Log product of land areas of the pair.  Rose (2004) 
ln(Dist) 
 Log of geographical distance between the capital 
cities of the two economies. 
 
Rose (2004) 
POPi   
POPj  
Population of economy i and j respectively 
 
WDI 
REG 
 
Economic Freedom Index of regulation, 0 -10, 
higher score denotes less regulatory burden.  
 Fraser Institute ‘s 
Economic Freedom 
of the World Report 
Gwartney, et al. 
(2008) 
RTA 
 Dummy for bilateral regional trade agreement. 1 
= yes, 0 otherwise.  
 Rose (2004) and 
WTO 
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iii. Components of the Regulation Index (REG) of the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Report 
 
 
A. Credit market regulations (Credit Reg) 
i. Ownership of banks: percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks 
ii. Competition: domestic banks face competition from foreign banks 
iii. Extension of credit: percentage of credit extended to private sector 
iv. Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative 
real interest rates 
 
B. Labor market regulations (Labour Reg) 
i. Impact of minimum wage: the minimum wage, set by law, has little 
impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed 
ii. Hiring and firing practices: hiring and firing practices of companies are 
determined by private contract 
iii. Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining 
iv. Mandated cost of hiring 
v. Mandated cost of worker dismissal 
vi. Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel 
 
C. Business regulations (Business Reg) 
i. Price controls: extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices 
ii. Administrative conditions and new businesses: administrative procedures 
are an important obstacle to starting a new business 
iii. Time with government bureaucracy: senior management spends a 
substantial amount of time dealing with government bureaucracy 
iv. Starting a new business: starting a new business is generally easy 
v. Extra payments/bribes: irregular, additional payments connected with import 
and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, 
police protection or loan applications are very rare 
vi. Licensing restrictions: Time in days and monetary costs required to obtain a 
license to construct a standard warehouse 
vii. Cost of tax compliance: Time required per year for a business to prepare, file, 
and pay taxes on corporate income, value added or sales taxes, and taxes on labor.  
 
 
 
Source: Gwartney, et al. (2008) 
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A.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrices 
 
The following is the descriptive statistics and correlation matrices of key 
variables used in each Chapter.  Descriptive statistics of the same variables 
may differ due to different sample size. 
 
i. Chapter 2 Data 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Key Variables      
      
GDPPC_gr 1101 0.0163  0.0458  -0.4288  0.3237  
      
DEMOC 986 3.9782  4.1208  0  10  
LEGAL 664 5.3639  1.9251  1.1500  9.3340  
IPOLITY2 1189 5.3734  3.4537  0  10  
QOG 625 0.5488  0.2351  0.0556  1.0000  
XCONST 1006 0.1601  14.2511  -88.0000  7.0000  
      
REG 699 5.4414  1.1096  2.4700  8.7600  
SM 800 6.5251  2.2143  0.0000  9.8633  
SCHOOLING 715 4.7890  2.9261  0.0420  12.2470  
      
Control Variables      
      
fdi_gdp 956 0.0303  0.1276  -0.0528  3.5772  
pop_gr 1375 0.0181  0.0165  -0.1605  0.1773  
fin_open 865 1.7679  6.5469  0.1195  179.2779  
ca_open 1037 -0.0657  1.4480  -1.8081  2.5408  
lliab_gdp 840 0.4439  0.3376  0.0084  3.0226  
      
gcon_gdp 1143 23.5662  11.3795  2.5525  79.5660  
ln(trade_gdp) 1075 4.1823  0.6104  0.8215  5.9644  
ln(invest_gdp) 1143 2.4376  0.6801  -0.0657  4.5148  
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 GDPPC_gr DEMOC LEGAL IPOLITY2 QOG XCONST REG SM SCHOOLING 
Lagged 
ln(GDPPC) 
GDPPC_gr 1          
DEMOC 0.0627 1         
LEGAL 0.2585 0.5181 1        
IPOLITY2 0.0713 0.9717 0.5463 1       
QOG 0.2014 0.5742 0.8768 0.5767 1      
XCONST 0.1616 0.2917 0.3219 0.2609 0.367 1     
REG 0.2321 0.3741 0.4496 0.4165 0.4159 0.1684 1    
SM 0.1725 0.2457 0.4578 0.2541 0.4351 0.1707 0.4611 1   
SCHOOLING 0.1479 0.6487 0.7006 0.6767 0.7633 0.2917 0.4132 0.3771 1  
Lagged 
ln(GDPPC) 
0.0507 0.5626 0.6907 0.5373 0.7403 0.2505 0.436 0.4232 0.8356 1 
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ii. Chapter 3 Data 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
DEMOC 1283 4.0748 4.1998 0 10 
IPOLITY2 1193 5.5610 3.4911 0 10 
EF 688 5.7346 1.1754 2.30 8.78 
ln(GDPPC) 1254 7.5600 1.5562 4.03 10.85 
GOVTC 934 6.1040 2.2231 0 10 
      
TRANSFER 736 7.6944 2.2268 0 10 
TAX 657 4.4072 3.0687 0 10 
FREE TRADE 871 6.1158 1.6058 1.35 9.78 
K_AC 852 3.3595 3.2159 0 10 
CREIDT 938 6.2549 2.6917 0 10 
      
LABOR 390 5.2107 1.4963 1.84 8.92 
SCHOOLING 907 4.4722 2.9035 0.04 12.25 
gcon_gdp 1320 22.5158 11.2597 2.97 76.14 
ER 1496 653.25 16237.44 0 625218.5 
POP 1571 15.1253 2.1114 9.91 20.99 
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 DEMOC IPOLITY2 EF ln(GDPPC) GOVTC TRANSFER TAX  
DEMOC 1        
IPOLITY2 0.9715 1       
EF 0.4582 0.4867 1      
ln(GDPPC) 0.5557 0.5353 0.6229 1     
GOVTC -0.1812 -0.1756 -0.1866 -0.4758 1    
TRANSFER -0.5379 -0.5095 -0.2276 -0.5897 0.4276 1   
TAX -0.1157 -0.1191 0.313 -0.0139 0.0997 0.3478 1  
FREE TRADE 0.4669 0.4521 0.7742 0.6088 -0.3633 -0.3815 0.2061  
K_AC 0.5266 0.5037 0.7026 0.5593 -0.1921 -0.3391 0.269  
CREIDT 0.4809 0.5187 0.7536 0.4749 -0.1469 -0.1014 0.2895  
LABOR -0.0207 -0.0079 0.3288 -0.0011 0.0616 0.3601 0.3116  
SCHOOLING 0.6391 0.6617 0.5936 0.8311 -0.3899 -0.6148 -0.0719  
gcon_gdp -0.1251 -0.0529 -0.2243 -0.2052 -0.2168 -0.0857 0.0094  
ER 0.0303 0.0077 -0.0011 0.0089 0.0206 0.0325 0.0153  
POP 0.1068 -0.0995 -0.1221 -0.1345 0.2145 -0.1117 -0.1576  
         
 
FREE  
TRADE 
K_AC CREIDT LABOR SCHOOLING gcon_gdp ER POP 
FREE  
TRADE 
1        
K_AC 0.7597 1       
CREIDT 0.5699 0.5297 1      
LABOR 0.1132 0.2166 0.2674 1     
SCHOOLING 0.5916 0.5968 0.4057 0.2161 1    
gcon_gdp -0.0692 -0.1446 -0.1301 -0.0142 -0.1137 1   
ER 0.0285 0.0326 0.0094 -0.0218 0.0009 -0.0158 1  
POP -0.0897 0.014 -0.2005 -0.0797 0.0357 -0.3062 0.0489 1 
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iii. Chapter 4 Data 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Key Variables      
      
lnfdi 16183 4.74018 3.538921 -1.20397 12.80514 
ln(GDPi) 38350 26.12662 1.566639 22.47594 30.05582 
ln(GDPj) 38170 25.44979 1.572495 22.13669 30.05582 
ln(POPi) 38940 16.49722 1.525094 12.39255 19.51595 
ln(POPj) 38940 16.78246 1.685671 12.39255 20.99329 
      
ln(Dist) 34869 7.882756 1.03274 4.764804 9.416901 
Landlock 34869 0.258625 0.467534 0 2 
Colonyij 34869 0.028048 0.165112 0 1 
Common Lang 34869 0.113855 0.317639 0 1 
Common Coloniser 34869 0.000803 0.028326 0 1 
      
Island 34869 0.263386 0.473608 0 2 
Border 34869 0.043649 0.204316 0 1 
ln(Areaij) 34869 24.90223 2.657506 14.33099 32.76884 
RTA 38940 0.093452 0.291068 0 1 
REG 17193 6.128058 1.150347 2.4732 8.764566 
      
Credit Reg 17282 7.495658 2.006974 0 10 
Labour Reg 15255 5.285696 1.336855 1.837167 8.9195 
Business Reg 13472 5.921909 1.404228 3 9 
      
Instrumental Variables     
      
religionj 35024 .4077816 .2312489 .0035 .8603 
ethnici 35024 .3389358 .2269986 .0119 .8505 
longitudej 36960 22.07841 63.03241 -112.103 172.8989 
UK legal originj 38940 .2677966 .4428167 0 1 
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  lnfdi ln(GDPi) ln(GDPj) ln(POPi) ln(POPj) ln(Dist) Landlock Colonyij Common Lang 
Common 
Coloniser 
Island Border 
lnfdi 1            
ln(GDPi) 0.5672 1           
ln(GDPj) 0.3662 -0.0054 1          
ln(POPi) 0.3907 0.8921 -0.0123 1         
ln(POPj) 0.1428 -0.0103 0.6561 -0.0144 1        
ln(Dist) -0.1249 0.1075 0.0684 0.1081 0.2544 1       
Landlock -0.1916 -0.2920 -0.0720 -0.2426 -0.1552 -0.3075 1      
Colonyij 0.1698 0.0826 0.0290 0.0752 0.0171 -0.0247 -0.0695 1     
Common Lang 0.2177 0.1069 0.0771 0.0703 0.0692 0.0856 -0.1218 0.3175 1    
Common Coloniser 0.0076 -0.0369 -0.0233 -0.0145 -0.0170 -0.0716 0.1056 -0.0048 -0.0102 1   
Island -0.0755 -0.0916 -0.0772 -0.1596 -0.1818 0.3586 -0.1544 -0.0219 0.0691 -0.0158 1  
Border 0.1914 0.0171 0.0877 0.0246 -0.0096 -0.4215 0.1376 0.1329 0.1320 0.1327 -0.1188 1 
ln(Areaij) 0.2182 0.3435 0.3477 0.3614 0.5613 0.3930 -0.3593 0.0209 0.1030 -0.0302 -0.0092 -0.0434 
RTA 0.2861 0.0907 0.2123 0.0484 -0.0197 -0.3665 -0.1095 0.0250 0.0076 -0.0097 -0.1567 0.1847 
REG 0.1412 0.0445 0.1039 0.0141 -0.3280 -0.0013 0.0870 0.0278 0.1003 -0.0011 0.1588 0.0038 
Credit Reg 0.1379 0.0421 0.0795 0.0122 -0.3109 -0.0825 0.0711 0.0194 0.0518 0.0013 0.1120 0.0406 
Labour Reg 0.0654 0.0125 0.0203 0.0041 -0.0456 0.2162 0.0337 0.0381 0.1396 0.0011 0.1750 -0.0880 
Business Reg 0.1268 0.0021 0.0644 0.0054 -0.4929 -0.0939 0.0558 0.0209 0.0694 -0.0139 0.1662 0.0283 
 
 
 
  ln(Areaij) RTA REG Credit Reg Labour Re Business Reg 
ln(Areaij) 1      
RTA -0.1034 1     
REG -0.2328 0.1344 1    
Credit Reg -0.2164 0.1707 0.8225 1   
Labour Reg -0.0643 -0.1233 0.6743 0.3028 1  
Business Reg -0.2693 0.1778 0.8113 0.5538 0.2957 1 
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iv. Chapter 5 Data 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
ln(Y) 648 17.3428  1.9759  12.6472  22.9634  
ln(K) 648 17.6750  2.3077  11.7310  23.7777  
ln(L) 648 15.1636  1.6502  11.4135  20.4427  
      
      
QOG 368 0.5749  0.2488  0.0556  1  
LEGAL 520 5.3408  1.9411  1.1500  9.6200  
LEGAL*H 473 34.4196  26.2418  0.9831  111.2123  
REG 543 5.5105  1.0569  2.5900  8.7600  
REG2 543 31.4804  11.6833  6.7081  76.7376  
      
REG*H 495 32.4934  19.6351  2.4780  100.6699  
SM 582 6.3968  2.3054  0  9.8430  
SM*H 532 37.9806  28.2863  0  117.8021  
DEMOC 613 4.4928  4.1925  0  10  
DEMOC* H  538 33.9340  36.1709  0  120.4900  
      
H 551 5.3354  2.8176  0.2610  12.0490  
FINOPEN 576 1.4912  6.2675  0.1422  147.5670  
TRADE 617 64.4729  37.4159  7.9800  270.7900  
KAOPEN 615 -0.2430  1.3212  -1.8081  2.5408  
FDI 598 1.6521  3.4464  -5.3796  51.4763  
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 QOG LEGAL 
LEGAL*  
H 
REG REG2 
REG*  
H 
H DEMOC 
DEMOC  
 *H 
FINOPEN TRADE KAOPEN FDI SM SM*H 
                
QOG 1.000               
LEGAL 0.889 1.000              
LEGAL* H 0.857 0.886 1.000             
REG 0.501 0.534 0.559 1.000            
REG2 0.519 0.549 0.587 0.990 1.000           
REG* H 0.747 0.735 0.930 0.693 0.721 1.000          
H 0.736 0.708 0.924 0.470 0.494 0.949 1.000         
DEMOC 0.596 0.584 0.649 0.476 0.475 0.650 0.636 1.000        
DEMOC* H 0.761 0.720 0.878 0.510 0.524 0.865 0.862 0.880 1.000       
FINOPEN 0.112 0.128 0.269 0.135 0.148 0.316 0.272 0.143 0.208 1.000      
TRADE 0.215 0.255 0.174 0.394 0.410 0.257 0.193 0.140 0.152 0.347 1.000     
KAOPEN 0.543 0.562 0.616 0.557 0.579 0.625 0.510 0.398 0.521 0.386 0.226 1.000    
FDI 0.223 0.252 0.247 0.341 0.357 0.285 0.192 0.080 0.164 0.368 0.425 0.189 1.000   
SM 0.500 0.502 0.520 0.497 0.508 0.532 0.447 0.336 0.443 0.102 0.245 0.620 0.254 1.000  
SM*H 0.754 0.743 0.908 0.578 0.604 0.919 0.892 0.600 0.825 0.327 0.243 0.685 0.286 0.754 1.000 
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A.4 List of Economies 
 
i. Country Coverage of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of 
the World Report in Chapter 2 
 
Albania  Denmark  Latvia  Romania 
Algeria  Dominican Rep.  Lesotho  Russia 
Angola  Ecuador  Lithuania  Rwanda 
Argentina  Egypt  Luxembourg  Senegal 
Armenia  El Salvador  Macedonia  Serbia   
Australia  Estonia  Madagascar  Sierra Leone 
Austria  Ethiopia  Malawi  Singapore 
Azerbaijan  Fiji  Malaysia  Slovak Rep 
Bahamas  Finland  Mali  Slovenia 
Bahrain  France  Malta  South Africa 
Bangladesh  Gabon  Mauritania  South Korea 
Barbados  Georgia  Mauritius  Spain 
Belgium  Germany  Mexico  Sri Lanka 
Belize  Ghana  Moldova  Sweden 
Benin  Greece  Mongolia  Switzerland 
Bolivia  Guatemala  Montenegro  Syria 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Guinea-Bissau   Morocco  Taiwan 
Botswana  Guyana  Mozambique  Tanzania 
Brazil  Haiti  Myanmar  Thailand 
Bulgaria  Honduras  Namibia  Togo 
Burkina Faso  Hong Kong  Nepal  
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Burundi  Hungary  Netherlands  Tunisia 
Cameroon  Iceland  New Zealand  Turkey 
Canada  India  Nicaragua  Uganda 
Central Afr. Rep.  Indonesia  Niger  Ukraine 
Chad  Iran  Nigeria  Unit. Arab Em. 
Chile  Ireland  Norway  United Kingdom 
China  Israel  Oman  United States 
Colombia  Italy  Pakistan  Uruguay 
Congo, Dem. R.  Jamaica  Panama  Venezuela 
Congo, Rep. Of  Japan  Pap. New Guinea  Vietnam 
Costa Rica  Jordan  Paraguay  Zambia 
Cote d'Ivoire  Kazakhstan  Peru  Zimbabwe 
Croatia  Kenya  Philippines   
Cyprus  Kuwait  Poland   
Czech Rep.  Kyrgyz Republic  Portugal   
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ii. Country Coverage in Chapter 3 
 
All-time 
Democracy 
All-time 
Autocracy 
More 
democratic 
More 
autocratic 
Regime 
changes 
Armenia Unit. Arab Em. Albania Zimbabwe Argentina 
Australia Azerbaijan Benin  Central Africa. Rep. 
Austria Burundi Bangladesh  Chile 
Belgium Bahrain Bulgaria  Congo, Rep. Of 
Botswana China Bolivia  Ghana 
Canada Cameroon Brazil  Guinea-Bissau  
Switzerland Algeria Cote d'Ivoire  Haiti 
Colombia Egypt Ecuador  Malaysia 
Costa Rica Gabon Spain  Nigeria 
Cyprus Iran Greece  Nepal 
Czech Rep. Jordan Guatemala  Pakistan 
Germany Kuwait Guyana  Peru 
Denmark Morocco Croatia  Turkey 
Dominican Rep. Myanmar Hungary  Zambia 
Estonia Oman Indonesia   
Finland Rwanda Kenya   
Fiji Singapore South Korea   
France Syria Madagascar   
United Kingdom Chad Mexico   
Georgia Togo Mali   
Honduras Tunisia Malawi   
Ireland Tanzania Niger   
India Uganda Nicaragua   
Israel Vietnam Panama   
Italy Congo, Dem. Rep. Philippines   
Jamaica  Poland   
Japan  Portugal   
Sri Lanka  Paraguay   
Lithuania  Romania   
Latvia  Senegal   
Macedonia  Sierra Leone   
Mongolia  Thailand   
Mozambique  Taiwan   
Mauritius  Uruguay   
Namibia     
Netherlands     
Norway     
New Zealand     
Pap. New Guinea     
Russia     
El Salvador     
Slovak Rep     
Slovenia     
Sweden     
Trinidad & Tobago     
Ukraine     
United States     
Venezuela     
South Africa         
 
Notes: 
Economies are classified as all-time democracy (autocracy) if they continuously score 5 or 
above (less than 5) in DEMOC during the sample period.  
Economies are classified as more democratic (autocratic) if they switched from autocracy 
(democracy) to democracy (autocracy) during the sample period, i.e. from scores of less than 5 
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to 5 or above (from scores of 5 or above to less than 5). 
Economies are classified as regime changes if they experienced more than one switch of 
political regime during the sample period.   
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iii. Country Coverage in Chapter 4 
 
 
OECD Economies (as Destination and/or Source Economies) 
Australia  Finland  Ireland  New Zealand  Spain  
Austria  France  Italy  Norway  Sweden  
Belgium  Germany  Japan  Poland  Switzerland  
Canada  Greece  Luxembourg  Portugal  Turkey  
Czech Republic  Hungary  Mexico  Republic of Korea  United Kingdom  
Denmark  Iceland  Netherlands  Slovakia  United States of America  
     
Non–OECD Economies (as Destination Economies) 
Argentina  Costa Rica  India  Morocco  Russian Federation  
Brazil  Croatia  Indonesia  Nigeria  Singapore  
Bulgaria  Cyprus  Israel  Pakistan  South Africa  
Chile  Egypt  Latvia  Peru  Thailand  
China  Estonia  Lithuania  Philippines  Ukraine  
Colombia  Hong Kong  Malaysia  Romania  Viet Nam  
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iv. Country Coverage in Chapter 5 
 
 
Economy Code^ Income group^ 
OECD Economies  
Australia AUS High income 
Austria AUT High income 
Belgium BEL High income 
Canada CAN High income 
Switzerland CHE High income 
Denmark DNK High income 
Spain ESP High income 
Finland FIN High income 
France FRA High income 
United Kingdom GBR High income 
Greece GRC High income 
Ireland IRL High income 
Iceland ISL High income 
   
Italy ITA High income 
Japan JPN High income 
Korea, Republic of KOR High income 
Luxembourg LUX High income 
Netherlands NLD High income 
Norway NOR High income 
New Zealand NZL High income 
Portugal PRT High income 
Sweden SWE High income 
United States of America USA High income 
   
East Asia and Pacific   
China CHN Lower middle income 
Fiji FJI Upper middle income 
Indonesia IDN Lower middle income 
Malaysia MYS Upper middle income 
Philippines PHL Lower middle income 
Papua New Guinea PNG Low income 
Thailand THA Lower middle income 
Taiwan TWN High income 
   
Latin America and Caribbean   
Argentina ARG Upper middle income 
Bolivia BOL Lower middle income 
Brazil BRA Upper middle income 
Chile CHL Upper middle income 
Colombia COL Lower middle income 
Costa Rica CRI Upper middle income 
Dominican Republic DOM Lower middle income 
Ecuador ECU Lower middle income 
Guatemala GTM Lower middle income 
Honduras HND Lower middle income 
Haiti HTI Low income 
Jamaica JAM Upper middle income 
Mexico MEX Upper middle income 
Nicaragua NIC Lower middle income 
Panama PAN Upper middle income 
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Economy Code^ Income group^ 
Peru PER Lower middle income 
Paraguay PRY Lower middle income 
El Salvador SLV Lower middle income 
Uruguay URY Upper middle income 
Venezuela VEN Upper middle income 
   
Sub-Saharan Africa   
Burundi BDI Low income 
Benin BEN Low income 
Burkina Faso BFA Low income 
Botswana BWA Upper middle income 
Central African Republic CAF Low income 
Cote d`Ivoire CIV Low income 
Cameroon CMR Lower middle income 
Congo, Republic of COG Lower middle income 
Comoros COM Low income 
Cape Verde CPV Lower middle income 
Ethiopia ETH Low income 
Gabon GAB Upper middle income 
Ghana GHA Low income 
Guinea GIN Low income 
Gambia, The GMB Low income 
Guinea-Bissau GNB Low income 
Kenya KEN Low income 
Lesotho LSO Lower middle income 
Madagascar MDG Low income 
Mali MLI Low income 
Mozambique MOZ Low income 
Mauritania MRT Low income 
Mauritius MUS Upper middle income 
Malawi MWI Low income 
Niger NER Low income 
Nigeria NGA Low income 
Rwanda RWA Low income 
Senegal SEN Low income 
Sierra Leone SLE Low income 
Chad TCD Low income 
Togo TGO Low income 
Tanzania TZA Low income 
Uganda UGA Low income 
South Africa ZAF Upper middle income 
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR Low income 
Zambia ZMB Low income 
Zimbabwe ZWE Low income 
   
South Asia   
Bangladesh BGD Low income 
India IND Lower middle income 
Sri Lanka LKA Lower middle income 
Nepal NPL Low income 
Pakistan PAK Low income 
   
Middle East and North Africa   
Algeria DZA Lower middle income 
Egypt EGY Lower middle income 
Iran IRN Lower middle income 
Jordan JOR Lower middle income 
Morocco MAR Lower middle income 
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Economy Code^ Income group^ 
Syrian Arab Republic SYR Lower middle income 
Tunisia TUN Lower middle income 
   
Europe and Central Asia   
Turkey TUR Upper middle income 
   
Others   
Barbados BRB High income 
Cyprus CYP High income 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ High income 
Hong Kong HKG High income 
Israel ISR High income 
Singapore SGP High income 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO High income 
   
 
Note ^ : Country code and income group classifications are based on World Bank Country 
Classification.  
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A.5 List of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) 
 
 
Abbreviation Name of RTA
(3)
  
Member countries 
(Date of Entry into Force) 
AZCERTA 
Australia – New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement 
 Australia, New Zealand 
(1983) 
EEC/EC 
European Union  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
 (1994) 
NAFTA 
Canada-US Free Trade 
Arrangement / North 
America Free Trade 
Agreement 
 Canada, United States, Mexico. 
(1994) 
SPARTECA 
South Pacific Regional 
Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 
 Covers trade relations between the 
Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, 
Papua, Papua-New Guinea, 
Salomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, on the one hand, 
and Australia and New Zealand on 
the other. 
(1981) 
APTA – China 
Asia Pacific Trade 
Agreement – Accession of 
China 
 Korea, China 
(2002) 
EFTA - Mexico 
  Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Mexico 
(2001) 
New Zealand - 
Singapore 
  New Zealand, Singapore 
(2001) 
EFTA - Croatia 
  Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Croatia 
(2002) 
Japan - Singapore 
  Japan, Singapore 
(2002) 
CEFTA –Croatia 
Central European Free 
Trade Agreement - 
Accession of Croatia 
 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Croatia 
(2003) 
EFTA - Singapore 
  Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Singapore 
(2003) 
Singapore - Australia 
  Singapore, Australia 
(2003) 
Turkey - Croatia 
  Turkey, Croatia 
(2003) 
                                                 
(3) RTA also includes bilateral trade agreement here.  
 -272- 
Abbreviation Name of RTA
(3)
  
Member countries 
(Date of Entry into Force) 
EFTA - Chile 
  Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Chile 
(2004) 
Republic of Korea – 
Chile 
Republic of Korea – Chile  Korea, Chile 
(2004) 
US - Chile 
  United States of America, Chile 
(2004) 
US - Singapore 
  United States of America, 
Singapore 
(2004) 
Japan - Mexico 
  Japan, Mexico 
(2005) 
Thailand - Australia 
  Thailand, Australia 
(2005) 
US -Australia 
  United States of America, 
Australia 
(2005) 
EFTA – Republic of 
Korea 
EFTA – Republic of Korea  Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Korea 
(2006) 
Japan - Malaysia 
  Japan, Malaysia 
(2006) 
Republic of Korea – 
Singapore 
Republic of Korea – 
Singapore 
 Korea, Singapore 
(2006) 
 
Source: WTO 
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A.6 Diagnostic Tests for Estimations in Chapter 4 
 
i. F-test for FE vs. OLS Estimations 
 
An F-test is used to test for the existence of individual effects.  Test for the 
two-way error component model is similar to the one-way model.  Given time 
effects, the null hypothesis assumes 
 
0...: 110 === −NuuH     given 0≠tδ for 1,...1 −= Tt . 
 
The unrestricted residual sum of squares (URSS) is the Within residual sum of 
squares.  However, the restricted residual sum of squares (RRSS) is based on 
the regression 
 
)()()( ... tittittit xxyy ννβ −+−=−  where ittiit u εδν ++= . 
 
The F-ratio used for the test is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )kNNTURSS
NURSSRRSS
kNNTNF
−−
−−
=−−−
)(
1
,1  
 
where k is the number of regressors.  F-test results of our FE models are 
presented below:  
 
Model FE(1) FE(2) FE(3) FE(4) 
F-stat 
F(1516, 7678 ) 
= 32.15 
F( 1516, 7679 ) 
= 33.05 
F( 1511, 7440 ) 
= 33.60 
F( 1562, 7001) 
=36.14 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conclusion Reject OLS Reject OLS Reject OLS Reject OLS 
 
Note: Conclusion does not change when using inter-OECD and intra-OECD samples. 
  
 
ii. Breusch and Pagan test for RE vs. OLS Estimations 
 
Breusch and Pagan. (1980) have devised a Lagrange multiplier test for RE 
model based on the OLS residuals. The test hypothesis is  
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 :   
 
 :   
 
 
The test statistic is described below.  Under the null hypothesis, the limiting 
distribution of LM is chi-squared with one degree of freedom.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
Breusch and Pagan test results on the RE models are show below:  
 
Model RE(1) RE(2) RE(3) RE(4) 
chi2(1) 13088.37 13476.41 12523.16 12246.28 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conclusion Reject OLS Reject OLS Reject OLS Reject OLS 
 
Note: Conclusion does not change when using inter-OECD and intra-OECD samples.  
 
 
iii. Hausman Specification Test  
 
The specification test devised by Hausman (1978) is used to test for 
orthogonality of the common effects and the regressors.  The test is based on 
the hypothesis of no correlation.  Under the null hypothesis, both OLS 
estimations in the FE model and GLS in the RE model are consistent, but OLS 
is inefficient.  Under the alternative, OLS is consistent, but GLS is not. 
Therefore, under the null hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ 
systematically. The covariance matrix of the difference vector ]ˆ[ β−b  is  
 
 ]ˆvar[ β−b  ],ˆcov[]ˆ,cov[]ˆvar[]var[ bbb βββ −−+=   
 
where b and βˆ  are estimates obtained from OLS and RE respectively.  
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Hausman’s result is that the covariance of an efficient estimator with its 
difference from an inefficient estimator is zero, which implies  
 
]ˆ),ˆcov[( ββ−b  ]ˆvar[]ˆ,cov[ ββ −= b  0=  
That said, ]ˆvar[ β−b  ]ˆvar[]var[ β−= b  ψ=  
 
The chi-squared test is based on the Wald’s criterion: 
 
W  ]1[2 −= Kχ  ]ˆ[ˆ]ˆ[ 1' βψβ −−= − bb  
 
For ψˆ , one can use the estimated covariance matrices of the slope estimator in 
the FE model and the estimated covariance matrix in the RE model, excluding 
the constant term. Under the null hypothesis, W has a limiting chi-sq. 
distribution with 1−K  degrees of freedom.  Hausman specification test 
results on the four key baseline panel models are as shown below: 
 
Models FE(1) vs. RE(1) FE(2) vs. RE(2) FE(3) vs. RE(3) FE(4) vs. RE(4) 
Wald chi2 (15) 249.21 251.73 203.89 235.96 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conclusion Prefer FE Prefer FE Prefer FE Prefer FE 
 
Note: Conclusion does not change when using inter-OECD and intra-OECD samples.  
 
For IV estimation, Hausman specification test can also used to test whether 
REG is endogenous, i.e. correlated with the disturbance term in our model.  
Under the null hypothesis, there is no correlation between the two.  If this is 
the case, estimators of both least squares and IV are consistent.  Under the 
alternative hypothesis, only the IV estimator is consistent.   
 
Models IV(1) vs. RE(1) IV(2) vs. RE(2) IV(3) vs. RE(3) IV(4) vs. RE(4) 
Wald chi2 (28) 26.61 104.65 4.13 71.29 
Prob > chi2 0.5396 0.0000 1.000 0.0000 
Conclusion cannot reject H0 reject H0 cannot reject H0 reject H0 
 
 
 
iv. Test for Autocorrelation 
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In a linear panel model framework, Wooldridge (2000) proposes to use the 
residuals from a regression in first-differences.  While first-differencing the 
data in the model removes the individual-level effect, the term based on the 
time-invariant covariates and the constant becomes 
 
yit − yit−1 = (Xit − Xit−1) β1 + εit − εit−1 
∆yit = ∆Xitβ1 +∆εit 
 
where ∆ is the first-difference operator. 
 
Wooldridge’s procedure begins by estimating the parameters β1 by regressing 
∆yit on ∆Xit and obtaining the residuals êit.  If the εit are not serially correlated, 
then Corr(∆εit, ∆εit−1) = −0.5.  Given this, the procedure regresses the residuals 
êit from the regression with first-differenced variables on their lags and tests 
that the coefficient on the lagged residuals is equal to −0.5 by using F-test.  
Our test results are at below.  The null hypothesis of no serial correlation is 
strongly rejected.   
 
Model RE(1) RE(2) RE(3) RE(4) 
F-stat F(1,1248) =141.397 F(1,1248)=140.798 F(1,1244)=133.776 F(1,1244)=133. 620 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conclusion Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
 
Note: Standard errors account for clustering within the panels. Conclusion does not change 
when using inter-OECD and intra-OECD samples.  
 
 
v. Sargan-Hansen Test on Instruments Validity  
 
A Sargan-Hansen test of over-identification restrictions is used to test the 
exogeneity of the instruments, i.e. the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term, and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the 
estimated equation.  In short, under the null hypothesis, the instruments are 
valid.  The test results are shown in the IV estimation results table at Table 
 4.5.3-1 – Table  4.5.3-3.  The test results conclude that we cannot reject the 
exogeneity of the instruments.   
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A.7 Summary Table of Time-Varying Technical Efficiency Models 
 
 
General Form : ititittit uvxy −++= βα
'
 
Model 
Time Trend and TE 
Specification 
Additional Parameters Error Form Assumptions Estimation Technique 
Cornwell, et al. (1990) 
2
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